




Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2017

Social Inclusion Monitor Europe














Daniel Schraad-Tischler, Christof Schiller,
Sascha Matthias Heller, Nina Siemer

EU Social Justice Index 2017




Social Justice Index


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- II Equitable education
- III Labor market access
- IV Social cohesion and non-discrimination
- V Health
- VI Intergenerational justice




Annotation: Scores on a scale from 1 to 10. Higher Scores = better performance. For further information see "Methodology" (chapter 3). Source: Own calculations.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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I. Key findings, in brief

1. Europe is recovering not only economically, but also in the domain of social justice

After years of downward movement, an upward trend in the domain of social justice is evident in the broad majority of EU member states. Although far from all member states have regained their pre-crisis levels, the most recent EU Social Justice Index data give cause for hope that the worst is over not just in economic terms, but also from a social perspective. At the top of this year's Social Justice Index are the northern European states of Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Rounding out the top group are the Czech Republic, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany, while Greece, despite again posting slight gains this year, remains clearly in last place.


Labor market recovery as a driver of social improvements

Recovery in the labor market has been the primary driver of improved participation opportunities in the EU. Job opportunities have improved in 26 of the 28 states as compared to the previous year. Recent data show the unemployment rate as a cross-EU average to have fallen to 8.7%. In 2013, at the height of the social crisis, this was 11% on a cross-EU basis (2008: 7%). An upward trend is also evident for the employment rate, which has risen from 64.1% (2013) to 66.6% (2016). An additional positive sign is that the recovery in the labor market has visibly reached the countries hit hardest by the crisis, even if the overall volume of joblessness remains very high particularly in southern Europe. In Greece, for example, the unemployment rate has fallen from 27.7% (2013) to 23.7% (2016), while in Spain a decline from 26.2% to 19.7% has been evident in the same time period. Among the countries that suffered from the euro crisis, Ireland and Portugal have shown the strongest recoveries. Alongside improved economic trends, these countries' recent labor market reforms have also begun to bear fruit. Even if both countries remain below their pre-crisis levels, developments have been positive. For example, in Ireland, the unemployment rate of 13.3% in 2013 has since fallen to 8.1%. A similar trend is evident in Portugal, where the unemployment rate has declined significantly from 17% to 11.5% in the same time period.

Youth-unemployment rates in southern Europe have also dropped back somewhat from the absolute record levels seen in past years. In Greece, for example, this rate has fallen from nearly 60% in 2013 to its current level of 47.3%. A similar picture appears in Spain, with a decline from 55.5% to 44.4%. In Italy, the youth-unemployment rate is now 37.8% – a decline of nearly five percentage points from its peak of 42.7% in 2014. However, youth-unemployment rates in all three crisis-struck countries remain around twice as high as before the crisis. Overall, the youth-unemployment rate EU-wide has fallen from 23.6% in 2013 to a current rate of 18.7%. As a trend, this is a welcome development. However, it cannot be regarded as a full recovery, as the youth-unemployment rate as an overall cross-EU average is still above the pre-crisis level (2008 EU average: 15.6%). Particularly in the southern European countries, the share of young people being left behind by the labor market remains far too great.

FIGURE 1 EU Social Justice Index (weighted)


Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 2 Social Justice Index – dimensions and indicators



The poverty risk is falling slightly – yet the gap between northern and southern Europe remains large

As a result of this overall positive employment trend, the risk of poverty and social exclusion has also fallen slightly across the European Union. While a total of 24.7% of the EU population faced this threat at the height of the social crisis in 2012/2013, this is now “only” 23.4%, according to the most recent data. However, the social gap between northern and southern Europe remains very large, as many of the crisis-struck states continue to tread water or show only very minimal forward progress with regard to poverty prevention. For example, the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Greece still sits at a shockingly high 35.6%, followed by 27.9% in Spain and 28.7% in Italy. As a comparison,

in Denmark, Finland and the Czech Republic – the three best-scoring countries in the area of poverty prevention – the corresponding shares are only between 16.7% and 13.3%.

For certain societal groups such as children and youth, the risk of poverty and social exclusion remains significantly higher; indeed, 26.5% of children and youth EU-wide are at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In countries such as Greece and Spain, this rate remains very high, with the countries showing respective ratios of 37.5% and 32.9%. It is particularly alarming that in Greece, the share of children suffering from severe material deprivation has even risen again, to a current level of 26.7%. This share has thus almost tripled since 2007 (9.7%). Material deprivation means that the people affected are undergoing conditions of severe hardship, and can no longer afford fundamental necessities of daily life (for example, an adequately heated apartment or a telephone). In the other crisis-struck southern European countries, by contrast, the rate of severe material deprivation among children has again fallen slightly. Thus, these countries follow the overall trend for this important indicator: EU-wide, the rate of material deprivation among children and youth has now fallen from its peak in 2012 (11.8%) to a current rate of 8.6%.


There remains a very large gap between young and old, with the share of children and youth suffering under so-called severe material deprivation being significantly higher as a cross-EU average than the corresponding share among the older population. The difference is a full three percentage points (8.6% as compared to 5.4%). However, in comparison to the previous year, the gap between the generations has become somewhat smaller, after increasing significantly in the course of the crisis. This latter effect was due to the fact that in most countries, pensions and old-age provisions for older people did not fall as significantly as the incomes of the younger population. Now, since younger people are clearly benefiting slightly from the better labor market and economic situation, the distance between old and young is shrinking somewhat.

The fact that the situation for younger people has again improved somewhat can be deduced from the so-called NEET rate as well as from the falling youth-unemployment trends. This indicator (NEET stands for “not in education, employment or training”) offers a particularly clear reflection of problems in the transition between the education system and the labor market. Young people who are completely outside the labor market and the education system find themselves in a very precarious situation, which radically limits future opportunities for those affected. At a cross-EU average rate of 16.7%, the share of young people between 20 and 24 years of age who are not in school, employment or training is certainly still above the pre-crisis level (2008: 15%), but the overall trend is positive. Even in the crisis-struck southern European states, the share of young people in this situation has declined – from about 31.3% in 2013 to 23% in Greece today, from 26.3% to 21.2% in Spain, from 27.2% to 19.6% in Croatia, and from 20.6% to 17.2% in Portugal, all during the same time period. Only Italy shows a rather small decline – here, the NEET rate remains at a startlingly high level of 29.1%. Thus, Italy retains a clear last place within this indicator. In contrast to the southern European countries, the lowest NEET rates can be found in the Netherlands (6.9%), Malta (8.1%) and Denmark (8.5%).

The summary of key indicators addressing opportunities for children and young people, which collectively constitute our sub-index on this topic, clearly reflects the division of countries in the Social Justice Index more generally.¹ Here, Denmark, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden perform best. At the other end of the spectrum are the southern and southeastern European countries of Spain, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. However, it can be expected that with the continuation of the labor market recovery, the gap between northern and southern Europe will once again shrink, as will differences regarding participation opportunities both for the overall population and for children and youth specifically.

FIGURE 3 Child and youth opportunity index

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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1 Four key indicators are included in the sub-index presented here: The number of children and youth under 18 that are at risk of poverty or social exclusion; the influence of socioeconomic background on educational outcomes; the rate of early school leavers; and the so-called NEET rate, which captures all young people that are not employed or taking part in any form of education or training. For more details, see the Methodology chapter in the full study, accessible at www.sgi-network.org.

Improvements in education indicators too, but stagnation with regard to intergenerational justice

In the majority of member states, a certain improvement with respect to educational opportunity is evident as compared to previous years' surveys. For example, the share of young people leaving school before graduating has declined EU-wide in comparison to previous years – from 14.7% in 2008 to 10.7% today. However, countries continue to show significant discrepancies regarding this indicator; for example, while Lithuania and Slovenia have a rate of under 5%, the most recent corresponding values for Malta and Spain remain at nearly 20%. However, the long-term trend remains positive.

The country distribution is also quite heterogeneous with regard to the indicator measuring influence of socioeconomic background on educational outcomes. Here, alongside the Nordic countries of Finland and Denmark, the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia are also well positioned, as their educational systems accord children even from socially weak families opportunities equal to those of children from socially better-placed families. Remarkably, however, Cyprus, Spain and Italy also perform well in this regard. However, education quality as measured by students' PISA results is higher particularly in Finland and Estonia. It is precisely these two countries that demonstrate that justice and quality in the educational system can go hand in hand. By contrast, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and France show the largest shortcomings with regard to the relationship between social background and educational outcomes.

Finally, it must be emphasized that a number of worrisome developments are evident in countries with populist governments. In Hungary, which has seen a series of controversial educational reforms in recent years, the relationship between social background and educational outcomes has grown significantly stronger over the past years. In Poland too, the new right-conservative government has reversed important reforms implemented by its predecessors, which had in previous years contributed to a significant improvement in educational opportunities and educational quality.

The EU is stagnating in the domain of intergenerational justice, both as an overall average as well as in individual countries. This is a worrisome sign with regard to the European Union's future sustainability, as aging societies mean younger generations will feel the burden of a lack of sustainability and high debt levels more strongly. The share of people who are no longer of working-age and thus are dependent on younger generations has significantly increased in most EU countries.

In addition, the debt levels of many member states, despite minimal improvements in the overall EU average between 2013 and 2016, remain very high. The discrepancies within the EU are enormous; while the best-placing Estonia, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 9.5%, is the only country that can once again boast a single-digit value for the first time since 2010, Greece remains stuck with a record-setting mountain of debt totaling 181.3% of GDP. Nor have the other countries at the lower end of the spectrum – such as Italy, Portugal and Cyprus (all with values over 100% of GDP) – achieved any reduction in their indebtedness in comparison to the previous year. The most significant improvements have been

shown by Germany, which was able to reduce its national debt by 13 percentage points between 2010 and 2016, to 67.7% of GDP. The north-south division of the EU visible throughout this indicator thus gives further cause for concern: Despite improvements in the labor market, the countries marked by crisis have still not managed to reduce the financial burden they are bequeathing to future generations, while the already well-situated countries are having fewer problems with this issue. Factors such as this, along with the already relatively high rates of youth unemployment, increase the probability of emigration among the younger generation's well-educated ranks (a so-called brain drain), again with negative consequences for the economy and society. The fact that investment in research and development is effectively stagnant in cross-European comparison is thus also problematic. EU countries can prepare for the future only with sustainable, innovative solutions.

In many countries, reforms are also necessary with regard to the future living conditions of older people, as a downward slide looms if no changes are made. As an overall trend, the rate of old-age poverty has not yet increased. However, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Croatia show just how devastating insufficiently reformed pension systems can be for future developments. All four countries have demonstrated labor market improvements and have emerged from the worst of the crisis; however, each has now been confronted by an extremely high and steadily increasing risk of poverty and social exclusion for the over-65 population. In Latvia, which brings up the rear in this indicator's rankings, the share of older people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has risen from 33% in 2011 to 43.1% today. Nor is Germany, with a corresponding increase from 14.8% in 2010 to 18.3% today, excluded from this trend. For the future, social-security systems must not only secure the standard of living of today's elderly, but also better address the increasingly interrupted employment histories of the currently young and middle generations. Otherwise, these individuals will be at greater risk of poverty in old age than is already the case today.

2. A step in the right direction:

The new European Pillar of Social Rights

This year, the EU Commission launched a comprehensive framework for ensuring social justice within all member states in the form of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The document's focus is on the protection and rights of workers, as well as of population groups that cannot participate in employment. The goal is to harmonize social conditions in the various member states, enable all citizens to participate socially and economically according to their capabilities, and protect all members of the population against poverty and social exclusion. In this way, the EU should be better prepared for the future.

Overall, a multidimensional approach is needed in order to provide for greater equity of participation in Europe. There is quite clearly no panacea here able to solve all problems. Even the new European Pillar of Social Rights cannot do this, as it is initially focused on very general and fundamentally formulated rights and principles. However, the formulation of the pillar is a very important step toward giving member states an obligation to create better social conditions and opportunities.

Given the very different welfare-state systems and concepts in the individual EU member states, each government must find its own, inevitably context-sensitive solutions. The EU Pillar of Social Rights formulates 20 principles that correspond very strongly with the dimensions of our Social Justice Index. Taken together, the individual objectives of the European Pillar and the present index could serve very well as a general orientation aid helping to identify reform necessities in particularly important areas. In the promotion of social justice, the following aspects are of particular significance:

- **Poverty prevention:** As outlined above, children and young people in the EU remain disproportionately affected by poverty. With its new Pillar, the EU establishes the right to be protected from poverty as a child, and particularly emphasizes that children within disadvantaged groups are entitled to targeted support in order to improve their prospects. In our previous SJI analyses, young migrants and – even outside the eastern European countries – the children of the Roma minorities show a particularly striking need for support. The northern European countries in particular offer a positive example of how child poverty can be quite effectively fought if socially disadvantaged groups receive targeted support through a functioning tax-and-transfer system. However, both in the 20 principles of the new European Pillar and in our study, it is clear that financial measures are not the only factor for addressing child poverty over the long term. Rather, if sustainable remedy is to be achieved, it is important to invest in equality of opportunity both in the education system and the labor market.
- **Equitable access to education:** Investment in high-quality early-childhood education is a key instrument for providing equal participation opportunities. This idea is also reflected in the Pillar of Social Rights, with affordable, high-quality early-childhood education and care declared to be a right for every child. The EU further emphasizes the right to high-quality education, training and lifelong-learning, which helps lead to success and flexibility in the labor market, and enables people to participate fully in societal life. With regard to the issues addressed in the EU principles, many studies show that integrative school systems, in which students stay together for long periods of time rather than being divided into age-based school classes after only a few years, are a better alternative with regard to individual learning outcomes and educational equity. An additional effective means of providing for greater quality and equity in education can be the targeted employment of highly qualified teachers in high-risk schools, enabling individual support for children with special needs. In general, to minimize the negative influence of socioeconomic background on educational outcomes, it is important that socially weaker families receive targeted support allowing them to invest in good education, for instance through the reduction of fees for preschools and whole-day schools.
- **Labor market access:** Nearly all EU states must take on the challenge of creating incentives for a high employment level, while at the same time facilitating the transition from precarious to secure employment. In this area, the principles of the EU Pillar of Social Rights are very specific: Governments should be required to support job searchers with individualized, ongoing support, and after 18 months at the latest, perform a detailed analysis jointly with the

affected individuals examining what causes and solutions might personally exist for them. This takes into account the fact that long-term unemployment represents one of the greatest risk factors with regard to poverty. The share of long-term unemployed individuals within the EU population as a whole has improved since 2013, falling from 5.2% to 4.1% today. However, it remains significantly above the pre-crisis level (2008: 2.6%). The current total comprises almost half of all unemployed people in the EU. With regard to the fight against youth unemployment too, which remains a serious problem particularly in the crisis-struck southern European countries, the EU member states must make greater efforts. This applies to improving vocational training, further reducing the number of early school-leavers, and better facilitating the transition from the education system into the labor market. There is frequently a great discrepancy between the demands of the labor market and the skills made available by the education system. The “youth guarantee” anchored in the new EU Pillar represents one step in the right direction. Improved cross-border labor mobility is also an important factor, which – as required in the EU Pillar of Social Rights – should go along with the right to transfer social-insurance entitlements and the implementation of continuing-education programs. Furthermore, an efficient cross-border approach is necessary, which should include improved cooperation between national employment agencies and the reduction of bureaucratic hurdles to the mutual recognition of educational and professional qualifications.

- **Social cohesion and nondiscrimination:** Great economic and social inequities not only impair sustainable growth, but also have a negative effect on social cohesion within a society. An effective anti-discrimination legislative regime (and its implementation) is a critical factor in increasing equality of opportunity. The EU Pillar of Social Rights addresses this issue at rather general level, but makes clear that everyone has the right to protection against discrimination and unequal treatment, and that opportunities for underrepresented groups should be promoted. Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, show model anti-discrimination policies according to the criteria considered in the current study. In addition, a coherent and effective integration and immigration policy is essential given the realities of demographic change. Most EU states are increasingly dependent on immigration in order to compensate for negative economic effects induced by societal aging. Integration policy must thus work toward opportunities for equal access for migrants within labor markets and education systems, while opening effective pathways with regard to issues such as family reunification, the expansion of political-participation opportunities, and naturalization. However, in many places this is threatened by nationalist-populist currents that are gaining strength within individual countries. If the EU countries were to act in solidarity, the large number of refugees could also become a definite opportunity for Europe.
- **Health:** Poor health conditions and health-related inequities generate high social and economic costs. Public health measures must thus aim at achieving high-quality health care for the largest possible portion of the population, at the lowest possible cost. In this year’s Social Justice Index, Sweden, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands perform best overall in this regard. In addition to political measures to create equitable access opportunities, an additional focus should be placed on the aspect of prevention. If effective health


care is achieved, health care systems will see significant financial relief and individual health statuses will improve. Overall, it must be borne in mind that opportunities for societal and economic participation are not limited only by structural inequities within a health care system, but also by individual health statuses, which depend in turn on the factor of healthy or unhealthy lifestyles.

- **Intergenerational justice:** Against the background of the present survey, various policy measures promoting intergenerational justice can be grouped, including improved opportunities for families through investment in the child-care infrastructure, reduction of the public debt, and the expansion of the renewable-energy share. The Nordic states in particular stand out with regard to intergenerationally just policy activity, with policy strategies that support young people and families with exemplary preschool, whole-day school and flexible parental-leave offerings. Their successful approach to combining parenting and working life thus offers a model for political reform in other countries.

The dimensions and political fields of activity for strengthening social justice described here are correlated with one another, and indeed are often mutually interdependent. Poor educational opportunities, for example, lead to impaired labor market prospects, and thus also less opportunity to earn a higher income. Parents with low incomes can in turn invest less in the education of their children – with the subsequent danger of a vicious circle emerging. This is why it is so important that EU member states and EU institutions take a holistic look at the causes of social injustice, its effects, and opportunities for political intervention on the issue. This is now happening with the new European Pillar of Social Rights, and it is to be hoped that the member states regard the goals formulated in this document as a binding standard for their policy. Because one thing is certain: Material prosperity and economic performance alone are not sufficient to produce social justice, as the distribution of countries in the following two graphics clearly shows.

FIGURE 4 Social Justice 2017 and GDP per capita 2016

Unit: Social Justice Index score / GDP per capita, PPP




Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 5 Social Justice 2008 and GDP per capita 2007

Unit: Social Justice Index score / GDP per capita, PPP



Source: Own calculations.

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II. Dimensions of social justice: empirical findings 2017

1. Poverty prevention

The most recent Eurostat data suggests that the Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands – countries where “only” 13.3 to 16.7% of the population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion – continue to demonstrate the most success in preventing poverty. In the EU overall, the percentage of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion has fallen once again and stands at 23.4%. However, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, the EU’s three worst-performing countries in this regard, register a whopping 35.6% to 40.4%.


In Greece, the risk of poverty and social exclusion has remained stubbornly high at 35.6% since 2013. This fact underscores the ongoing dramatic state of social affairs in the country. In Spain, where far-reaching structural reforms have yielded improvements in some economic indicators, the percentage of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion has, according to the most recently available Eurostat data, been reduced to 27.9% after having peaked at 29.2% in 2014. However, pre-crisis values of 23.3% in 2007 are still far out of reach. The country experts for Spain assess the latest developments as follows: “Those at a higher risk of marginalization include immigrants, unemployed youth and elderly people with minimal pensions. Particularly serious is the child-poverty rate of nearly 30%, according to different reports published by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights or the Spanish statistical authority (INE). Women (in particular those in precarious employment and heading a single-parent family) are more vulnerable than men. Finally, the share of employed people living under the poverty threshold is also very high, one of the worst cases in the EU. Two back-to-back recessions (2008 – 2009 and 2010 – 2013) further impoverished vulnerable households and broadened the gap between the poorest and wealthiest sectors of the population (...) The combined impact of economic difficulties (rising unemployment rates along with cuts in salaries and benefits) and austerity measures (affecting health care, education, social services and disabled-person support programs) have exacerbated marginalization. The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion for the 2013 – 2016 period has clearly proved insufficient, and privately run social organizations have been unable to fill the service-provision gap.”²

Sweden registers the most dramatic increase in the overall risk of poverty and social exclusion compared to previous years (2007: 13.9%; 2015: 16%; 2016:

2 Molina, Ferret, and Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 6 Poverty prevention

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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18.3%). The country experts highlight the most recent challenges facing the Swedish welfare state: “If we compare Sweden with other countries, we find that recent developments challenge the country’s historical position as a leader in the public provision of welfare through wealth redistribution and as a country with extremely low levels of poverty. Together, the data and recent developments suggest that Sweden is gradually losing its leading role in these respects and is today largely at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and income distribution.”³

Developments in Poland show, by contrast, the most positive trend in this regard. Indeed, Poland stands out as an exception within the EU, as the risk of poverty and social exclusion has fallen steadily from 34.4% in 2007 to its current rate of 21.9%. The country experts credit both the current and the previous government

3 Pierre, Jochem and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

for these improvements: “Social inequalities have visibly declined since the early 2000s. This has partly been due to Poland’s strong economic performance and the EU structural funds which were predominantly aimed at helping less-developed regions and relatively poor households. In addition, previous governments have been successful in mitigating regional disparities through regional-development policies. Moreover, government policies have helped improve families’ financial conditions, especially those suffering from poverty, and have increased average educational attainments. The most dramatic pockets of poverty have shrunk, and income inequality has fallen substantially since the early 2000s. In-depth sociological studies have shown that poverty in Poland is not inherited across generations. Still, the PiS was able to capitalize on looming popular dissatisfaction with social inclusion in the country. By raising family allowances and increasing the minimum wage, the PiS government has contributed to a further decline in social inequality.”⁴

FIGURE 7 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, total population

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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4 Matthes, Markowski, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

In sharp contrast to Poland and despite its excellent labor market performance, Germany has in recent years made little headway in mitigating the risk of poverty and social, as some 19.7% of the total population is currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2013: 20.3%).

FIGURE 8 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, children (0-17)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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Of particular concern is the fact that the risk of poverty among children and youth is significantly higher than that for the total population in the EU. While the EU average for the risk of poverty and social exclusion among the total population is 23.4%, the EU average for children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion – though it has declined somewhat – remains alarmingly high at 26.5%. In most southern European crisis countries, we've observed a slight reduction in this rate. For example, in Spain, the share of children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion currently stands at 32.9% as compared to 34.4% in 2015. Slight reductions have also been recorded in Greece (2015: 37.8%; 2016: 37.5%) and Portugal (2015: 29.6%; 2016: 27%).

In the countries with the best rates for this indicator – Finland, Denmark, and Slovenia – trends are mixed. We see positive changes since the economic and financial crisis in Denmark (2016: 13.8%; 2013: 15.4%) and Slovenia (2016: 14.9%; 2013: 17.5%). In Finland, however, we see an increase in the poverty rate among children from 13% (2013) to 15.6% (2014), with most recent figures showing only modest improvements (2016: 14.7%). Sweden, on the other hand, significantly dropped in the ranking, featuring a 19.9% risk of poverty and social exclusion among children and youth as compared to 14% in the previous year. Despite its excellent labor market performance since the crisis, Germany has also failed to bring about any major reduction in child poverty and has actually seen its rate increase from 18.5% in 2015 to a current 19.3%. As is the case in many other EU states, there are, however, profound regional differences with regard to poverty rates for children in Germany. Children in single-parent households, for example, are disproportionately affected by poverty and social exclusion.

Also worth noting is the fact that stark generational imbalances – an issue addressed in previous SJI editions – persist: figures for the risk of poverty and social exclusion among the 65+ generation are, once again, far lower than those for children and youth.

Whereas an average of 17.7% of senior citizens EU-wide are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, 26.5% of children and youth across the EU are at risk. This can be accounted for in part by the fact that throughout the crisis, pensions in most countries have not shrunk as much as incomes among younger generations. This is most vivid in the case of Spain, where the share of children and youth at risk of poverty and social exclusion is still more than two times higher than that of senior citizens. On this latter point, Spain is even doing relatively well in comparative terms; the country is at 14.4%. In several countries, therefore, intra-familial redistribution and cross-generational support again play an increasingly important role in the overall national welfare mix. In direct comparison to the 2015 data, however, the EU average risk of poverty for children and youth declined slightly, while the average for seniors indeed rose. If we look exclusively at the aspect of relative income poverty among senior citizens, Spain features a rate (13%) lower than countries such as Sweden (16.8%), Germany (17.6%) and Slovenia (17.6%).

However, there are also notable exceptions among the EU countries, where old-age poverty is an even more pressing issue than child poverty. Croatia, in addition to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shows the most dramatic results – all four of them are at the bottom of the 2016 evaluation as they feature a larger percentage that is at risk of poverty both compared to the previous year and to 2013. Croatia, with its current old-age poverty rate (income poverty) of 27%, features a pension politics that is representative of these four countries, as described by the country experts: “Like some other East-Central European countries, Croatia introduced a three-pillar pension system with a mandatory second pillar in the late 1990s. The average effective replacement rate for pensions is around 40%, partially due to the fact that many pensioners retire early. As a result, pensioner poverty is rather high in Croatia. The rules for calculating benefits are generally equitable. However, war veterans enjoy strong privileges, and inequalities between cohorts have been introduced through irregular supplements that have reflected the electoral cycle. As a consequence of the aging of the population, the low general employment rate and the decline in the effective retirement age,

FIGURE 9 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, seniors (65+)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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the system is neither fiscally sustainable nor intergenerationally fair. The public pension fund has shown a persistent deficit, which represents a significant risk to the stability of the system.”⁵

In Estonia, today more than one-third (2016: 40.2%; 2015: 35.8%; 2013: 24.4%) of persons aged 65 or over are at the risk of poverty, which marks a dramatic increase from the previous year. Estonia thus registers by far the worst results in the EU when it comes to old-age poverty. The Estonia country experts explain: “Old-age pension benefits are indexed, which guarantees slight annual increases based on social tax revenues and the cost of living. In 2016, this indexation resulted in an average pension-payment increase of 5.7%. Due to the low absolute level of benefits (€396 per month), elderly people still struggle to make ends meet. Because

5 Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

wages and salaries grow faster than pensions, the poverty rate among the elderly has increased in 2015. Despite modest pension expenditures (roughly 5.5% of GDP), the sustainability of Estonia's pension system is at risk. State pension-insurance expenditure persistently exceed social tax revenues, and according to the state budget strategy, the annual deficit will reach €474 million in 2017. A recent OECD report (2016) revealed that Estonian pension funds performed worst among the OECD countries during a 10-year period by showing negative annual productivity as 2.2%. Furthermore, the present pension system does not encourage people to work longer – 12% of old-age pensioners have retired before the nominal age. In order to face these financial challenges, government has initiated several reform plans such as making retirement age flexible and revising the regulations for pension funds. The latter is aimed at increasing competition between pension funds and bringing administrative costs down.”⁶

The second-largest share of old people at risk of poverty (income poverty) in the EU is found in Latvia, where the share more than doubled from 17.6% in 2013 to 38.1% in 2016. Lithuania, where the at risk of poverty rate among the elderly increased from 19.4% in 2013 to 27.7% in 2016, is planning to reform its pension system: “The European Commission has recommended adopting a comprehensive reform of the pension system. In 2016, the Lithuanian parliament approved a new ‘social model,’ which includes three major changes to the state social insurance pillar. First, the basic part of the pension will be state financed, while the individual part of the pension will depend on social security contributions and be financed from the Social Security Fund. Second, clear pension indexation rules will be introduced, linking pension rises to average increases in the wage fund. Third, the mandatory period a person has to work before qualifying for a pension will be gradually increased from 30 to 35 years by 2027. These changes were expected to take effect from 2018, though the new coalition government may reserve the reforms.”⁷

As these examples demonstrate, the figures for those at risk of poverty and social exclusion – an EU headline indicator – are comprised of several indicators. It therefore makes sense to look more closely at the specific items comprising this composite indicator in order to gain a fuller, more differentiated understanding of poverty in individual countries. It is particularly important to look at the aspect of severe material deprivation, which refers to the share of persons who cannot afford the basic goods and activities of daily life.

Notably, this problem is far less pronounced in the wealthy countries of northern Europe. In Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria, the share of those subjected to severe material deprivation ranges from 0.8% to 3%. Over the past few years, these figures have remained rather stable in these countries. Estonia has, in recent years, managed to halve material deprivation among children and youth in particular. The country now numbers among a middle group consisting of Germany, France, the Czech Republic, the UK, Slovenia and Belgium with somewhat higher rates of severe material deprivation (3.7% – 5.5%). Malta stands out as having made the most significant gains in reducing this rate, halving its share from 8.1% in 2015 to 4.4% in 2016.

6 Toots, Sikk, and Jahn, (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

7 Nakrosis, Vilpisauskas, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 10 Severe material deprivation, total population

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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Greece, however, continues to lose ground on this key indicator. Since the onset of the crisis, the country's share of those affected by severe material deprivation has nearly doubled and stands currently at a disturbingly high 22.4%.

There is, however, some encouraging news on this issue in Bulgaria, which has made significant headway in battling severe material deprivation. Nonetheless, with a share of 31.9% (2015: 34.2%), the southeast European country clearly continues to rank at the bottom on this indicator. The country experts for Bulgaria see poverty as an ongoing problem, among both the general population and the elderly: "There is a general level of dissatisfaction with the state of society, which can be explained by the loss of subjective security during the transition to a market economy, the inability of state social policies to replace social networks disrupted by the transition, and the unfavorable international comparison in terms of material deprivation and poverty rates... While the pension system substantially reduces poverty among the elderly, the poverty rate among senior citizens remains high from a

comparative perspective. The Bulgarian pension system also suffers from a lack of intergenerational fairness and fiscal sustainability. Given the present demographic dynamics and the existing system's configuration, both the implicit public-pension debt and the real pension burden will increase significantly over time.”⁸

A look at the rate of severe material deprivation for children and youth (i.e., 0–17 years of age) reveals similar findings and trends. Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg are among the top performers here. Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Estonia and France follow at ranks 6 to 10. Overall – and similar to the at risk of poverty or social exclusion indicator – the rate of severe material deprivation is higher among children and youth than it is among the total population. While on average the rate of severe material deprivation for children and youth has further decreased in the EU, this is clearly not the case in every

FIGURE 11 Severe material deprivation, children (0-17)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014 or 2015; f: 2016)

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8 Granev, Popova, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

country. In Greece, for example, the rate among children and youth increased again to a horrifying 26.7% this year, and in Romania it rose back up to 30.2%. Bulgaria fares even worse with 36.1% on this issue, despite some notable improvements in the past few years.

The average EU-wide rate of severe material deprivation among children and youth is significantly higher than the corresponding rate among senior citizens (8.6% and 5.4%, respectively). In the Nordic countries, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands and the UK, material deprivation among senior citizens is rare with rates ranging between 0.3% and 1.2%. Material deprivation among senior citizens is, however, a huge issue in such countries as Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, which show a range of 15.2% to 37.5%. Among the lower ranks, Latvia has managed to steadily improve on this measure, down from 35.8% in 2008 to 14.9% in 2016. While this is still high, the improvement as such is remarkable. The country experts also note positive trends due to government

FIGURE 12 Severe material deprivation, seniors (65+)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014 or 2015; f: 2016)

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regulations, yet also see pitfalls for future developments: “The social safety net includes a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) program addressing the needs of unemployed people and at-risk population groups. The minimum GMI benefit has since been increased, but responsibility for financing the program has been transferred from central to local government. This has undermined the program’s financial sustainability, and as the economy has recovered, a gradual phase-out is being considered. However, the GMI benefit remains in place for 2016.”⁹ Though this is not the case in Latvia, where severe material deprivation of minors has gone down to 11.9%, the situation among children and youth in many European countries is far worse. In Spain, again, almost three times as many children and youth as senior citizens face material deprivation. This demonstrates once again how Spain’s older citizens have suffered less under the impact of the crisis and the government’s austerity measures than have the country’s younger citizens.

FIGURE 13 Population living in quasi-jobless households

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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9 Terauda, Auers, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.


Overall, since 2014, we see slight, yet continuous improvements across the EU with regard to poverty prevention. Nonetheless, close to one-fourth of the total EU population continues to face the risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e., 117.5 million people). Neither EU leaders nor policymakers in individual EU member states should accept this generational gap. Indeed, the alarmingly high rate of children living in poverty in southern Europe's crisis states is in urgent need of attention.

2. Equitable education

The northern European states of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as Slovenia, Lithuania and Estonia perform very well in terms of granting equal access to education. Latvia has joined the ranks of top-performing countries in this year's

FIGURE 14 Equitable education

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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ranking, thanks to the considerable improvements made there since 2016. Poland and Croatia, however, no longer number among the top performers.

It should be noted that significant differences in individual indicators exist across each of these countries. Students' socioeconomic background has the least impact on learning success in Latvia and Estonia, with Cyprus topping the ranking for the first time in 2015 (the most recent PISA evaluation). The United Kingdom, Denmark and Spain also perform relatively well in this regard, with all three of them showing considerable improvements since 2012. Estonia not only ensures fair conditions in educational access, but also demonstrates equity of instruction quality throughout the country's education system, as measured by students' proficiency levels. Whereas Finland's performance with regard to the impact of student's socioeconomic background has worsened somewhat since 2012, the country continues to show convincing overall educational results.

Country experts highlight several strengths of Estonia's education system, including "the small number of low achievers and low school-level variance in student achievement. Enrollment rates at various education levels, including life-long-learning courses, are above the international average. Moreover, Estonia has already reached some of the EU's Education and Training 2020 (ET 2020) headline targets, and is close to the target level in other areas."¹⁰ In Finland, we continue to see a similar state of affairs. However, the country experts also point to a number of new challenges, which need to be tackled in the near future: "By and large, Finland's education system is successful, and Finland has ranked at the top of the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment in recent years. However, Finland's ranking appears to be slipping as gender and regional disparities in student performance are growing significantly. (...) On 1 August 2016, new curricula for compulsory basic education was introduced. The curricula are designed to increase equality in compulsory education, enhance pupil participation in goal setting and evaluation, and integrate more technology in teaching. While the curricula reflect more thoroughly the growing needs of a knowledge society, it has been criticized for the short period of transition involved with implementing it and the lack of resources and training for teachers. Additionally, restrictions on the right to day care for children whose parents are not participating in the labor market undermine equal access to early education, especially in socially vulnerable families. This change in education policy is likely to decrease the quality and diminish the successes of the Finnish educational system."¹¹

With respect to public expenditure on early-childhood education, Sweden and Denmark hold lead positions within the EU. In contrast, the United Kingdom, Greece and Ireland spent the least on preschool education. Despite Sweden's strong showing in the overall ranking, the country's educational performance is not uniformly successful. For example, the country experts note that in the most recent surveys, "(...) the trajectory of Sweden's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) rankings suggests a consistent, steep decline in performance (...) Critics also point to the high level of youth unemployment, which suggests that the education system fails to provide skills and knowledge demanded by the contemporary labor market. A final criticism is that the skills required to enter

¹⁰ Toots, Sikk, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹¹ Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 15 Socioeconomic background and student performance

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006, 2012, or 2015; b: 2009, 2012, or 2015; c: 2012 or 2015; d: 2012 or 2015; e: 2012 or 2015; f: 2015).

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into a teachers' education program at universities today are relatively low, hence there is very little competition to enter those programs. As a result, new teachers may have only a limited aptitude to teach successfully (...). Nevertheless, equitable access to education is realized to a great extent for adult education. Sweden is rather successfully targeting the ambitious goals of lifelong-learning as a high percentage of adults are regularly in contact with further education organizations."¹²

Croatia stands out with the EU's lowest rate of early school-leavers, but nevertheless shows some weaknesses with regard to the quality of educational outcomes. Especially in the area of vocational training, SGI country experts see significant room for improvement: "As in other former Yugoslavian countries, vocational education is very weak, and there is a high degree of mismatch between what is

12 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 16 Pre-primary education expenditure

Unit: Percent of GDP



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2001, 2004, 2005, or 2006; b: 2004, 2007, or 2008; c: 2004 or 2011; d: 2004, 2011, or 2012; e: 2004, 2011, 2012, or 2013; f: 2004, 2011, 2012, 2013, or 2014).

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taught and the demands of employers. Thus, vocational education is not an assured route to a job.”¹³ Lithuania stands out with the EU’s lowest share of low-educated persons. However, as in the case of Croatia, SGI country experts highlight the need to further improve both vocational education programs and the education system overall. They note: “The reputation of vocational education and training in Lithuania could still be improved. According to an OECD survey of education released in September 2016, only 15% of all students are expected to graduate from vocational training programs compared to an OECD average of 46% and EU average of 50% (...) Adult participation rates in lifelong-learning programs are also comparatively low. Moreover, Lithuania needs to increase the quality of its education programs. In the 2009 and 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) reports, which evaluate student performance in the areas of reading, mathematics and science, Lithuania was ranked below the OECD average.

13 Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Furthermore, the country must address mismatches between graduates' skills and labor-market needs, as the country's youth unemployment rate of about 19.3% in 2014 was partly associated with young people's insufficient skills and lack of practical experience."¹⁴

FIGURE 17 Early school leavers

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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Germany performs significantly better on this measure, a fact underscored by the country's low – the lowest in the EU – youth unemployment (see also the next chapter on labor market access). A key problem in Germany remains the still-strong correlation between students' social backgrounds and success in school. However, in more recent years, Germany has continuously seen improvements in this area: "Educational opportunities are particularly constrained for children from low-income families and for immigrants. PISA results from 2012, however,

¹⁴ Nakrošis, Vilpišauskas, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 18 Less than upper secondary education

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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had shown significant improvements (OECD 2013), reflecting possibly a catalytic effect of the “PISA shock” in the early 2000s. Germany ranked above the OECD average in mathematics, reading and science, and the importance of students’ socioeconomic background had lessened. While in 2000, the level of social equity in German education was among the lowest of all OECD countries, Germany had risen to around the OECD average in 2012. The most recent PISA results from 2015 indicate a setback in science and mathematics, further stable performance in reading and confirm a looser link between socioeconomic background and performance compared to the 2000s (OECD 2016).¹⁵ The worst performers with regard to the influence of socioeconomic background on students’ educational success are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and France.

15 Rüb, Heinemann, Ulbricht, and Zohlhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Several countries at the lower end of the ranking have made noteworthy improvements since 2014, including Greece, Portugal and Spain. Nonetheless, these countries continue to rank at the bottom in terms of their educational performance and are thus in need of continued reform efforts.

Once one of the top gainers in terms of education, Poland, under the new government led by Beata Szydło, has lost its advantageous position. Polish country experts see a direct correlation between the change in government and worsening performance: “The PiS government has reversed part of the previous reforms. As one of its first measures, it reversed the controversial obligatory lowering of the school age and made it possible for parents to send their children to school at the age of seven, as was the case until 2014. Second, it passed a bill in November 2016 that aims at closing the lower secondary schools (gimnasiums) introduced in 1999 and returning to the previous two-tier school system (eight-year primary school followed by upper secondary or vocational education). The planned reorganization has been criticized by the teachers’ trade union (ZNP – Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego) and others for risking the achievements of previous reforms and worsening academic outcomes by earlier vocational streaming. Criticism has been leveled against government attempts’ to change the curricula with a view to rewriting Polish history and removing many liberal and cosmopolitan texts and values from the core of teaching programs. Teachers critical of the current government fear losing their positions and or being fired.”¹⁶

In addition, education performance has steadily declined in Hungary and the Czech Republic since 2008. Though the Czech Republic still scores slightly above the EU average, in this year’s survey, SGI country experts point out that “Educational outcomes, and the employability of school and higher education graduates are generally good. One problem, however, is the low tertiary education attainment rate. Moreover, education outcomes are strongly influenced by students socio-economic backgrounds (...) The period under review saw the initiation of long-awaited education reforms. In January 2016, the Chamber of Deputies adopted a reform of higher education aimed at raising the standard of accreditation by setting up an independent accreditation authority. However, the reform of the funding system for higher education is still pending, as attempts to introduce output indicators as a way of increasing efficiency in the use of resources were undermined by large-scale scandals uncovering millions of Czech koruna used as rewards for publishing articles in fraudulent and unethical journals. A second reform focused on the development of a new career system for teachers and pedagogical staff with a view to increasing the attractiveness of the profession. As the new system implies higher salaries, its implementation was postponed.”¹⁷

In the case of Hungary, the country experts highlight the following developments in education: “Since the beginning of the decade, the education system has undergone major changes. Spending has been cut, competencies and control have been centralized and private and religious schools have been strengthened. As a result of these changes, Hungary’s PISA results have further worsened (...) Under the pressure of mass demonstrations by teachers, organized by the Tanítanék (I would like to teach) movement and supported by the larger public, the gov-

16 Matthes, Markowski, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

17 Guasti, Mansfeldová, Myant, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

ernment agreed upon a formal decentralization of the over-centralized National Education Center (KLIK) into 58 territorial units. Circumventing the official Council of Interest Mediation in Public Education (Közoktatási Érdekegyeztetési Tanács), the government created a Roundtable for Public Education (Köznevelési Kerekasztal). However, the latter was boycotted by major organizations, and the conflicts between teachers and the government, while somewhat frozen, are still virulent.”¹⁸

Portugal, Romania and Malta demonstrate the greatest need for reform. Malta features the highest dropout rates in the European Union, at 19.6%. Its rate of investment in early-childhood education is below the EU average, and the country is only in the middle of the pack with regard to the influence of socioeconomic background on students’ learning outcomes. For Romania too, country experts see significant problems in the area of education, though also noting some modest initial attempts by the government to respond to previous critiques: “The Romanian education system has suffered from low public spending, unequal access and high dropout rates (especially among Roma and students from rural areas and poor families), low tertiary attainment and weak labor-market relevance for both higher and vocational education. Moreover, the widespread plagiarism and academic dishonesty plaguing Romanian universities has eroded their credibility in- and outside the country (...) While modernizing curricula and changing university financing have been on the way, debates on education policy in the period under review were dominated by negotiations between the Ministry of Labor and the public education trade unions over wage increases in summer 2016. In April 2016, the Ciolos government adopted a national strategy on vocational education and training aimed at implementing a dual system involving private companies. The Ministry of Education appointed a new National Commission for Academic Titles and Diplomas, tasked with revamping the criteria for appointment and promotion, in order to restore credibility to Romanian universities.”¹⁹

3. Labor market access

Labor markets in most EU countries have clearly improved. The EU average employment rate now stands at 66.6% (2016), as compared to 65.6% in the previous year. Moreover, for the first time since the 2008 crisis, the employment rate has surpassed its pre-crisis level (2008: 65.7%). A similar trend is observed in unemployment rates, which have improved considerably. At 11% in 2013, the EU average now stands at 8.7% and thus remains far above the 2008 level of 7.0%.


For most countries, the worst seems to have passed. In terms of labor market access, we see major differences among the individual member states that are underscored by a close look at individual indicators. Overall and across all indicators, Denmark, Germany, the UK, Austria and Sweden continue to register the most successful labor market performance. Among this group of top performers, Germany, the UK and Denmark also proved able to improve on their pre-crisis labor market performance levels. Croatia, Spain and Greece, by contrast, remain at

¹⁸ Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁹ Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org

FIGURE 19 Labor market access

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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the bottom of the ranking on this point as their labor market performance levels remain below their pre-crisis levels.

With employment rates approaching 75%, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany are closing in on top-ranked Sweden (76.2%), which used to be the only country to have achieved the EU 2020 employment goal. Germany also features some of the EU's lowest overall and youth unemployment rates and has demonstrated its capacity to build on these conditions relative to the previous year. For example, Germany's employment rate for those over 65 has once again risen substantially. However, the rate of female labor market integration has not improved since the last SJI.

FIGURE 20 Employment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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A slight improvement relative to the last SJI is evident in the “in-work poverty” indicator, which remains a major challenge for both Germany and the EU more generally. In addition, the share of low-wage earners among Germany’s low-skilled workers is the EU’s largest. This state of affairs points to the need to improve the transition from atypical forms of employment to normal working conditions. The significantly weaker job opportunities afforded to people not born in Germany represent a further weak point, as this has worsened even further compared to the 2016 survey. Other countries that otherwise achieve good scores overall, such as the Netherlands, face even more pressing problems in this area. The Nordic countries of Sweden and Finland also show mounting challenges on this point.

Labor market performance in the UK has improved consistently since 2010. No other country in our sample offers better job opportunities for low-skilled workers. Indeed, the UK’s unemployment rate for low-skilled workers (6.2% in

2016) is considerably lower than the EU average (15.1%). While the UK has clearly returned to its strong pre-crisis labor market performance level, some problems persist, as SGI country experts point out: “(...) after labor market flexibility was increased through deregulation and the lowering of secondary-wage costs, the unemployment rate fell significantly from 8.3% at the end of 2012 to now 4.9% in September 2016 (...) The UK labor market continues to attract substantial numbers of economic migrants. However, the increase in employment has come at the cost of weakness in real wages. Furthermore, wages have only recently returned to their pre-crisis levels, partly because of a moderating effect of immigration. An increase in the national minimum wage to the level of the so-called living wage has been announced (£7.20 since 1 April 2016 for people over 25 and scheduled to rise more rapidly than average wages over the coming years), which is expected to reduce sharply the de facto subsidy to employers provided by tax credits. There has also been criticism of other facets of labor market flexibility. For example, the topic of zero-hour contracts gained substantial attention during the general election, though more recent research has indicated that a sizable proportion of people employed on zero-hour contracts are happy with their contracts (Brinkley, 2013). Although the rate of youth unemployment fell to 13.1% for September 2016, it is still more than double the overall unemployment rate of 4.8% and six percentage points above Germany, but much lower than the other major economies in Europe. Consequently, integration of young people into the UK labor market could be improved. However, the UK does well in retaining older workers in the labor market, with an employment rate for those aged 55–64 of 62%, compared with an EU average of 54%.”²⁰ The effects of the Brexit vote on the labor market remain unclear and will be subject to analysis in future surveys.

A closer look at the Nordic countries reveals interesting differences in the evolution of labor market opportunities – particularly for young workers – in recent years. Denmark and Sweden, for example, continue to record promising scores, even if Sweden has yet to return to its pre-crisis scores. However, we see striking differences in the trajectories of both countries since the crisis. In the case of Denmark, which has sought “flexicurity,” the SGI country experts note that the model “is not a safeguard against business cycle fluctuations, including a drop in employment caused by a fall in aggregate demand. Thus, the question is whether its main performance characteristics (i.e., high turnover, etc.) have been maintained. Indeed, a high level of turnover still characterizes the Danish labor market, implying that many are affected by unemployment, but most unemployment spells remain short. Consequently, the burden of unemployment is shared by a larger group and although there has been an increase in long-term unemployment, it is not dramatic when seen in relation to the fall in employment. The transition rate from unemployment into employment is thus the highest in the EU, which facilitates the labor market entry of youth (...) wage formation has adapted to the new economic situation. The deterioration in wage competition during the boom period prior to the crisis has, to a large extent, been eliminated. The main challenge in the Danish labor market remains among groups with low qualifications. Since minimum wages are relatively high, it is difficult for individuals with weak qualifications to find stable jobs (...) The active labor market policy is a key element of the Danish labor market model and absorbs many resources, as a result it is continuously debated. Following recommendations from the Kock Group, a

20 Busch, Begg, and Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 21 Older employment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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recent reform offers less rigid participation rules for programs aimed at better matching the characteristics of the individual with the needs of the labor market. A recent change in the social assistance scheme has changed to ensure that young people (below the age of 30) attain a labor market relevant education rather than receiving passive support. Additional work incentives for other groups on social assistance include both a cap on total transfers and an employment requirement to maintain support.”²¹

In contrast to Denmark, Sweden’s challenges lie in youth unemployment and the integration of migrants. The country experts explain: “The current labor market statistics indicate that Sweden today does not differ in any significant way from comparable capitalist economies. If anything, unemployment among youth and immigrants is higher than in other comparable countries (...) Union strength has

21 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

declined rapidly in recent years, but union power remains strong by international standards. The strength of unions in part explains the relatively modest reform in labor market rules related to dismissal, minimum wage and apprentice arrangements, which would entail some workers earning a lower salary. But this applies only to insiders on the labor market because employment protection legislation for precarious work is underdeveloped. As in other European countries, Sweden's labor market is undergoing dualization, albeit at a slower speed than, for example, in Germany. Whether related to culture or differences in training and work experience, immigrants to Sweden have for a long time experienced severe problems in entering the labor market. Sweden shares this problem with a large number of countries but it has proven to be inept at addressing this aspect of integration. The large number of unemployed immigrants tears at the fabric of integration policies. In 2017 and 2018, large numbers of immigrants will be actively looking for employment, which will pose a significant challenge to the labor-market system. Sweden's Labour Market Agency is criticized by both business organizations and the unemployed for performing poorly in terms of matching the unemployed with vacant jobs. The agency has been subject to a massive internal reorganization process and developed a new model for its internal management, which will take time to establish."²² The employment ratio of foreign-born workers to native-born workers in Sweden is one of the lowest within the EU (2016: 0.74).

In Finland, which continues to register good marks overall, labor market performance declined steadily after the crisis, finally stabilizing in this year's survey. The SGI country experts highlight a number of structural weaknesses in Finland: "Present achievements in stemming long-term unemployment, youth unemployment and low-skilled unemployment are not satisfactory, and the high level of youth unemployment is a particular cause for concern."²³ Nonetheless, the youth-unemployment rate fell somewhat, from 22.4% in 2015 to 20.1% in 2016. The overall unemployment rate stands at 9%, while unemployment among the low-skilled could be reduced to 11.8% (2015: 12.3%) – still, all numbers remain far from their pre-crisis levels. The country experts also note that the new Sipilä government initiated reforms in 2017 that may enhance labor market performance: "The Sipilä government has initiated a reform of the unemployment benefit system, with first amendments coming into force 1 January 2017. The first part of the reform cuts the duration of earnings-related unemployment benefits from a maximum of 500 to 400 days, sets stricter conditionalities for the unemployed in accepting job offers and seeks to personalize employment services by interviewing job-seekers regularly. The reform marks a shift from passive to more active labor market policies."²⁴

Like Finland, France has also seen its labor market performance steadily decline since the crisis, though this downward trend has halted in this year's evaluation. The SGI country experts summarize the malaise of the French labor market as follows: "Since 2012, unemployment increased by 500,000 people, but slight improvements can be observed in 2016 as the unemployment rate has fallen from 9.9% in the first quarter of 2016 to 9.3% in 2017. France has a notoriously high youth-unemployment rate. Similarly, French citizens with immigrant back-

22 Pierre, Jochem and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

23 Ankar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

24 Ankar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

grounds, particularly youth, face tremendous difficulties integrating into the labor market. The employment rate of workers over 55 years of age is one of the lowest in the OECD (48.6% in 2015 compared to an OECD average of 58.2% and an EU target of 50%). The high level of youth unemployment is linked to the French job-training system, which relies heavily on public schools; yet diplomas from such training are not really accepted in the industry at large, which hinders a potential worker's transition from school to a job. As for senior workers, a retirement age of 60 (which, after Sarkozy's reform of the pension system, has increased to 62) and various early-retirement schemes have led to the present situation of low employment among those over 55. Heavy labor market regulation is another issue, as well as the high cost of labor. There is a dual labor market: on the one side, a highly regulated and protected sector (including five million public employment positions, one of the highest figures in Europe), and on the other, a sector characterized by precarity, limited job protection, and insecurity. The rigidity of the former sector has triggered the development of the latter. While

FIGURE X22 Unemployment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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stable contracts (contrats à durée indéterminée) still represent 85% of total contracts, 87% of all new contracts are of a limited duration, and 70% of all contracts in total are limited to less than one month.”²⁵

The problems in the crisis-battered southern European countries, however, are a completely different matter. Greece, for example, continues to struggle with near-crippling rates: employment is at 52%, unemployment at 23.7%, youth unemployment at 47.3%, and the female-to-male employment ratio is at 0.71. To some extent, Greece also seems to have weathered the worst of the storm. For example, the youth-unemployment rate has fallen by some eleven percentage points relative to 2013. Nonetheless, the overall situation remains disastrous. Long-term unemployment, one of the primary drivers of poverty and social

FIGURE 23 Youth unemployment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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25 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohlnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

exclusion, though having fallen somewhat nonetheless remains high at 17%, marking a fourfold increase since 2007. In addition, the employment rate among older people has shown only modest improvement at 36.3% in this year's survey. Greece is clearly bringing up the rear in this regard.

Spain has shown some improvement on certain indicators. The overall unemployment rate has fallen to 19.7%, down from 26.2% in 2013, and the youth unemployment rate has also fallen by more than ten percentage points to 44.4% for the same period. Securing employment thus remains critically difficult for young people. The same is true for the low-skilled, who suffer an unemployment rate of 26.1%. This rate is more than twice as high as the rate at the onset of the crisis. In addition, the risk of in-work poverty in Spain has increased even further to 10.7%. Moreover, in terms of the number of people involuntarily in temporary employment, Spain ranks with Cyprus at the bottom of the cross-country comparison.

FIGURE 24 Involuntary temporary employment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 1999, 2003, or 2007; b: 1999, 2003, 2009, or 2010;

c: 1999, 2009, or 2013; d: 1999, 2009, or 2014; e: 1999, 2009, or 2015; f: 1999, 2009, or 2016).

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FIGURE 25 Long-term unemployment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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More than 90% of those holding a temporary contract in Spain have taken this form of employment because they cannot find a permanent position. By comparison, this rate is just 9.1% in Austria, the top-placed country on this measure.

Italy has still not been able to return to even its comparably low pre-crisis labor market performance level. Despite some of the notable reform efforts made by the former Renzi government, youth unemployment (37.8%) and long-term unemployment (6.9%) rates remain very high, while conditions to foster employment opportunities for women (and younger people) have not improved.²⁶ However, Italy is quite advanced when it comes to providing employment opportunities for disabled persons (rank 4). In their latest report, the SGI country experts conclude: “Starting in 2014, the Renzi government has shown a willingness to tackle this

26 See also Ciccarone, Dente, and Rosini (2016): Labour Market and Social Policy in Italy. Policy Brief 2016/02, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung.

problem more resolutely. After some more limited but immediate measures to make the hiring of young people easier, the government launched a systematic revision of the labor code aimed at encouraging firms to adopt more flexible but also stable labor contracts. The law, informally called the Jobs Act, has given the government broad discretion to define specific labor market norms and has been accompanied by fiscal measures that should make the hiring of new workers more convenient for firms. During the period under review, the government has gradually expanded the scope of this law and encouraged a new type of labor contract. This new labor contract increases employers' ability to hire and fire, while also encouraging a shift from precarious to long-term contracts. It has been received very favorably and 2015 data on new contracts indicates that it has been a significant success. However, in 2016, fewer such contracts were issued as economic incentives for employers have been reduced. Overall the new policies have been relatively more successful in expanding the employment rates of the older than of the younger cohorts of workers. The new and more inclusive social insurance benefit for those who have lost their job (NASPI, "nuova prestazione di assicurazione sociale per l'impiego") is part of the Jobs Act and is a first step toward creating a national unemployment insurance."²⁷

In Croatia, a sharp increase in unemployment among the low-skilled population after the crisis could level out again, while the overall unemployment level of 13.3% remains among the highest in the EU. Considering the negative developments of recent years, the SGI expert renders the judgment that "various institutional and policy shortcomings continue to affect labor market performance. The severance payment regime hinders labor mobility and discourages the use of open-ended contracts. The multi-layered social benefits system and generous early-retirement options create disincentives to work. The wage-setting regime is not conducive to aligning wage dynamics to macroeconomic conditions. In particular, little has been done to facilitate job creation. From a comparative perspective, it is the low rate of job creation rather than a high rate of job destruction that underlies the weak labor market performance in Croatia. Like its predecessor, the Orešković government largely failed to address these issues."²⁸

Slovakia, which ranked among those at the bottom of this indicator's assessment last year, managed to improve its situation by two ranks and now fares better than in 2008. Despite this positive trend, the country experts remain critical: "Due to the strong growth of the Slovak economy, the unemployment rate fell from 11.5% in 2015 to 10.3% in 2016 and is expected to dip under 10% in 2017. At the same time, however, several structural problems persist which have not been adequately addressed by the government: Long-term unemployment is one of the highest in the EU, and the labor market participation of groups such as Roma, young people, women with children, the elderly and low-skilled persons is relatively low. As labor market mobility within Slovakia is low, regional differences in (un-)employment are strong. A more recent problem is the growing shortage of qualified labor for industrial production. The Central Labor Office has been reorganized, but the potential for individualized support to the long-term unemployed and vulnerable groups has not been realized yet. Slovakia's expenditure on active labor market policy is low compared to the rest of the EU. In addition, there

²⁷ Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

²⁸ Petak, Bartlett, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 26 Low-skilled unemployment rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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is no comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of measures.”²⁹ Despite some recent improvements, Slovakia stands out for recording the highest unemployment rate for low-skilled workers (29.4%) aged between 25 and 64 years in the EU.

29 Kneuer, Malová, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Many EU countries still lack sufficient measures to facilitate the full participation of disabled persons in the labor market. Lithuania, Malta and Ireland face the greatest need of reform in this policy area. However, it is remarkable that many crisis-hit European countries, including Slovakia, Portugal, Italy and France, are the most advanced when it comes to including persons with disabilities. By contrast, the Nordic countries, which rank at the top of nearly all SJI categories, only perform average in terms of ensuring disabled persons' labor market participation.

FIGURE 27 In-work poverty rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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FIGURE 28 Employment rate, disabled/non-disabled

Unit: Ratio



Source: Jorge Calero, University of Barcelona (data refer to a: 2008, 2010, or 2011; b: 2009, 2010, or 2011; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015).

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
4. Social cohesion and non-discrimination

Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg top the ranking in terms of social cohesion and nondiscrimination in EU comparison with Slovenia, Germany and Austria on their heels. Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Hungary and Croatia comprise the group of countries at the bottom of the ranking.

The poor performance of the four southeast European countries – Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria – is in part due to their significant difficulties in preventing discrimination against certain societal groups. In Romania, for example, the country experts note that “the Romanian state has been ineffective in countering discrimination against a number of vulnerable groups, including members of the LGBT community, adults and children infected with HIV, people with disabilities, and the country’s large Roma minority. The civil code still pro-

FIGURE 29 Social cohesion and non-discrimination

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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hibits same-sex partnership and marriage, and fails to recognize any such marriages registered abroad. In September 2015, the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and Romania's Council for Combating Discrimination recommended that Romanian authorities enforce legislation to penalize discrimination, initiate a public awareness campaign, and provide training to societal actors such as teachers, police officers and judges. The Ciolos government failed to follow these recommendations. The popular initiative to make the constitutional definition of marriage more restrictive, with strong support by the Romanian Orthodox Church, has favored the discrimination of members of the LGBT community.”³⁰

The experts issue a similar judgment with respect to Hungary: “The government’s attempts to prevent atrocities from being perpetrated against Roma, Jews and

30 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 30 Non-discrimination (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016; f: SGI 2017).

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homosexuals, as well as to protect opposition demonstrators, have remained rather half-hearted. (...) Hungary has a comprehensive anti-discrimination legal framework, but practice has been different. Fidesz's traditional family concept corresponds with strong discrimination against women in the areas of employment, career and pay. After all, Fidesz has no female ministers or top leaders. The failure is even greater regarding the Roma minority. By trying to create a separate school system, the Orbán government has aggravated segregation. It has also continued its hate campaign against Muslims. As a result, xenophobia has grown among Hungarians, with a spillover to all kinds of minorities, including Jews.”³¹ Discrimination against certain minorities also remains a serious social problem in Croatia and Bulgaria.

31 Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönke (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Worth mentioning in the context of overall developments in the indicator of social cohesion and nondiscrimination is also the case of Poland. After years of improved policy results in the area of social cohesion and nondiscrimination, the country has now seen by far the strongest deterioration in this regard compared to the previous year. The country experts for Poland point to the new government in accounting for this alarming shift toward exclusion: “The two national elections held in Poland in 2015 altered the country’s political landscape and shifted power relations between the two major parties, the centrist Civic Platform (PO) and the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS). (...) Capitalizing on its clear parliamentary majority and the strong party discipline, the government has initiated radical changes in institutions and policies. (...) The quality of democracy has also suffered from the strong discourse launched by the government against Muslims, the LGBT community and “gender-ideology,” the increasing corruption and cronyism in state-owned enterprises and rising political polarization.”³²

By contrast, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden have served as success stories and models for other countries with regard to effective nondiscrimination policy: “The Netherlands is party to all the important international agreements against discrimination. A nondiscrimination clause addressing religion, life philosophy, political convictions, race, sex and “any other grounds for discrimination” is contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions or another individual. The constitutional framework has been specified by several acts that also refer to the EC directives on equal treatment (...).”³³

In Ireland, the country experts stress the role of the so-called Equality Authority as a positive and well-functioning institutional example of anti-discrimination policy: “There are strong anti-discrimination laws on the Irish statute books. The Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Equal Status Act, 2000 outlaw discrimination on grounds of gender, marital status, family status, age, intellectual or physical disability, race, sexual orientation, religious belief or membership in the Traveler Community in employment, vocational training, advertising, collective agreements, the provision of goods and services, and other opportunities to which the public generally has access. The Equality Authority is an independent body set up under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 to monitor discrimination. An independent equality tribunal was established under the same act to offer an accessible and impartial forum to remedy unlawful discrimination. These agencies have been active in recent years and successful in prosecuting cases on behalf of parties who felt they had been discriminated against. In 2012, a referendum was passed to amend the constitution to explicitly recognize the rights of children and generally provide enhanced protection to children. In May 2015, a referendum legalizing same-sex marriage was passed by a vote of 62% in favor, 38% against. The Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Act was signed into law on 29 August 2015.”³⁴

Sweden achieves similarly promising results, although the country experts here point to a growing ethnic heterogeneity that has been expressed in problems with

32 Matthes, Markowski, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

33 Hoppe, Woldendorp, and Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

34 Murphy, Mitchell, and Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

integration policy (see more on this below): “During the period of review, ethnic segmentation in several suburbs of metropolitan areas in Sweden has increased. This societal fracturing remains an unsolved political challenge in contemporary Sweden. With the increased immigration in 2015 and 2016 there is an imminent risk that these challenges will be exacerbated.”³⁵ According to the country experts, the “Swedish model” is undergoing some change: “If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today. Reflecting on the 2014 general elections, Bo Rothstein concludes that ‘the days of Swedish exceptionalism are over.’ Not only does Sweden now have a strong anti-immigration party in its parliament, core data on Sweden’s welfare state are moving toward levels found among comparable, average-performing countries. It remains to be seen whether the current red-green government will be able to

FIGURE 31 Gender equality in parliaments

Unit: Percent



Source: World Bank Gender Statistics Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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35 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

reverse this development.”³⁶ Overall, however, Sweden remains one of the most egalitarian societies in the EU and OECD.

One aspect of successful anti-discrimination policy is the prevention of discrimination on the basis of gender. In many EU states, discrimination against women in particular persists – and is manifest in the absence of equal pay for equal work or the relative lack of women’s representation in leadership positions or political offices. If one considers the share of national parliamentary seats by gender as a rough proxy indicator for this issue, it is notable that no EU state has a legislature featuring equal numbers of women and men as representatives. Worst in this regard is Hungary, where only 10% of parliamentary seats are held by women. Malta, Romania and Croatia perform similarly poorly on this measure, each with a share below 15%. The most balanced ratio can be found in Sweden, where 44 of 100 seats are held by women. In Finland and Spain, the share is around 40%.

Overall, the Nordic countries still do the best relative job in terms of battling social exclusion. However, it is interesting that the lowest level of income inequality has for some time no longer been found in the north European countries, but rather in Slovenia and Slovakia. Finland follows at rank four and Sweden and Denmark on ranks seven and eight, respectively. The level of income inequality in these countries is in this regard significantly higher than in 2007. Germany, which has registered a slight decrease in income inequality since the 2016 survey, ranks 14th. However, the EU’s highest levels of income inequality are evident in Bulgaria, and Lithuania, which are closely followed by Portugal, Greece, Latvia, Spain and Romania.

In the area of integration policy too, the north European countries show certain weaknesses that detract from otherwise solid performances in social inclusion. However, policy in these states is by no means inactive: Sweden has taken diverse action in the area of immigration and integration, and like many other EU countries, today faces enormous challenges as a result of the current dramatic refugee situation: “The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq and Syria and, in 1992, from former Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are individual local authorities (Södertälje) that have received more immigrants from Iraq than has the entire United States. In the European setting Sweden, together with Germany, stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly countries. As is the case across Europe, the war in Syria has triggered huge immigration to Sweden. The Migration Board previously predicted that Sweden would receive between 80,000 and 105,000 refugees. The current estimate for 2015 and 2016 is that Sweden will receive between 160,000 and 190,000 refugees per annum from Syria and other Middle East countries. Today, Sweden (still) offers permanent residency for unaccompanied children and for Syrian families with children. These provisions, however, are highly disputed in contemporary public discourse and in the parliament. The increasing immigration represents a major challenge, unprecedented in size and scope, to Swedish integration policy. These policies cover a wide range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the extensive autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by central government to receive asylum-seekers.”³⁷

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 32 Gini coefficient

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016).

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Generally, the country experts find that it is difficult to “argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far-reaching. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience. Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts otherwise, thus indicates that the problem lies in the design and implementation of its integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles facing young people as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against immigrants. There is some good news, however. Studies show that second-generation immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary education.

FIGURE 33 Integration policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016; f: SGI 2017).

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However, for immigrants with low education, entry into a labor market with high standards seems more or less blocked.”³⁸

In Denmark’s case, the country experts reach similar conclusions regarding current developments and challenges in the area of integration policy: “On 1 January 2016 there were about 700,000 immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in Denmark, or 12% of the population (7% immigrants, 5% descendants). Roughly two-thirds of immigrants are from non-Western countries. After the tightening of immigration policies introduced by the liberal-conservative government in 2002, immigration from non-Western countries fell, but net immigration from Western countries rose. More recently there have been increases from both groups.

³⁸ Ibid.

The employment rate of immigrants and their descendants (ages 16 to 64) is low compared to other groups, though it had been increasing from the mid-1980s until the onset of the financial crisis. There is a substantial employment gap, taking into account the age distribution, immigrants from non-Western countries have an employment rate (2014) which is 25% lower than that of ethnic Danes (for descendants the gap is 20%). The gap is higher for women (27%) than for men (22%). For immigrants from Western countries the gap is about 12% (for descendants about 8%). The gaps in employment rates should be viewed in light of high employment rates in Denmark for both men and women, high qualification requirements to find a job and high minimum wages. Concerning educational achievements, immigrants and their descendants – especially girls – are making progress. In 2013, for the age group 30 to 39 about 47% of men and 64% of women had completed a labor market qualifying education. The corresponding numbers for ethnic Danes are 72% and 80%. For those 22 years old 49% of male and 61% of female non-Western descendants are in education, which is only two and three percentage points below the corresponding rates for ethnic Danes. The 24-year-old rule for family reunification introduced in 2004 has allowed fewer immigrants and their descendants to bring spouses to Denmark from abroad. The percentage fell from 61% in 2001 to 31% in 2008. Instead, immigrants increasingly marry other immigrants already living in Denmark as well as native Danes. Since these reforms have gone into effect there have been improvements. Indeed, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated and have more Danish friends, and fewer say they experience discrimination. In addition, many more immigrants speak Danish than ever before. Denmark has recently received many refugees and asylum-seekers from Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries, which has affected political and public debates regarding immigrants. Immigration was an important issue in the electoral debate in June 2015, with most parties wanting to limit immigration. However, the great influx of asylum-seekers that followed over that summer forced the government to adopt stricter policies. Although Denmark does not take part in the EU's asylum policy it offered to take some asylum-seekers beyond those that arrived in Denmark as a contribution to a European solution.”³⁹

Countries such as Belgium and France have significantly bigger problems. In discussing the situation in Belgium, the country experts emphasize that “Belgium has a contradictory attitude toward immigration. On the one hand, it has traditionally been quite welcoming to political refugees. Its reaction to the Syrian refugee inflow was no exception: despite being comparatively immigration-skeptic, the current government responded with the rapid creation of emergency accommodation centers, followed by the re-dispatching of families to different cities and villages to promote integration and avoid the creation of ghettos. The terrorist attack on Brussels produced some racist reactions, but to a comparatively limited degree (when juxtaposed with the pushback observed in some other European countries or in the United States). Yet, the follow-up has been dismal. The country currently lacks the capacity to integrate first and second generation immigrants with appropriate education and successful entry into the labor force. The Itinera Institute details the lack of data collection, which would be the necessary first step for identifying immigrants’ skills for job placement. Immigrants must follow a lengthy and cumbersome administrative process. The administration

39 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

is insufficiently staffed to process applications. As a consequence, immigrants cannot apply legally for jobs for months, if not years. Similar outcomes apply to second-generation immigrants: even when they are legally Belgian, they are confronted with a schooling system that is insufficiently adapted to people whose parents' mother tongue is not Dutch or French. Even those who manage to get appropriate education face difficulties on the labor market (this is, unfortunately, not unique to Belgium). A long time ago, Belgium began taking steps to combat these challenges. The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism was created specifically to address discrimination issues. Civil society and the press are very wary of acts of outright discrimination and racism. Nonetheless, public funding and proactive policies are still insufficient to deliver the substantial results that are needed to turn the immigration that has occurred over the past 30 years into a success."⁴⁰

Similar problems are evident in France: "The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, and so on. Add to this the challenges of illegal immigrants, many of whom moved to France more than 10 or 15 years ago yet have no regular job and thus do not contribute to the pension system. Although they have access to health care and their children can attend schools, the situation is often dramatic and inextricable as for many, it is impossible to fulfill the requirements for a residence permit. Immigrants must demonstrate that they have the required documents, such as tax records, employment contracts and housing contracts, while at the same time they are essentially forced into the labor and housing black market. Potential employers and landlords will not document that they employ or house illegal aliens, as this is a crime. Under such conditions, integration is difficult, if not impossible. Immigration from Eastern Europe, the southern Balkans and, more recently, from the Middle East has become a very sensitive subject exploited by the National Front. The reluctance of the French socialist government to put in place a serious migration policy has been challenged by German Chancellor Merkel's sudden decision to open the doors to migrants from Syria, forcing the government to revise its veiled but deliberate policy of restricting entry (low level of asylum admissions, cumbersome and discouraging bureaucratic processes). The number of refugees that have come to France since the summer of 2015 is substantially smaller than in neighboring Germany. The national office on refugees (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, Ofpra) reported that close to 80,000 refugees came to France in 2015, an increase of 27% from 2014. Integration remains at the heart of French political discourse, but actual policies set up to achieve this aim are notoriously insufficient."⁴¹

Our 2017 evaluation has for the first time incorporated information on opportunities for equal participation among persons with disabilities. This extends the scope of the Social Justice Index to include the many structural challenges disabled people face in our societies. The new indicator "discrimination against people with disabilities" draws on three different indicators addressing the discrimination suffered by people with disabilities in the following areas: access to

40 Castanheira, Rihoux, and Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

41 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohlnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

education, access to medical treatments and access to a suitable dwelling. Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, France, Slovenia and Austria form the strong top group on this measure. Interestingly enough, the otherwise top-ranking countries in the dimension of social cohesion and nondiscrimination, as well as in the overall report – namely Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark – receive only average scores for the new indicator assessing discrimination against persons with disabilities. Romania, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Malta, however, are still the poorest performing countries in this regard, all scoring less than four points on the ten-point scale.

FIGURE 34 Discrimination against people with disabilities

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Jorge Calero, University of Barcelona (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2014 or 2015).

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FIGURE 35 NEET rate

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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
Finally, our assessment of social cohesion and nondiscrimination includes as well the so-called NEET rate, which refers to the share of youth that are not in education, employment or in training. This indicator sheds light on a key aspect of social exclusion among young people. Here, as might be expected, the crisis-battered southern European states are the countries with the greatest problems. With a NEET rate of 29.1%, Italy brings up a sobering rear in this regard. The NEET rates in Romania and Greece, too, are still very high with 23.6% and 23%, respectively. On a positive note, though, all three of these bottom-ranking countries have improved their NEET rate compared to the previous year. The Netherlands, Malta, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and Germany take the first six places in the comparison, registering the lowest NEET rates (all below 10%). In Germany, this rate even fell by more than three percentage points from 2008 to 2015.

5. Health

In the area of health, Sweden, Germany and Luxembourg hold the top three places. The Netherlands, Malta, Belgium, the Czech Republic and France also belong to the expanded top group. By contrast, conditions have deteriorated the most since 2008 in Greece, which is second from the bottom in the 2017 cross-EU comparison and is closely followed by Latvia.

FIGURE 36 Health

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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In most EU countries, the quality of health care is high. However, with regard to both quality and inclusiveness in health care systems (equality of access), there are quite significant variations within the European Union. The greatest deficits are still to be found in Latvia, Greece and Romania. The country experts for Romania offer the following judgment in their most recent SGI report, with a somewhat hopeful outlook: “Romania has a public health insurance system. Despite its claim to universal coverage, however, many citizens are not insured, as highlighted by the deadly nightclub fire in Bucharest in October 2015. Access to health care is further limited by a high salience of informal payments and a low density of doctors in rural areas. The problems are aggravated by relatively low public spending, large-scale emigration of medical staff and rampant corruption. In 2016, an outbreak of a nosocomial infection at a Bucharest hospital, summer protests by doctors demanding better pay for overtime hours and the resignation of Health Minister Voiculescu helped to put health care reform on the agenda. However, overall changes remained modest. While the medical staff benefited from the wage increases in the public sector and health care spending increased in the course of the amendments to the 2016 budget, relatively little was done to address other structural problems. A new law on community care setting up health centers and teams, adopted as part of the government’s anti-poverty package in October 2016, might improve access to health care for vulnerable groups in rural areas. Compared to its predecessor, the new national anti-corruption strategy 2016–2020 from August 2016 put more emphasis on fighting corruption in the health sector.”⁴²

In Latvia too, problems of quality and equity in the health sector remain significant: “Latvia has universal health care insurance and a single payer system financed through general taxation. Universal population coverage, highly qualified medical staff, the innovative use of physician’s assistants are positive aspects of the system. However, substantial challenges remain, including disproportionately high out-of-pocket expenses (one in five people report foregoing health care due to cost), and long waiting times for key diagnostic and treatment services. Mortality rates for men, women and children are higher than in most other EU countries. The economic crisis in 2008 resulted in a dramatic decrease in public funding for health care. The crisis gave impetus to structural reforms, which aimed to reduce costs, for example, by shifting from hospital to outpatient care. Attempts to tie individual access to health services and income tax payments stalled at the political level. As of 2014, a “diagnosis-related group” system has been introduced to improve the financing of health care services. Latvia is lagging in its ability to develop evidence-based reform proposals. Attempts to introduce e-health and IT solutions have been lagging. Public expenditure on health care was equal to 3.7% of GDP in 2014.... Total expenditure on health care amounted to 5.88% of GDP in 2014, below the EU average for public health care expenditure.”⁴³


Greece’s further deterioration in the area of health must be considered in the context of the damage done to living standards as a result of the economic crisis. From 2008 to 2015, the number of people who say they are unable to obtain needed medical care as a result of financial constraints, long waiting lists or geographical distances increased from 5.7% to 12.3%, marking the most significant

42 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

43 Terauda, Auers, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 37 Accessibility and range

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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such increase within the entire European Union. In absolute terms, only Estonia (12.7%) remains behind Greece on this measure. Certainly, the crisis has had a major impact on this situation, though the country experts come to a more differentiated conclusion: “Greece is one of the lowest spenders for the share of preventive health measures in total health care expenditure. At the same time, compared to other EU member states, Greece shows one of the largest shares of out-of-pocket household expenditure in total health care expenditure. This speaks volumes to three perennial problems of Greek health care policy: first, the lack of long-term planning and programming with regard to preventive health measures; second, the volume of transactions between patients and doctors which goes unrecorded and is not taxed; and third, the differential in health care access based on the purchasing power of households. In addition to these policy-related problems, public health care in Greece suffers also from structural problems. These problems are, first, the long-term irrational distribution of

FIGURE 38 Health system outcomes

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

| BertelsmannStiftung

resources, including funds, supplies and personnel, which results from a chronic application of a clientelistic, rather than rational, logic permeating the relations between the Ministry of Health and regional and local state-run health services; and, second, the fragmented and sprawling character of hospital care.... Pharmaceutical spending in Greece has been significantly affected by the crisis. The large reductions in drug spending have come as a result of a series of government measures aimed at reducing the price of pharmaceuticals. However, some cost reductions have shifted to households. In summary, both the quality and inclusiveness of health care have deteriorated in the period under review, in continuation of negative trends of the previous years. However, there were some positive government initiatives. The Ministry of Health issued instructions to state hospitals to provide medicine, tests and treatment to uninsured patients without charge. Indeed, since June 2014, uninsured people were covered for prescribed pharmaceuticals, emergency department services in public hospitals, as well as

for non-emergency hospital care under certain conditions. The Syriza-ANEL government made access easier.”⁴⁴

FIGURE 39 Self-reported unmet medical needs

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2007, or 2010; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2011 or 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015 or 2016)

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Despite these significant problems, Greece still has the sixth-best score on healthy life expectancy. People in Greece can expect an average of 64 healthy life (or disability-free) years. Only Sweden, Malta, Ireland, Belgium, Spain and Germany perform equal or better in this respect. The Netherlands and Denmark, each with a value of just below 60 years, fall – somewhat surprisingly – into the lower half with respect to this indicator. While their overall health scores are still high, this suggests that for the number of expected healthy life years, it is not only the quality of and conditions of access to health care that are relevant, but also individual behavior in the sense of healthy or unhealthy lifestyles. In the case of Denmark, which has one of the most inclusive health care systems in the European Union,

44 Sotiropoulos, Huliaras, and Karadag (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

the country experts point out that “there has been a marked decline in smoking in Denmark in recent years, but obesity rates have increased. The social gradient in health remains strong.”⁴⁵

FIGURE 40 Healthy life expectancy

Unit: Years



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2007, or 2010; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2011 or 2012; d: 2012 or 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015).

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Italy numbers among those countries to have deteriorated relatively significantly in recent years. Strong regional differences have had an effect on this outcome, but the SGI country experts highlight initially promising efforts to address the regional heterogeneity of health care quality and inclusiveness: “On average, the services provided achieve medium to high standards of quality (a recent Bloomberg analysis ranked the Italian system among the most efficient in the world), but, due to significant differences in local infrastructures, cultural factors, and the political and managerial proficiency of local administrations, the quality of public

45 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

health care is not nationally uniform. In spite of similar levels of per capita expenditure, services are generally better in northern and central Italy than in southern Italy. In some areas of the south, corruption, clientelism and administrative inefficiency have driven up health care costs. In these regions, lower quality levels and typically longer waiting lists mean that wealthier individuals will often turn to private sector medical care. Regional disparities also lead to a significant amount of health tourism heading north. Early moves in the direction of fiscal federalism are now stimulating efforts to change this situation through the introduction of a system of national quality standards (correlated with resources), which should be implemented across regions.”⁴⁶

6. Intergenerational justice

In the area of intergenerational justice, the average score for all EU countries has decreased slightly compared to pre-crisis levels. At 5.47 in the 2017 survey, this score is one of the lowest average scores across all indicators. The Nordic and some Baltic states are currently best-situated to do justice to the issue’s complex and multidimensional challenges. Slovenia, too, ranks among the top five. By contrast, the southern European countries Hungary, Cyprus, Italy and Greece bring up the rear in the cross-EU comparison. Malta (rank 22) has been able to continuously improve its score since entering the ranking in 2014 and no longer numbers among the worst performers on this indicator. The same applies to Ireland, which has shown even stronger improvement (rank 14), receiving scores almost on par with the EU average. Poland, which now ranks 22nd and numbers among the worst EU performers on this issue, has received considerably lower marks since the last survey.


Despite significant demographic pressures, the top-ranking Nordic countries have demonstrated success in keeping the interests of younger generations in view while pursuing sound policies for the young and old alike. In this regard, these countries continue to serve as a model for other EU states in the area of family policy. Sweden, for instance, “has been politically and economically committed to strong family policy for the past 50 years. Major features of Sweden’s policy have been the separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood. The parental leave program is expected to be expanded further, adding another month which can only be used by the father (a so-called ‘daddy-month’), thus incentivizing fathers to take more time off to engage in the care of their children. The basic difference between the Social Democratic and Green, on the one hand, and that of the non-socialist Alliance parties, on the other, is that the former emphasize gender equality whereas the latter emphasize freedom of choice. Both constellations of parties are, however, fully committed to the overarching goals of family policy and see it as integral to promoting gender equality.”⁴⁷

46 Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

47 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 41 Intergenerational justice

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

| BertelsmannStiftung

Denmark, Estonia and Finland likewise stand out in terms of their family-oriented policies – although France’s family policies also receive high marks from the SGI country experts: “There is a long and consensual tradition of support for families, going back to the 1930s. The comprehensive policy mix which has developed since then has been successful in providing child-care, financial support, parental leave and generous fiscal policies (income is not taxed individually but in each family unit, dividing up the total income by the number of people in a family). In addition, families using the child-care support at home benefit from rebates on the social costs involved. These policies have been effective. Not only is the birth rate in France one of the highest in Europe, but also the percentage of women integrated in the labor market compares favorably to the European leaders (Scandinavian countries) in this domain.”⁴⁸

48 Mény, Uterwedde, and Zohnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 42 Family policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016; f: SGI 2017).

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Italy, by contrast, appears more problematic from the perspective of family policy: “Italian society has traditionally relied very much upon its very strong family institutions. The family (often in its extended version) remains even today a major provider of welfare for its weakest components – children, young couples with precarious jobs and elders. Within the family, significant amounts of economic redistribution take place, and important services are provided, such as the care of preschool age children by grandparents. Partly because of this reliance, state support for families has generally been weak. Apart from relatively generous rules on maternity leave (paid for by social insurance) and limited tax deductions for children, the state has not offered much. Public day care facilities for preschool children are available on a limited scale and vary significantly across regions. Private firms and public offices have only recently started offering similar services, with some support from the state. The lack of more significant policies has contributed to the limited participation of women in the workforce and a low overall

employment rate, while also contributing to a very low birth rate (except in the immigrant population). Proposals recurrently advanced to introduce important changes to tax policies with respect to families have never materialized, including the ‘quoziente familiare,’ which would have divided taxable income by the number of family members. The crisis has left little space for such initiatives, which would strain the state’s budget. As a result, only limited subsidies for families with children in the lowest income brackets have been introduced. Because of the economic crisis, the levels of children living in poverty are above average. New and innovative Scandinavian-style concepts (such as parental leave) that go beyond maternity allowance are not widely implemented. The whole child-care sector, and indeed the state of the public debate over the ability of women to combine work and children, lags behind that in the wealthier and more progressive European countries. The decreasing transfers of financial resources to regions and municipalities during previous and Renzi governments mean that many institu-

FIGURE 43 Pension policy (SGI)

Unit: Standardized Scale



Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (data from a: SGI 2009; b: SGI 2011; c: SGI 2014; d: SGI 2015; e: SGI 2016; f: SGI 2017).

BertelsmannStiftung

tions and projects working in family support have run out of money and may have to cut back services significantly. Men would also benefit from an extension of state support for families, as they would be better able to assist in their children's development."⁴⁹

The Nordic states' ability to serve as a model for other countries not only in family policy, but also with regard to the design of pension policies, is underlined particularly by Finland and Denmark. In recent years, these countries have carried out successful reforms aimed both at securing the financial sustainability of their pension systems and ensuring a high degree of social security and intergenerational justice within these systems. In Finland, "major reform of the pension system in 2005 aimed at increasing pension-policy flexibility and creating more incentives for workers to stay in employment later in life. In 2011, a national guarantee pension was introduced. While these reforms were successful, a further major reform will come into effect in 2017. In September 2014, the social partners agreed on a further gradual raise of the lowest retirement age to 65, with adjustments for future cohorts based on changes in life expectancy, flexible part-time retirement and amendments to the accumulation rate. Exceptions are valid for those pursuing long careers of strenuous work, who will be able to retire at 63. The reform ensures the financial sustainability of the pension systems and will provide incentives for longer working careers. At present, Finland ranks in the middle in the EU in terms of average exit age from the labor force, but the effective retirement age is expected to reach its target level of 62.4 years in 2025 as a result of the 2017 reforms."⁵⁰

Denmark, too, has done much in recent years to protect the future sustainability of its pension system: "The pension policy in Denmark is well-diversified in accordance with the World Bank's three-pillar conceptual framework. Concerning the first pillar, Denmark has public pensions in the form of a universal base pension with a means tested supplement. For the second pillar, labor market pensions are negotiated in the labor market but mandatory for the individual. Moreover, the contribution rate has been increased over the years and is now 12% or more for most employees. As for the third pillar, it is comprised of both tax-subsidized pension arrangements (tied until retirement) offered by insurance companies, pension funds and banks as well as other forms of savings (for most households in the form of housing wealth). The combination of the different pillars of the pension scheme creates a pension system that both protects against low income for the elderly (distributional objective) and ensures that most have a pension which is reasonable in relation to the income earned when the pensioner was active in the labor market (high replacement rates). The Danish pension scheme ranks first in the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index. The division of work between the public and private pension systems, however, has its problems. The means testing of public pension supplements has the effect that the net gain from additional pension savings or later retirements can be rather low (high effective marginal tax rates) for a broad segment of income earners. Moreover, the system is very complicated. In addition, there is the problem of citizens outside the mandatory labor market pensions (the "residual" pension group). Statutory ages in the pension system (in public pensions for early retirement and age limits for

49 Cotta, Maruhn, and Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

50 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

payment of funds from pension schemes) are established by legislation. Recent reforms – the 2006 welfare reform and the 2011 retirement reform – will increase these ages considerably to cope with the aging population. The first elements of these reforms include a discrete increase in the early retirement age from 60 to 62 years over the period 2014–2017, shortening the early retirement period from five to three years over the years 2018–2019 and 2022–2023 (implying an early retirement age of 64 in 2023), and increasing the pension age from 65 to 67 years over the period 2019–2022. The second element is an indexation of the early retirement age and pension age to the development in life expectancy at the age of 60, in order to limit the expected pension period to 14.5 years (17.5 including early retirement) over the long term (currently between 18.5 and 23.5 years).⁵¹

By contrast, the biggest problems with regard to sustainable and intergenerationally just pension policies are evident in Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia and Romania. “In Romania, low fertility rates combined with the massive out-migration of working-age citizens have contributed to a rapidly aging population. Forecasts for 2050 predict that 43% of the population will be over the age of 65 – a dramatic increase from the comparable figure of 27% in 2011. These demographic pressures threaten to undermine the pension system’s sustainability, even more so as the actual retirement age continued to decline in 2015 despite an increase in the official retirement age in 2014. Poverty among pensioners remains a problem as well. The situation is particularly dire in the agricultural sector, where workers of the former agricultural cooperatives were left with very low pensions following the dissolution of these cooperatives after 1990. As a result, many retirees live below or near the poverty limit, and many more rely on support from relatives to supplement their pensions. In part due to their lower pension-eligibility age, women typically have considerably lower pensions than men, and therefore have double the poverty-risk rates. The Ciolos government did little to address these issues. It ignored the repeated recommendation by the European Commission to harmonize the retirement age for men and women, and even weakened the sustainability and credibility of the pension system by deviating from the original rules on the financing of the second, fully funded pension pillar. The 2008 pension reform, which introduced a three-pillar system along World Bank guidelines, contained provisions for a statutory 0.5 percentage point increase per year in contributions to the mandatory fully funded second pillar, with a target of reaching 6% of employees’ gross salaries by 2016. In 2016, however, contributions were raised only to 5.1%, with the government pleading budget constraints and pressures on public spending. With a little help from the Constitutional Court, the Ciolos government succeeded in preventing new special pension rights for mayors, deputy mayors, local and county counselors, as legislated by parliament. It did not dare to tackle existing huge pension privileges of certain occupational groups.”⁵²

As for Hungary, the country experts also point to the current government’s problematic policy approach in which nationalism and centralism figure prominently: “Hungary introduced a three-pillar pension system along World Bank guidelines in 1997, featuring a strong mandatory second pillar. Upon coming to office, the Orbán government abolished this second pillar, confiscated, “nationalized” assets, and also eliminated some early-retirement options that has strongly

51 Laursen, Andersen, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

52 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

increased uncertainty regarding income in old age. The growing shadow economy and the increasing tendency to replace a share of wages with benefits not subject to social insurance contributions have reduced the pension claims of many future pensioners. However, the Orbán government has failed to address these issues. The main reform since 2014 has been the merger of the Pension Insurance Fund (Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság, ONYF) and part of the National Health Insurance Fund (Országos Egészségbiztosítási Pénztár, OEP) adopted in June 2016. Part of a broader administrative reform, the merger has been justified as a means to better integrate different fields of social policy and reduce costs. As it stands, however, the reforms, which were drawn up quickly, looks more like another monstrous centralization drive.”⁵³

Germany presents another interesting case. The decline registered in the Federal Republic’s scores regarding pension policy since the SJI 2014 represent the largest within the European Union. In this regard, the SGI experts come to the following conclusion: “In 2014, the current government reversed the previous pension reform agenda. Subsequent reforms have been hotly disputed with critics claiming they would undermine the long-term sustainability of the pensions system. First, the government reduced the retirement age by two years for workers who have contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years. Second, it provided a catch up for housewives with children born before 1992 relative to those with children born after 1992. An additional pension point will be added to the former group, which now can claim two points (instead of one), while the latter group can claim three. Finally, pensions for people with disabilities were improved. The calculation will now include two additional years of (fictive) contributions. The cost of these reforms is estimated to be €160 billion by 2030. Public subsidies for the pension fund will increase from €400 million to €2 billion by 2022. In June 2016, pension payments increased by an astonishingly high rate of 5.03% in the east of Germany and 4.35% in the west of Germany. This is the largest increase in pension payments since 1993 and due to increasing wages and high employment rates. However, increasing health care contribution rates and long-term care insurance costs will reduce the level of net pension increases. Even so, the statutory pension level is expected to decrease about 6% by 2045 due to the current pension adjustment formula. This expected decrease has been hotly discussed, but no legislative reforms have been undertaken.”⁵⁴

In Germany and elsewhere, the dependency ratio is an indication of the strength of demographic pressure. The six demographically “oldest” countries are Sweden, Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Italy. Sweden’s and Finland’s performance in this respect is all the more surprising, as it manages to score very highly in terms of intergenerational justice despite the strong demographic pressure. This is a sign that the right social policy steps have been taken in recent years.

Sweden and Denmark also perform well in another aspect of intergenerational justice: pursuing policies that ensure financial sustainability. Sweden’s public debt ratio of “only” 41.7% of GDP takes 9th place in cross-EU comparison. Denmark, currently ranked 7th with a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 39.8%, could improve its score by a few percentage points. Estonia once again performs best on this mea-

53 Ágh, Dieringer, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

54 Rüb, Heinemann, Ulbricht, and Zohnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 44 Age dependency ratio

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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sure, with debt totaling 9.5% of GDP. In this regard, Estonia holds a rather solitary position at the top of the ranking. Only 12 countries fulfill the Maastricht criterion addressing this issue with debt ratios of less than 60% of their GDP.

Following a strong increase in debt during the course of the crisis, only a few countries have returned to a clearly positive track. Germany is among these countries, as it was able to reduce its public debt to 67.7% of GDP (2010: 80.3%). Ireland, too, has reduced its debt very significantly from 119.6% of GDP in 2013 to 76.4% in 2016. Discussing the reasons behind this tremendous improvement, the country experts note that “the combined effect of onshoring intellectual property and contract manufacturing was the most significant driver of the 2015 increase in GDP, and for the revised growth rates of 8.5% for GDP and 9.2% for GNP in 2014. A secondary driver of these growth rates was the rise in aircraft leasing operations financed in the Irish Financial Services Center (IFSC).... The rapid improvement in

FIGURE 45 Public debt

Unit: Percent of GDP



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2012 or 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016).

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the fiscal situation has been aided by the continuation of several favorable external developments, such as the fall in the euro exchange rate against the dollar, lower imported energy costs, relatively rapid growth in U.S. and UK markets that are particularly important for Irish exporters, and the continued low interest rate environment in the EU. International financial markets rapidly revised their view of the Irish economy as growth resumed and now show confidence in the soundness of Irish fiscal policies, as reflected in the fall in the yield on long-term government debt (ten-year bonds).⁵⁵

In some of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, national debt has once again increased or remained at a high level. For instance, Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio is now at 132.6% (2007: 99.8%), and Greece, too, has not yet managed to make any headway in reducing its ratio of 181.3%. Moreover, countries such as France and

55 Murphy, Mitchell, and Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Belgium have seen their debt levels rising significantly over the last nine years: France's public debt now amounts to 96.7% of annual economic output, while Belgium fares even worse with a debt ratio of 105.5%. However, the negative trend seems to have been halted, as debt levels in both countries did not rise further from 2015 to 2016. Portugal, however, having successfully reduced debt somewhat and increase its GDP the previous year, now faces an all-time high of public debt (130.3%). Spain, which numbers among those at the bottom of the ranking on this indicator, has at least proven able to stabilize its ratio (around 100%) over the past three years.

Thus, despite the strong policy focus on budget consolidation, the budgetary situation – when viewed in terms of an EU average – has not shown substantial improvement. The average debt level on a cross-EU basis rose from 62.3% of GDP in 2008 to a current level of 85.7%, which is only marginally lower than the previous years. In Cyprus, debt levels more than doubled between 2007 (53.2%) and 2016 (108%). The same applies to Croatia (2016: 84.4%; 2007: 37.8%), while Spain is facing almost triple the ratio compared to pre-crisis levels (2016: 99.3%; 2007: 35.5%). The fiscal burden for future generations especially in the southern European countries, but also in some of the EU's founding members, such as France and Belgium, thus remains immense.


By contrast, investment in the future in the form of spending on research and development (R&D) has stagnated across the European Union. Only three countries – Austria, Sweden and Denmark – have managed to achieve the EU-2020 goal of an investment ratio of 3% of GDP. At 3.17%, Finland was the best performer in cross-EU comparison in the previous year, but dropped to 2.9% on this key indicator in the current survey. This year, the ranking is led by Sweden with 3.26%. Its investments in this field have traditionally been high, though experts observe that the country has only recently been able to convert this spending into commensurate top-performing outputs: “Governments – center-right as well as Social Democratic-Green – rarely miss an opportunity to reinforce the argument that public spending on higher education, research institutions, and research and development in general is integral to future prosperity and wealth. There is nothing suggesting that the commitment among all major political players to R&D spending is about to change. While R&D spending has a long history, converting research and development concepts into valuable products has been far more challenging for Sweden. The “Swedish paradox,” as it is called, is precisely the inability to convert research findings into commercially viable products. However, as recent data show, Sweden now ranks first with regard to patent applications and license fees for intellectual property. This is a valid indicator that R&D is bearing fruit, as securing intellectual ownership of emerging products is a critical stage in the process from the research facility to the market. Public policy has targeted this very issue lately and the data suggest that R&D is now increasingly paying off.”⁵⁶

By contrast, with investment ratios below 0.7%, countries such as Latvia, Cyprus and Romania lie at the tail end of the ranking. However, according to the SGI country experts, Romania's R&D policy has at least seen some improvements compared with previous years: “Years of mismanagement and underinvestment

56 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 46 Research and development spending

Unit: Percent of GDP



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2007 or 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012 or 2013; e: 2014; f: 2014 or 2015).

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in the sciences and industries which drive research development have resulted in a brain drain of innovators, educators and entrepreneurs. In line with the National Research-Development and Innovation Plan 2015-2020 adopted by the Ponta government, R&D spending has grown. Romania's research budget increased by one-third from 2015 to 2016 and was paired with investments and grants from various sources including the European Research Council, Norwegian Financial Mechanism, and Research and Innovation Center of the Ford Motor Company. The increased budget will close out existing projects and provide initial funding to new projects in research, development and innovation, with particular attention paid to green industry. Romania's current status as an emergent high-tech and communications hub has driven private and public sector innovation. However, this increased funding might take some time before actually reaching interested researchers. UEFISCDI, the state authority in charge of disbursing research funds, has been very slow in organizing funding competitions and adjudicating applica-

tions. As in previous years, there is the danger that funding for winning applications might be considerably delayed.”⁵⁷

FIGURE 47 Greenhouse gas emissions

Unit: Tons in CO₂ equivalents



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015).

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In addition to the Nordic and Baltic countries' generally future-oriented family, pension and budget policies, their strong performance with regard to intergenerational justice also derives from a relatively good record in the area of environmental sustainability. For example, Sweden features by far the EU's highest share of renewable energy sources in its overall energy consumption (53.9%). With regard to Sweden's environmental policy efforts the country experts note: "As is the case with global social injustice, Sweden tries to be a forerunner in environmental policy as well. Environmental policy made its way onto the political agenda in the 1970s and has remained a salient set of issues. With its legacy

57 Wagner, Stan, and Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

FIGURE 48 Renewable energy (consumption)

Unit: Percent



Source: Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015).

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as a high-energy consuming industrial economy, Sweden certainly has a long way to go, but the data suggest its environmental policy is working. (...) After the 2014 elections, the Social Democrats formed a coalition government with the Greens. While both the Social Democrats and the Greens are strongly committed to “green” issues, it seems as if the Greens’ ascendance to power has further increased the attention on environmental issues. Nonetheless, the two coalition partners do disagree on some issues. For instance, they do not seem to agree on the future of nuclear power; the Social Democrats want to study the issue further whereas the Greens want to shut down two reactors before the next elections (in 2018).”⁵⁸ In terms of the share of renewable energy in overall energy consumption, Finland (39.3%) and Latvia (37.6%) follow at second and third place. Austria also places relatively well with 33%. The EU average is at 16.7%, marking a slow yet steady overall increase over the past years. This demonstrates, however, how

58 Pierre, Jochem, and Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

far behind countries such as Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom remain. These four countries, with renewable energy shares between 8.2% (UK) and 5% (Luxembourg), lie at the bottom end of the comparison.

In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, Sweden again serves as a role model for the remainder of the EU member states. With a significant gap, Croatia, Lithuania and Romania follow on rank two to four. Ireland, Estonia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg show the most significant deficits in this regard. In the case of the Netherlands the SGI country experts observe a problematic trend: "Environmental policy is no longer a significant issue among the public in the Netherlands. According to a 2011 Eurobarometer study, only about half of the population supports a progressive environmental policy (e.g., one that addresses climate change, with a sustainable energy policy). Climate skepticism has won a voice in the States General through the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) and the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). Although government references to sustainable growth are largely rhetorical, as GDP growth and job creation clearly have priority over criteria reflecting environmental and social sustainability. While the future development of a low-CO₂ energy system has been agreed, the government has failed to demonstrate a strong political commitment to climate change policy and develop a long-term energy strategy. The government has preferred to pursue quick policy wins with structural reforms receiving insufficient attention."⁵⁹

59 Country Experts Netherlands Environment (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

III. Methodology

“Social justice” is a central constitutive element of the legitimacy and stability of any political community.⁶⁰ Yet defining what social justice means and how best to achieve it is often subject to considerable controversy. The conceptual boundaries of social justice are continually in flux because the idea is a result of culturally and historically dependent value systems. Nevertheless, a modern concept of social justice that refers to the aim of realizing equal opportunities and life chances provides us a conceptual ideal able to garner the consensus needed for a sustainable social market economy. This paradigm suggests that establishing social justice depends less on compensating for exclusion than it does on investing in inclusion. Instead of an “equalizing” distributive justice or a simply *formal* equality of life chances in which the rules of the game and codes of procedure are applied equally, this concept of justice is concerned with guaranteeing each individual *genuinely* equal opportunities for self-realization through the targeted investment in the development of individual “capabilities.”⁶¹

Thus, within the scope of his or her own personal freedom, every individual should be empowered to pursue a self-determined course of life, and to participate in society more broadly. Specific social backgrounds, such as membership in a particular social group or demographic category would not, according to this concept of social justice, be allowed to negatively affect one’s opportunities to succeed in life.⁶² By focusing on opportunities for self-realization, such a concept avoids the blind spots of an efficient market-driven, simply formal procedural justice on the one hand and a compensatory distributional justice on the other, and thus ultimately establishes a bridge between rival political ideologies.⁶³

Government policies of redistribution function as an instrument of social justice and are conceived in terms of an investment rather than compensation. Within

60 This chapter and several other conceptual and methodological parts of this study contain elements of the previous publication “Social Justice in the OECD: How Do the Member States Compare” (Schraad-Tischler 2011) and “Social Justice in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison” (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll 2014).

61 See Sen (1993; 2009); Merkel (2001; 2007); Merkel and Giebler (2009), pp. 192–194.

62 See Rawls (1971); on the underlying principles of “equal opportunity” see Roemer (1998: 1), who distinguishes between a “level-the-playing-field principle” and a “nondiscrimination principle”: “An instance of the first principle is that compensatory education be provided for children from disadvantaged social backgrounds, so that a larger proportion of them will acquire skills required to compete, later on, for jobs against persons with more advantaged childhoods. An instance of the second principle is that race or sex, as such, should not count for or against a person’s eligibility for a position, when race or sex is an irrelevant attribute insofar as the performance of the duties of the position is concerned.” The concept of social justice applied in the present report covers both principles. It is important to note that the concept of social justice employed here emphasizes less the principle of equality *per se* than it does the principle of individual freedom, which can be exercised only when the state and a society establish the most level playing field possible for the pursuit of life chances. See in this regard Merkel and Giebler (2009: 193–195).

63 See Vehrkamp (2007), p. 11.

the conceptual framework of economic and social participation, redistributing resources within a community are a legitimate, if not essential, means of empowering all to take advantage of the opportunities around them. In this sense, social justice can be understood as a guiding principle for a participatory society that activates and enables its members. A sustainable social market economy able to combine the principles of market efficiency with those of social justice requires the state to take on a role that goes beyond that of a “night watchman.” It requires a strong state led by actors who understand the need for social equity as a means of ensuring participation opportunities.

The Social Justice Index presented here is informed by this paradigm and encompasses those areas of policy that are particularly important for developing individual capabilities and opportunities for participation in society. In addition to the fundamental issue of preventing poverty, the Social Justice Index explores areas related to an inclusive education system, labor market access, social cohesion, health and intergenerational justice.

In so doing, the Social Justice Index dovetails with current EU efforts to monitor social affairs in the member states as mandated in the ten-year strategy issued by the European Commission in 2010, “Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth” (hereafter referred to as the Europe 2020 strategy), as well as in the Commission’s important new “European Pillar of Social Rights” initiative. The European Pillar of Social Rights outlines a number of key principles and rights intended to support fair and smoothly functioning labor markets and welfare systems. It is designed to serve as a compass guiding a renewed approach to ensuring improved working and living conditions across all participating member states. It is primarily conceived for the euro area, but is applicable to all member states wishing to participate.⁶⁴

The EU itself collects vast quantities of various data relevant to issues of social inclusion, all of which are open to public access through Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office. For the purpose of tracking the implementation of each policy objective formulated in the Pillar of Social Rights, the Commission has developed a specific tool, the so-called “Social Scoreboard.”⁶⁵ Based on a detailed set of indicators, which partially overlap with the indicators used in our Social Justice Index, the scoreboard helps compare the policy outcomes of all EU countries in key social policy areas. As part of the European Semester, this instrument, which will be applied through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), is thus designed to chart progress made in expanding social inclusion within member states.

While these efforts to institute regular reporting on key aspects of social inclusion in each member state are timely and extremely worthwhile, there has not been an instrument that links features of social justice with specific indicators to deliver a conceptually cohesive and empirically meaningful *overall* ranking of all EU member states in terms of social justice. The new “Social Scoreboard to the European Pillar of Social Rights” functions as a “dashboard” but stops short of offering overall country rankings. The Social Justice Index presented here is designed to fill

⁶⁴ Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_en

⁶⁵ <https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-scoreboard/>

this gap and thus measures on a regular basis the progress made and the ground lost on issues of social justice in each EU member state. Together, the Social Justice Index and the EU's Social Scoreboard can help promote the social dimension of the Europe 2020 strategy and the European Pillar of Social Rights by providing evidence-based analyses.

Such kinds of instruments are necessary if the EU is to develop a truly integrated strategy for economic progress *and* social justice. Raising awareness among the public of developments in social justice are instrumental to creating genuine political leverage capable of affecting change. Regular benchmarking in the form of a clearly communicable ranking can be of great help in this matter. The Social Justice Index ought to function as an illustrative example of how this can be achieved.

The following section explains the methodology underlying the Social Justice Index and its features. The index is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected by the Bertelsmann Stiftung within the framework of its SGI project (www.sgi-network.org). The SGI survey (sixth edition published in September 2017), which draws on 136 indicators, provides a systematic comparison of sustainable governance in 41 OECD and EU member states. Individual SGI indicators have been selected and aggregated for use in the Social Justice Index following a tested procedure for measuring social justice.⁶⁶

Clearly, no set of indicators can be expected to fully represent the complexity of social reality on the ground. Creating an index involves, by definition, the condensation of vast amounts of information. It also demands, at times, that pragmatic decisions be made when selecting indicators, given the limitations set by the availability of comparable data. In-depth case studies of specific countries are therefore required in order to provide a thicker description of the state of affairs in each policy area while at the same time ensuring that findings are properly contextualized.

Concept and indicators of the Social Justice Index

Drawing upon Wolfgang Merkel's conceptual and empirical groundwork, we can differentiate several dimensions for measuring the construct of social justice.⁶⁷ The Social Justice Index is composed of the following six dimensions: poverty prevention, access to education, labor market inclusion, social cohesion and non-discrimination, health, as well as intergenerational justice.

As a cross-national survey, the Social Justice Index comprises 30 quantitative and eight qualitative indicators, each associated with one of the six dimensions of social justice.⁶⁸ The data for the quantitative SGI indicators used in the Social

⁶⁶ The approach and procedure used here is derived from Merkel (2001; 2007) and Merkel and Giebler (2009).

⁶⁷ The methods of measuring social justice applied here are derived from those applied by Merkel (2001; 2007) and the approach and argument provided by Merkel and Giebler (2009). In contrast to Merkel and Giebler (2009), the index comprises six instead of seven dimensions to be measured. In addition, the weighting process and indicator set have been modified and supplemented. We are indebted to Dr. Margit Kraus (Calculus Consult) for providing important advice and feedback on statistical and technical issues, imputing missing values, and constructing Excel sheets for the aggregation of scores.

⁶⁸ A full list and description of individual indicators is provided in the appendix.

Justice Index is derived primarily from Eurostat and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The qualitative indicators reflect the evaluations provided by more than 100 experts responding to the SGI's survey of the state of affairs in various policy areas throughout the OECD and EU (see www.sgi-network.de). For these indicators, the rating scale ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). In order to ensure compatibility between the quantitative and qualitative indicators, all raw values for the quantitative indicators undergo linear transformation to give them a range of 1 to 10 as well.⁶⁹

According to Merkel and Giebler (2009), the first three dimensions of poverty prevention, access to education and labor market access carry the most conceptual value, which is why they are each weighted more heavily in creating the index. For the purposes of comparison, in addition to the weighted Social Justice Index, a non-weighted ranking was created in which the six dimensions were treated equally.⁷⁰ The findings discussed here derive from the weighted Social Justice Index.

The effective prevention of poverty plays a key role in measuring social justice. Under conditions of poverty, social participation and a self-determined life are possible only with great difficulty. The prevention of poverty and social exclusion is in a certain sense a *sine qua non* for social justice, and thereby takes precedence to the other dimensions from the perspective of justice theory. For this reason, the dimension of poverty prevention is weighted most strongly – in this case, given triple weight – in the overall ranking.

In line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU Social Justice Index uses the headline indicator “people at risk of poverty or social inclusion” to monitor poverty prevention. According to Eurostat, this indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are “at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living households with very low risk intensity.”⁷¹ At risk of poverty is defined as those persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk of poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons live in conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources. This means they cannot afford (and are therefore deprived of) at least four of the following nine items: the ability 1) to pay rent or utility bills, 2) to keep their home adequately warm, 3) to face unexpected expenses, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, 5) to take a week of vacation away from home, 6) to afford a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a color TV, or 9) a telephone. People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0–59 living in households where the adults (aged 18–59) worked less than 20% of their total work potential during the past year. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.⁷²

69 The period under review for the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017 survey extends from November 2015 to November 2016 (www.sgi-network.org). The raw data for the Social Justice Index is provided in the appendix. In order to ensure comparability over time, we use the SGI's method of fixed minimum and maximum values for each indicator. See Schraad-Tischler, and Seelkopf (2014).

70 See Table 1 in the appendix, p. 142.


71 Definitions taken from Eurostat's “Dataset details” website at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=T2020_50.

72 Ibid.

Comprised of several sub-indicators, the conceptual reach of this headline indicator extends far beyond a simple measure of relative income poverty. Indeed, the inclusion of severe material deprivation points to the problem of measuring non-monetary poverty in highly developed industrial countries. In order to conduct an in-depth empirical analysis, we have included the relevant sub-indicators of this particular headline indicator in the respective chapter on poverty prevention. In addition, age groups particularly at risk of poverty are accorded special attention, which is why poverty rates for children (0–17 years of age) and the elderly (over 65) are also considered in the analysis.

FIGURE 49 Social Justice Index – dimensions and indicators

Social Justice Index



Source: Own representation.

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Equal access to good-quality education is another essential factor in providing equitable capabilities and opportunities for advancement (vertical mobility). Social, political and economic participation depends in large part on this public good. To this end, the state must take care that genuinely equal educational opportunities are available to every child. Social or cultural background must not be allowed to adversely affect educational success. The importance of such conditions is emphasized in the Social Justice Index by doubly weighting the access to education dimension. The dimension considers efforts to provide early-childhood education, the role of socioeconomic background in students' economic success (drawing on the latest PISA data as a basis), the rate of early school-leavers, the rate of people with less than upper secondary attainment in the age group of 25 to 64 years and, finally, a qualitative expert assessment of educational policies, focusing particularly on the provision of high-quality education and equitable access opportunities.

Assuring equity in education opportunities is primarily an ethical imperative, since weak access to education and social poverty generate a vicious circle in which those lacking education access are denied opportunities for social betterment, and the socially disadvantaged are denied access to education. Breaking this vicious circle is a matter of solidarity and key to maintaining the social fabric of society. At the same time, it makes good economic sense to nourish and apply the talents and abilities of everyone in society, as much as is possible.

The labor market's degree of inclusiveness is likewise of considerable importance to social justice, as an individual's status is defined in large part by his or her participation in the workforce. Exclusion from the labor market substantially limits individual opportunities for self-realization, contributes to an increase in the risk of poverty, and can even lead to serious health stresses: "So long as gainful employment remains the primary means by which not only income, but also status, self-respect and social inclusion are distributed in developed societies, inclusion in the labor market must be a high priority for a just society" (Merkel and Giebler 2009: 198). This dimension is therefore also counted doubly in the overall ranking. In order to do even rudimentary justice to the complexity of this dimension, nine indicators were used to capture a more full understanding of employment and unemployment. Alongside the overall employment rate, the specific rates for 55- to 65-year-old workers, for foreign-born workers as compared to natives, and for women as compared to men are considered. Also, one indicator looks at the employment rate of people with disabilities as compared to people without disabilities (from 25 to 50 years). In addition, the labor market inclusion dimension examines the overall unemployment rate, and is supplemented by the long-term unemployment rate and the degree of labor market exclusion experienced by both young and low-skilled workers. Finally, two further indicators addressing the problem of precarious employment are included in this dimension: in-work poverty and the percentage of those persons involuntarily employed on a temporary basis.

The dimension of social cohesion and non-discrimination examines the extent to which trends toward social polarization, exclusion and the discrimination of specific groups are successfully countered. This dimension is factored into the Social Justice Index with a normal weight. Income disparities, measured in terms of the Gini coefficient, are taken into account here as a potentially important factor of

social polarization. However, from a social justice theory perspective, the issue of income inequality carries less conceptual salience relative to the first three dimensions of justice – namely poverty prevention, access to education and labor market inclusion.⁷³ To capture progress made in terms of gender equality, the number of seats in national legislatures held by women compared to the number of seats held by men is also considered. This dimension includes three qualitative indicators, each based on expert assessments. One of these indicators assesses how effectively social policies preclude social exclusion and decoupling from society, a second examines how effectively the state protects against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion, and a third evaluates how effectively policies support the integration of migrants into society. The latter question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education, and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. Furthermore, a new aggregated indicator has been included to assess specific forms of discrimination against people with disabilities. The indicator aggregates the values of three different indicators each designed to monitor the discrimination suffered by people with disabilities in three areas: access to education, access to medical treatments and access to a suitable dwelling (see also the description and definition of all indicators in the Annex, p. 146)⁷⁴. Finally, the so-called NEET rate, which refers to the number of young persons aged 20 to 24 who are not in education, employment or training and therefore face limited opportunities of economic and societal participation, is also factored into this dimension.

The fifth dimension of the Social Justice Index covers questions of equity in the area of health. In 2008, the World Health Organization's Commission on Social Determinants of Health pointed to dramatic differences in health within and between countries that are closely linked with degrees of social disadvantage: "These inequities in health, avoidable health inequalities, arise because of the circumstances in which people grow, live, work and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness. The conditions in which people live and die are, in turn, shaped by political, social and economic forces. Social and economic policies have a determining impact on whether a child can grow and develop to its full potential and live a flourishing life, or whether its life will be blighted."⁷⁵ Given these considerations, an assessment of social justice must also take into account the issue of health. However, identifying meaningful indicators for which data is available for all EU states is not an easy task. Nevertheless, there are some indicators giving us at least a basic impression of differing degrees of fairness, inclusiveness and quality between the EU countries' health systems. We use three quantitative indicators and one qualitative indicator. The qualitative indicator from our SGI survey assesses to what extent policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care. The rationale behind the question is that public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population, at the lowest possible costs. Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency – quality and inclusiveness are given priority over

73 See Merkel and Giebler (2009), pp. 199–200.

74 We are greatly indebted to Fundacion Once (Spain) and the EFC Disability Thematic Network (Brussels) for providing important conceptual advice with regard to the incorporation of new indicators on the participation opportunities of persons with disabilities. In this context, we are also indebted to Professor Jorge Calero (University of Barcelona) for collecting and calculating the values for the new indicators based on EU-SILC data

75 Cf. www.who.int/social_determinants/thecommission/finalreport/en/index.html.

cost efficiency. Two quantitative indicators are drawn from the European Health Consumer Index (EHCI): the first captures the outcome performance of each country's health system; the second addresses the question of accessibility and range of services. Finally, we use also use the indicators "healthy life expectancy at birth" and "self-reported unmet need for medical help" as provided by Eurostat. As inequalities in health can be seen as being strongly determined by misguided developments in other areas, such as poverty prevention, education or the labor market, the health dimension is factored into the index with a normal weight.

The sixth dimension of the Social Justice Index approaches the issue of intergenerational justice. The issue at stake here is the need for contemporary generations to lead lives they value without compromising the ability of future generations to do the same. This dimension, which is factored into the index with a simple weight, is comprised of three components. The first component addresses policy support for both younger and older generations. The former is captured through the SGI's qualitative "family policy" indicator, the latter through the "pension policy" indicator, which is also qualitative. In order to reflect each country's specific demographic challenge, the old-age dependency ratio is also considered here. The second component focuses on the idea of environmental sustainability and measures this on the one hand with the help of a qualitative indicator for environmental and resource protection policy, on the other through two quantitative indicators: greenhouse gas emissions in CO₂ equivalents per capita and the share of energy from renewable resources in gross final energy consumption. The third component, which is concerned with economic and fiscal sustainability, is comprised of two quantitative indicators. The first of which highlights public spending on research and innovation as an investment in future prosperity, and the second points to national debt levels as a mortgage to be paid by future generations.

Child and youth opportunity index

Social justice for children and youth is key to ensuring a sustainable society. It is without doubt ethically and morally right to provide all children and youth the greatest possible spectrum of participation opportunities. Every child, indeed every member of society, should be in a position to make the most of their lives in the context of their individual potential and personal freedoms. Whether a child is born into poverty or wealth should play no role, for example, in their educational opportunity. Societies must therefore invest in the capabilities and potential inherent to individuals in order to expand opportunities for self-realization and decouple access to such opportunities from an individual's socioeconomic background. This is an ethical-moral imperative.

But there are also several economic reasons to promote equal access to opportunities for children and youth. The positive effects of a level playing ground on job prospects, income levels and even health have been clearly documented in evidence-based studies. And the positive impact these benefits have on financing social safety nets or facilitating a country's innovation and productivity levels are obvious.

In order to compare across the EU the extent to which participation opportunities for children and youth are ensured, we created a Child and Youth Opportunity

Index that draws on data from the Social Justice Index. Simple and transparent in design, this subindex is comprised of four key indicators that are particularly relevant to issues associated with children and youth participation opportunities.

- The first indicator, the EU headline indicator “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” for children and youth up to 17 years of age, is taken from the Social Justice Index’s poverty prevention dimension. This indicator is comprised of three further indicators: income poverty, severe material deprivation and people living in quasi-jobless households.
- The second and third indicators are taken from the equitable education dimension: socioeconomic impact on educational performance and the number of early school-leavers.
- The fourth indicator, which tracks the so-called NEET rate, is from the labor market access dimension. This indicator, which measures the number of young people who are neither in the labor force nor education or training, highlights problems in education-to-work transitions. Young people who are not participating in either education or the labor market face a highly precarious situation with narrowing future opportunities.

Following the Social Justice Index’s normative model, the poverty prevention indicator used in this subindex is weighted more strongly than the other three. Comprised of three indicators, the poverty prevention indicator accounts for 50% of the total calculation, whereas the other three indicators together account for the remaining 50%.

IV. Twenty-eight country profiles


Austria

Austria's overall SJI performance has been fairly stable since our first survey in 2008. With a score of 6.69, the country ranks 8th among the 28 EU member states. Austria ranks among the top ten on five of the six social justice dimensions considered in this study. With regard to children and youth, Austria places 8th on this subindex with a score of 6.68.


While Austria's overall performance on the SJI surpasses many EU peers, it continues to excel most at ensuring broadly inclusive access to its labor market. With a score of 7.06, the country ranks 4th on this dimension, behind Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. The employment rate, 71.5% in 2016, has modestly improved since 2008. Over this period, the employment of older workers (55 – 64 years) has increased by 13 percentage points, though at 49.2% it continues

Austria

EU Social Justice Index 2017



Source: Own calculations.



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to lag well behind the majority of surveyed countries. Austria continues to have by far the lowest incidence of involuntary temporary employment. A comparatively small 9.1% (2016) of working-age Austrians are in temporary work because they could not find a permanent position. In comparison, the rate in Denmark, which ranks 4th on this measure, is 36.7%.

In total, 6.1% of the working-age population were unemployed in 2016, well below the double-digit rates observed in France and southern Europe (except Malta). Austria also features among the lowest rates of youth unemployment, placing 5th. At 11.2%, the rate is comparatively low, but it has been steadily rising since 2008 (9.4%). The SGI country report notes: “One factor contributing to the still quite successful labor market outcomes is the social partnership between the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) and the Austrian Economic Chambers. Many labor market policies in Austria are effectuated through the Public Employment Service, another institution key to the country’s employment successes. The Austrian dual system of vocational education, in which young people receive on-the-job vocational training while still attending school, has also been successful, and is increasingly drawing international attention.”⁷⁶ This vocational education “is primarily aimed at individuals who want to take up work at the age of 15, but is accessible up to the age of 18.”⁷⁷

Austria’s performance with regard to providing equitable access to education is more mediocre. With a score of 6.33, the country ranks 13th on this dimension. The average Austrian student’s PISA results (492 in 2015) are 30 points or more below those of students in Estonia and Finland. Most worrying, Austria places 21st with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. “The reason for this underperformance is seen by research institutions and experts such as the OECD to lie with the early division of children into multiple educational tracks, which takes place after the fourth grade. The result is that parents’ social status is reflected in students’ ability to access higher education, more so than in comparable countries.”⁷⁸ A similar unjust impact of background can also be seen in the education outcomes of immigrants. Austria ranks the fourth worst in the EU for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students, again highlighting policy failures to integrate marginalized segments of society. “[C]hildren from migrant families have a more difficult task in qualifying for higher education, and are often stuck in the lowest type of school, called a special school (Sonderschule), undermining their chances for future labor market success.”⁷⁹

Belgium


Belgium’s SJI score of 6.18 places it 13th among the countries of the EU. Its performance has remained stable since 2008, the first SJI assessment year. The country ranks among the top ten on two of the six social justice dimensions in our study, placing 6th in the health dimension and 10th in the social cohesion and non-dis-

76 Pelinka/Winter-Ebmer/Zohlnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.



crimination dimension. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Belgium ranks 18th with a score of 5.91.

Belgium continues to rank highest on our health dimension, with a score of 7.64. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Belgian health policy has succeeded in achieving short wait times as well as a high range and wide reach of health services, ranking the country 2nd in the EU (surpassed in 2016 for the first time by the Netherlands). Also, the EHCI places the country 9th for its health system outcomes. This is particularly praiseworthy as the health outcomes for Belgians have much improved since 2008. These improved outcomes are also reflected in an increase in healthy life years. On average, Belgians can expect 64.2 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 5). The Belgian government received a score of 7 out of 10 from the SGI country experts for its health policies. The SGI researchers find health care “[c]overage is broad and inclusive,” that the system is efficient, and health services are “quite affordable, thanks to generous subsidies.”⁸⁰ They note, however, that “Belgium insufficiently emphasizes prevention, and spends more than similar countries on subsidized drugs, which generates a structural increase in health policy costs and hampers long-run sustainability within the health care system.”⁸¹

The Belgian government does face numerous policy challenges, particularly related to intergenerational justice. With a score of 5.12, the country ranks 19th on this dimension (effectively on par with Slovakia). Belgium places among the

80 Castanheira/Rihoux/Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

81 Ibid.

bottom third on several measures of intergenerational justice related to environmental protection and public debt. A low 7.9% of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) comes from renewable sources (rank: 25, 2015). While this share has more than tripled since 2006, it falls far short of most EU countries. Five countries, including Denmark, Austria and Latvia, exceed 30% renewables in their energy mix. The Belgium economy also emitted 10.2 tons of greenhouse gases per capita (rank: 22, 2015). “Belgium’s environmental policy is...split between the federal government and the three regions, which makes it largely unmanageable. (...) In practice, this means that environmental policy in Belgium remains largely uncoordinated, local and inefficient.”⁸² Regarding fiscal sustainability, the sizable public debt, 105.5% of GDP in 2016 (rank: 24), remains a concern. “One ticking time bomb continues to be the implicit pension debt related to entitlements that will be owed to current workers in 10 to 20 years.”⁸³ Both the extreme level of public debt and lack of consequential climate change mitigation policies threatens to saddle future generations with the excesses incurred today.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria’s overall performance on the SJI continues to place it among the EU countries most urgently in need of policy reforms. With a score of 4.19, the country ranks 26th. On four of the six social justice dimensions in our study, Bulgaria ranks among the bottom fourth of countries. Most troubling, the country places last both in poverty prevention as well as social cohesion and non-discrimination. With regard to children and youth, Bulgaria places 27th on this subindex with a score of 3.81.


Bulgaria ranks highest on our education dimension, albeit with only mediocre performance. With a score of 6.23, the country ranks 14th on this dimension. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on pre-primary education totaled 1.05% in 2014 (the most recent reported year), placing the country a commendable 3rd. In 2016, 82.3% of the working-age population had attained at least an upper secondary education (rank: 14), a five percentage point improvement over 2007. Notwithstanding, the share in first-place Lithuania is 94.6%. Bulgaria continues to struggle with reducing the number of early school-leavers. The number of 18-to-24-year olds who drop out of education or training, currently at 13.8% (rank: 23), has fluctuated little since 2008. The SGI country experts note “serious skill mismatches, with secondary and tertiary schools producing a surplus of people specialized in areas where labor demand is low, and severe deficits of people specialized in areas where demand is high, such as engineering and IT.”⁸⁴ Also, the average Bulgarian student’s PISA results (440 in 2015) are more than 80 points below those of students in Estonia and Finland. Most worrying, Bulgaria places 25th with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. “[T]he school dropout rate among minorities, especially Roma, is significantly higher than the average, meaning that schools do not provide the same opportunities for all ethnic groups.”⁸⁵

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ganev/Popova/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

85 Ibid.




While the Bulgarian government faces numerous major policy challenges, none is greater than keeping its population out of poverty (score: 1.39, rank: 28). Despite a 20 percentage point improvement compared to 2007, an alarming 40.4% (2016) of Bulgarians remain at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest share in the EU. This rate remains over 25 percentage points higher than that seen in first-place Czech Republic. Within this at-risk population, 31.9% do not have the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone). Of greatest concern is the fact that, among the population at risk, seniors and children are faring the worst. The average Bulgarian senior faces a situation worse than that faced by their counterparts in all other EU countries: 45.9% are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Of these seniors, 37.5% suffer from severe material deprivation and 24.3% are at risk of poverty. Similarly alarming, 45.6% of Bulgarian children and youth are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the second-highest rate in the EU. Among this at-risk population under 18 years of age, 36.1% suffer from severe material deprivation and 31.9% are at risk of poverty. Progress, however, can be seen: the incidence of severe material deprivation, among the sub-groups as well as the total population, is markedly lower than it was in 2008. Most significantly, the rate among seniors decreased by 30 percentage points.

Croatia

Overall, Croatia's position on the SJI continues to place it among the worse performing EU countries. The country's score of 5.07 ranks it 23rd and demonstrates only a minor improvement over previous assessments. Croatia ranks among the bottom five on three of the six social justice dimensions in our study. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Croatia has progressively improved and now ranks 12th with a score of 6.32.

In terms of equitable education, Croatia (score: 6.91, rank: 8) has several strengths, but the quality of education trails many other EU countries. The education system continues to feature the lowest dropout incidence in the EU (2.8% in 2016). The number of 18-to-24-year olds who leave education or training has nearly halved since peaking in 2010 at 5.2%. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on pre-primary education totaled 0.66% in 2011 (the most recent reported year), ranking the country 8th. The education system also performs above average in ensuring that learning opportunities do not favor particular socioeconomic groups, ranking the country 12th with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. However, education quality lags behind EU standards, as vocational education is decoupled from market demands, the country grapples with a major skills mismatch. The average Croatian student's PISA results (475 in 2015) were more than 45 points below those of students in Estonia and Finland, placing the country in the bottom third.

Croatia's most perilous social justice challenge remains labor market access (score: 4.35, rank: 26). In 2016, only 56.9% of working-age Croatians were employed (a



progressive, though small, improvement since 52.5% in 2013), ranking the country ahead of only Greece. In comparison, the employment rate is above 70% in eight EU countries. In addition, only 38.1% of older workers were employed, again the second-lowest share in the EU. Those in temporary employment involuntarily made up 80.1% of all temporary workers, a 30 percentage point increase over 2013. The overall unemployment rate hit 17.5% in 2013 before decreasing to 13.3% in 2016 (rank: 26). After peaking in 2013 at 11.1%, the number of persons unemployed for a year or more has decreased to 6.7% (rank: 25). In comparison, the share is below 2% in the top five performing EU countries. Those with less than upper secondary education are unemployed at a higher rate (16.8%), but have witnessed an improvement over 2014, when the share was 24.4%. The labor market condition for youth has also improved, but they continue to fare the worst, with 31.3% of 15-to-24-year-old Croatians unemployed (rank: 25). The SGI country report notes that “[w]hile the economic recovery contributed to the decline in unemployment, the main underlying factor has been the shrinking domestic labor force due to strong emigration to other EU countries. (...) [L]ittle has been done to facilitate job creation. From a comparative perspective, it is the low rate of job creation rather than a high rate of job destruction that underlies the weak labor market performance in Croatia.”⁸⁶


Cyprus

Cyprus’ current SJI score of 5.31, a nominal improvement over our previous three assessments, places the country 21st in the EU. On two of the six social justice dimensions in our study, Cyprus finds itself among the five worst-performing countries. Most troubling, the country places second-to-last in intergenerational justice. With regard to children and youth, the country places 17th on this subindex with a score of 6.02.

Cyprus continues to rank highest on our education dimension. With a score of 6.72, the country places 10th on this dimension. The Cyprian education system ranks 1st for the comparatively low impact socioeconomic factors have on the PISA results of its students. Yet, Cyprus’ policies for ensuring that educational opportunities are equitable, while praiseworthy, have failed in one vital aspect: quality. In 2015, the average Cyprian student’s PISA results were 85 points or more below those of students in Estonia and Finland, ranking it second-to-last. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on pre-primary education totaled 0.36% in 2014 (the most recent reported year), ranking Cyprus 23rd. Much evidence has shown that these early investments in children’s education yield significant, lifelong positive effects. Also, for a time, the education system was succeeding in reducing student dropout, but this is now on the rise. In 2016, the number of 18-to-24-year olds who left education or training rose to 7.7%, placing the country 13th. The SGI experts note optimistically that the “primarily knowledge-based education is ceding ground to more focus on research, experimentation and critical thought.”⁸⁷

86 Petak/Bartlett/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

87 Christophorou/Axt/Karadag (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.



Cyprus faces major challenges in securing outcomes that are intergenerationally just. Like many other EU countries, Cyprus has been witnessing a growing gap between the generations in recent years. The number of children and youth threatened by poverty or social exclusion is higher (29.6% in 2016) than in 2007 (20.8%). In the same period, the risk of poverty or social exclusion among senior citizens declined from 55.6% in 2007 to 22.9%. “The guaranteed minimum income (GMI) program and special allowances have partially mitigated the economic crisis’s worst ills, partly compensating for the cuts in benefits and pensions that affected vulnerable groups. Pensioners, particularly people living alone, and above all women, seem to have benefited significantly from the GMI, while still facing high risks of poverty and social exclusion.”⁸⁸ In contrast, the SGI country experts flagged Cyprian family policy as inadequate, scoring it 4 out of 10 (the lowest score in our sample). “A lack of adequate family support policies leads to, among other things, a low rate of enrollment in nurseries and child-care centers. Combining motherhood with employment is difficult in Cyprus, which may also account for the country’s low birth rates. (...) [S]tate coverage of nursery fees and the resolution of other problems are needed to prevent young mothers from having to choose between employment and providing young children care.”⁸⁹

Intergenerational justice also requires a sustainable public budget. Cyprus, however, continues to rank among the five EU countries with the highest public debt. At 108.0% of GDP (2016), the government has more than doubled gross debt compared to 2007 (53.1%). While public debt has risen, total expenditure on research


⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

and development remains at just 0.5% of GDP. This places the country last (with Romania) and undermines the innovation dexterity necessary to maintain high employment in a modern economy. Finally, a truly broad-based social justice strategy requires the sustainable management of natural resources and preservation of a country's vital ecological habitats. However, Cyprus shows major weaknesses in this respect as well. A low 9.4% of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) comes from renewable sources (rank: 22, 2015). While this share has nearly tripled since 2006, it falls short of most EU countries. Five countries, including Denmark, Austria and Latvia, exceed 30% renewables in their energy mix. "Exploitation of solar energy has begun to improve only recently, but progress in using renewable resources remains slow overall. (...) [M]ajor challenges persist with regard to waste management and the development of a comprehensive policy framework that prioritizes the protection of the environment and sustainability."⁹⁰

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic ranks a commendable 4th overall on the current SJI with a score of 6.84. The country's performance has modestly, but progressively improved since our first assessment in 2008. The Czech Republic ranks among the top ten on three of the six social justice dimensions in our study. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the Czech Republic ranks 11th with a score of 6.33.



90 Ibid.

The Czech government can be lauded for several policy successes relating to social justice, in particular the fight against poverty. With a score of 7.81, the country ranks 1st in the EU. At 13.3%, the Czech Republic has the lowest share of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU (2016). To put this in context, this rate is the lowest in our longitudinal study and 3 percentage points lower than in second-place Finland. The contours of this policy achievement can be seen across a range of related indicators. The share of children and youth (under 18) at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 17.4%. Those 65 or older fare particularly well, with a comparatively low 10.1% at risk. In terms of income poverty, a relative advantage can again be seen. The Czech population, as a whole, is the least at-risk-of income poverty: only 9.7% receive 60% or less of the median income (after social transfers). Among the populations under 18 and seniors these rates respectively increase to 14.7% and decrease to 8.1%. The SGI country experts attribute this success “to a favorable employment picture and a still rather redistributive social policy.”⁹¹ There are, however, “substantial differences between regions and ethnic groups. Since 2006, the number of areas of social exclusion (defined as those where more than 20% of inhabitants live in inadequate conditions) has doubled to about 600, now covering more than 100,000 people. In more than half of these areas, Roma form a majority.”


The picture is more mixed when it comes to labor market access (score: 6.46, rank: 11). The Czech government ranks among the top ten on several indicators assessing access to the labor market. In 2016, the Czech Republic’s unemployment rate of 4.0% ranked 1st in the EU. The percentage of unemployed who have been out of work for a year or more, 1.7% (rank: 4), likewise appears to be progressively readjusting to below pre-global financial crisis levels. Youth unemployment, which has remained persistently higher, was 10.5% in 2016, a marked improvement over the 19% seen in 2013. In line with these trends, the overall employment rate in 2016 was higher than it had been in 2007 (72.0% versus 66.1%). Yet, not all of our labor market measures paint such a rosy picture. For instance, those in temporary employment involuntarily make up 79.9% of all temporary workers (2016), a 16 percentage point increase over 2007. Those with less than upper secondary education were unemployed at a higher rate (19.2%), but have witnessed an improvement over 2013, when the share was 23.4%. “[G]roups such as parents with small children, low-skilled workers, people with disabilities and Roma are still strongly disadvantaged on the labor market. Parents with small children and single parents are hampered in labor force participation by a shortage of affordable child-care services together with the limited use of flexible working hours. Low-skilled employment has suffered from tax disincentives, a weak capacity of public employment services and low regional mobility.”⁹²

Denmark

Denmark continues to be one of the most socially just countries in the EU. It ranks 1st, ahead of Sweden and Finland, with an overall score of 7.39. This score is an improvement over previous SJI assessment years. Denmark’s overall success is broad-based, with the country ranking in the top five on five of our six social

91 Guasti/Mansfeldová/Myant/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

92 Ibid.



justice dimensions (it places 9th in the other dimension, health). With regard to children and youth, the country places 1st on this subindex with a score of 7.58.

Danish public policy has successfully confronted a broad spectrum of social justice issues. One policy area particularly worth highlighting relates to the country's success at promoting a well-functioning labor market. Denmark ranks 1st among the 28 EU member countries on our dimension labor market access, scoring 7.63. The employment rate stood at 74.9% in 2016, behind only Sweden. The rate among older workers (those 55 to 64 years old) has risen from 58.9% in 2007 to 67.8% (rank 3). Denmark also continues to have among the lowest incidences of involuntary temporary employment. In 2016, 36.7% (rank: 4) of working-age Danes were in temporary work because they could not find a permanent position. Unemployment appears to have stabilized at 6.3% after hitting a high of 7.6% in 2010. This rate, however, remains double the share reported in 2007. The number of persons unemployed for a year or more has decreased to 1.4% (rank: 2). The unemployment rate among workers with less than upper secondary education was likewise comparatively low, standing at 6.6 percent. These various measures, when taken as a whole, demonstrate that the Danish labor market, thanks to sound active labor market policies, is effectively ensuring that employment benefits a broad spectrum of workers. "The main challenge in the Danish labor market remains among groups with low qualifications. Since minimum wages are relatively high, it is difficult for individuals with weak qualifications to find stable jobs."⁹³

93 Laursen/Andersen/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

Denmark ranks lowest on our health dimension, with a comparatively high score of 7.43 (rank: 9). According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Danish health policy ranks 8th (with Finland) in achieving short wait times as well as a high range and wide reach of health services. Also, the EHCI places the country 4th for its health system outcomes, behind Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. These sound outcomes, however, are not reflected in healthy life years. On average, Danes can expect 59.0 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 19), 8.5 years less than in 2006. In 2015 (the latest reported year), 1.3% of surveyed Danes reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 12). “There has been a trend of increasing health expenditures, mainly driven by a policy shift from a top-down system to a more demand-driven system. This shift has been motivated by a concern about long waiting lists; to address this, the government has moved to offer a ‘time guarantee,’ where patients in the public health care system can turn to a private provider if a public hospital can’t meet a specified wait time limit for treatment.”⁹⁴

Estonia

Estonia once again numbers among the better-performing EU countries on the SJI. With an overall score of 6.19, it ranks 12th. Across the six social justice dimensions that comprise our index, Estonia places among the top ten in three dimensions (intergenerational justice, labor market access and equitable education). On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Estonia places 6th with a score of 6.77.

Estonia generally demonstrates the greatest success with respect to ensuring outcomes are intergenerationally just. With a score of 6.69, the country ranks 4th in the EU. The SGI researchers awarded the government scores of 9 out of 10 for both its family and environmental policies and a score of 7 for its pension policy. They observe that “Estonia has one of the most generous parental benefit systems in the OECD, entitling parents to benefits equal to her/his previous salary for 435 days.”⁹⁵ The government can also be lauded for having maintained the lowest level of public debt in the EU throughout the crisis. Though higher than the level seen in 2007 (3.7% of GDP), the government’s gross debt of 9.5% of GDP (2016) has improved since peaking in 2014 (10.7% of GDP). “Yet maintaining a balanced budget has come with some costs. The government substantially cut municipal budgets during the economic recession, and has not yet restored these funds. As a result, many local governments are struggling under mounting debts, with insufficient resources to accomplish their tasks.”⁹⁶ Regarding environmental preservation, the share of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) from renewable sources has increased from 16.1% in 2006 to 28.6% (2015, the latest reported year), placing Estonia 7th. Here, however, we see highly ambivalent policy performance. “[T]he national economy is still dependent on energy-heavy technologies.”⁹⁷ As a consequence, Estonia ranks 26th for its high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, ahead of only Ireland and Luxembourg. It emitted an alarming 12 tons of climate-warming gases per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents) in 2015.

⁹⁴ Ibid.


⁹⁵ Toots/Sikk/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Estonia

EU Social Justice Index 2017



Source: Own calculations.

BertelsmannStiftung

Estonia ranks lowest on our health dimension, with a score of 5.17 (rank: 24). According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Estonian health policy ranks 11th (with Malta) in achieving short wait times as well as a high range and wide reach of health services. Also, the EHCI places the country 13th for its health system outcomes. This is particularly praiseworthy as the health outcomes for Estonians have much improved since 2008. These sound outcomes, however, are not reflected in healthy life years. On average, Estonians can expect 55.1 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability, placing the country 26th, ahead only of Slovakia and Latvia. While Estonians have, on average, gained 3 years compared to 2006, their healthy lifespan is 19 years shorter than in Sweden and Malta. In 2015 (the latest reported year), 12.7% of surveyed Estonians reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 28). The SGI country experts find that “the most significant social problem with the Estonian health care system is inequality across income groups.”⁹⁸ “[A]ccess to health service is not universal, but depends on insurance status. Members of the working-age population not employed or in school are not covered by the national health insurance program.”⁹⁹


⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Finland

Since our first social justice assessment in 2008, Finland has consistently ranked as one of the best-performing countries in the EU. Its current score of 7.14 places 3rd, behind Denmark and Sweden. Finland ranks among the top ten of countries in five of the six SJI dimensions. In four of the six dimensions (poverty prevention, equitable education, social cohesion and non-discrimination and intergenerational justice) it ranks among the top five. With regard to children and youth, the country places 4th on this subindex with a score of 7.01.

Finland is largely ensuring social cohesion and that members of society are free from discrimination. With a score of 7.46, the country ranks 3rd in the EU. Finland places second for the share of parliamentary seats held by women (41.5% in 2016, until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). The country ranks 8th in mitigating discrimination against people with disabilities when accessing education, health care and housing. The SGI country experts awarded the government a score of 8 out of 10 for both its non-discrimination and social inclusion policies as well as a score of 7 for integration. “While social policy largely prevents poverty and the income-redistribution system has proven to be one of the most efficient in the European Union, pockets of relative poverty and social exclusion still prevail. In particular, poverty rates among elderly women are comparatively high due to the low pensions accrued within this population.”¹⁰⁰ “There are also great differences in labor market attachment relative to



100 Anckar/Kuitto/Oberst/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

migrants' countries of origin, with Estonians and Russians, for example, finding their way into employment much more easily than migrants from sub-Saharan Africa."¹⁰¹ Finland ranks 20th in the EU for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students. The NEET rate of 14.6% in 2016 (rank: 11), is a welcome improvement over the previous year. Even so, the rate of 20-to-24-year olds neither employed nor participating in education or training remains 4 percentage points above the pre-global financial crisis level.

Finnish policies relating to intergenerational justice are likewise some of the best seen in the EU. The country scores 7.20 in this dimension, ranking it 2nd behind Sweden. The SGI country experts award the Finnish government a score of 9 (out of 10 possible points) for its family and pension policies as well as an 8 for its environmental policies. Finnish energy consumption has become progressively more sustainable, with the share from renewable sources increasing from 30.0% in 2006 to 39.3% (2015, the most recent reported year), the second-highest share in the EU. In line with this, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have decreased from 8.96 tons per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents) in 2015 to 5.38 (rank: 6). "Finland's most valuable natural resource is its forests, the management of which is of vital importance for sustainable economic development. The overall annual growth rate of trees in the forests exceeds the total timber harvest, a result of institutionalized protections." Also, in terms of investing in the future, Finland devotes a comparatively generous share of its GDP to research and development. Indeed, public and private expenditure totals 2.9% of GDP (2015, the latest reported year). The country experts note, however, that "the focus of R&D has been on applied research. (...) In the long run, given the dependence of applied research on basic-research developments, the heavy bias in favor of applied research will in fact carry negative consequences for product development and productivity. Furthermore, the system of technology transfer from universities to the private sector is comparatively weak, and academic entrepreneurship is not well developed."¹⁰²


France

France's overall performance on the SJI has remained relatively stable and within the midrange since our first assessment in 2008. In the current index, it ranks 10th overall in the EU with a score of 6.29. France has successfully implemented policies to reduce poverty. However, policies on the labor market, integration and education exhibit shortcomings. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, France places a wanting 23rd with a score of 5.25.

France's score of 6.65 in poverty prevention ranks it 7th. With 18.2% of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2016), the country performs better than many of its EU counterparts. However, as in many other EU countries, the gap between young and old has widened over the last years. Several indicators provide additional detail. The share of children and youth (under 18) at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 22.6%. Those 65 or older fare especially well, with a comparatively low 10.0% at risk. Some 4.4% of the total population do not have

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.



the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone), landing the country at rank 8 for this measure. Yet, material deprivation does not affect all segments of society equally. Again, French seniors are less likely (2.9%) whereas children and youth are more likely (5.3%) to be materially deprived. In terms of income poverty, France places 6th. Among the total population, 13.6% must survive on 60% or less of the median income (after social transfers). Among the population segments under 18, this rate increases to 19.1%; for those 65 or older, it decreases to 8.2%.

The education system continues to pose among the greatest policy challenges. Requiring urgent policy action, France ranks last in the EU with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. “[T]here are persisting inequalities that effectively penalize students of working-class families at the university level, and flagrantly in accessing the elite schools (*grandes écoles*). Social, ethnic and territorial inequalities are often linked (as a result of a massive concentration of poor immigrant families in suburban zones).”¹⁰³ The education system also requires additional reforms to further reduce the number of early school-leavers and increase upper secondary attainment. The rate of 18-to-24-year olds who dropped out of education or training has shifted little since 2014 and stands at 8.8% (2016, rank: 16). Also, only 78.1% of the working-age population have attained at least an upper secondary education (2016, rank: 20). In comparison, the rate in first-place Lithuania is 94.6%. The SGI country experts report that beyond excellent elite institutions, France’s mass university system

103 Mény/Uterwedde/Zohlhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

“is poorly funded and poorly managed, and does not prepare its students well for a successful entry to the labor market.”¹⁰⁴ Most alarming, “only 40% of registered students obtain a university degree.”¹⁰⁵

The labor market represents another major policy area requiring reform (score: 5.92, rank: 19). Specifically, difficult problems include the notoriously high youth unemployment figures (24.6%, 2016) and the fact that (especially young) French citizens with immigrant backgrounds face tremendous difficulties integrating into the labor market (rank: 22). Both of these measures highlight a missed opportunity to integrate youth and marginalized adults into society. “The high level of youth unemployment is linked to the French job-training system, which relies heavily on public schools; yet diplomas from such training are not really accepted in the industry at large, which hinders a potential worker’s transition from school to a job.”¹⁰⁶ “[S]o-called second-generation immigrants, especially those living in the suburbs, as well as less vocal groups in declining rural regions feel excluded from broader French society: abandoned to their fate, their situations combine poor education and training, unemployment, and poverty.”¹⁰⁷

Germany

With an overall score of 6.71 on the 2017 SJI, Germany ranks a respectable 7th in the EU. It places among the top ten on four of the six social justice dimensions that comprise our index. On both labor market access and health Germany places 2nd; having laudably improved on the latter since our first assessment in 2008. With regard to children and youth, the country places 7th on this subindex with a score of 6.74.

With a score of 7.21, the country’s labor market continues to rank among the best in the EU, surpassed only by Denmark. The overall employment rate in 2016, 74.7%, places virtually on par with Denmark and the Netherlands and a mere 1.5 percentage points behind first-place Sweden. The rate of employment actually increased throughout the crisis, especially among older workers (age 55 to 64). In 2016, 68.6% of this demographic were employed. This is the second-highest rate in the EU and 17 percentage points higher than in 2007. These high rates of employment are conversely reflected in low unemployment figures. Germany has the second-lowest overall unemployment in the EU. In 2016, a comparatively low 4.2% of the labor force were unemployed. Here again we observe a steady improvement throughout the crisis (the unemployment rate was 8.8% in 2007). A similar positive trend can be seen with youth unemployment: the rate has steadily decreased from 11.9% in 2007 to 7.1% (by far the lowest incidence in the EU). This is “attributable largely to a highly effective vocational training system.”¹⁰⁸ The number of people unemployed for a year or longer has also decreased. While in 2007, long-term unemployment stood at 5.0%, in 2016 that rate had been cut to 1.7% (rank: 4). “Germany has a comprehensive toolbox of active labor market programs, which includes financial support for vocational training programs,

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.


¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Rüb/Heinemann/Ulbricht/Zohnhöfer (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

support for self-employed individuals, provision of workfare programs and the subsidized employment of long-term unemployed individuals.”¹⁰⁹ “According to the Federal Statistical Office, growth in employment has not reflected a disproportionate increase in atypical employment. (...) Over the previous year, normal employment has again risen slightly by 0.5 percentage points to a total share of 68.7%.”¹¹⁰

The German health care system has improved since our first social justice study in 2008. Today, it places 2nd in the EU with a score of 8.05. In 2015 (the latest reported year), 0.5% of surveyed Germans reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 4), a 4.5 percentage point drop since 2006. Empirical data from the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) shows that wait times as well as the range and reach of health services, have actually marginally worsened compared to 2008. In contrast, health system outcomes, as measure by the EHCI, have improved; ranking 1st in 2016 (with Finland and the Netherlands). These improved outcomes are reflected in an increase in healthy life years. On average, Germans can expect 66.4 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 4). The SGI researchers find the “system is of high quality, inclusive and provides health care for almost all citizens. It is, however, challenged by increasing costs. Recently, the system’s short-term financial stability was better than expected due to buoyant contributions resulting from the employment boom. However, long-term financial stability is challenged by the aging population.”¹¹¹



109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

Germany has made much progress in ensuring social cohesion and that members of society are free from discrimination, but access to education and the labor market remain highly unequal for immigrants. Germany ranks last in the EU for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students and has not measurably demonstrated progress the previous five years. A similar unjust impact of background can also be seen in the labor market outcomes of immigrants. The employment of foreign-born workers has fallen well below native workers and remained virtually unchanged for years, placing Germany 24th among the 28 EU countries. Given the inflow of hundreds of thousands seeking education or work since the beginning of the European refugee crisis in 2015, rapid reforms will be required if Germany is now to succeed at broad-based integration. “The way Germany logistically dealt with the inflow of almost a million refugees in a very brief period of time is impressive. The main challenge for the future will be to integrate these people into German society. The government and political parties are still struggling to come up with a convincing strategy for this immense task.”¹¹²


Greece

With an overall score of 3.70, Greece continues to place last in the EU on the SJI. The country is measurably worse-off than during our first assessment in 2008 and has witnessed only nominal improvements over the past three years. The country finds itself among the bottom five in all six social justice dimension that comprise our index, ranking very last in two of these dimensions (labor market access and intergenerational justice). On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Greece places 22nd with a score of 5.34.

The crisis has had a devastating effect on poverty and social exclusion. The bailout package measures have aggravated existing social problems. The share of people threatened by poverty or social exclusion remains extraordinarily high: 35.6% of the total population (2016, rank: 26). The rate for children is 37.5% and for older people 22.0%. The gap between old and young in terms of poverty have strongly increased over the last years. The situation for young people has strikingly deteriorated compared to 2007. Moreover, the share of children living under conditions of severe material deprivation (e.g., without an appropriately heated apartment or regular access to meat or proteins) has more than doubled since 2008, from 9.7% to 26.7% (2016, rank: 26).

To sustainably lift the country out of poverty, Greece requires high employment rates with good, well-paying jobs. The labor market, however, falls dauntingly far of the mark (score: 3.46, rank: 28). In 2016, only 52.0% of working-age Greeks were employed, the lowest rate in our sample. While the rate of employment has been moderately improving since 2013, it remains 9 percentage points lower than in 2007. Older Greek workers, those 55 to 64, have the lowest incidence of employment in the EU, just 36.3% were employed in 2016. The ratio of women to men active in the labor force is likewise low (0.71 in 2016, rank: 27). Looking at the Greek labor market from the perspective of the unemployed, it becomes clear how much must still be done. The overall unemployment rate, 23.7% in 2016, remains the highest in the EU. Again, a moderate improvement can be seen since the peak

112 Ibid.



in 2013, but the number of unemployed remains 15 percentage points higher than in 2007. The share of the long-term unemployed, those out of work for a year or more, has likewise moderately improved but remains alarmingly high: 17.0% (rank: 28). These long-term unemployed are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion. Young Greeks face a particularly uncertain future. The unemployment rate of these 15-to-24-year olds has more than doubled since 2007 to 47.3% (2016, rank: 28). “The primary reason the labor situation has not improved is the government’s reluctance to implement measures which would facilitate job creation in the private sector. There is still resistance, if not aversion, among government ministers toward large-scale, industrial or other private investments, which could create job opportunities.”¹¹³ “As long as the Greek government delays implementing structural reforms in the market economy and public sector, economic growth will remain anemic, while the lower social strata, which Syriza fought for before coming to power, will see their living standards deteriorate.”¹¹⁴

Greek policies are also failing to adequately ensure social cohesion and non-discrimination (score: 4.36, rank: 26). In terms of the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, Greece ranks 23rd. In addition, Greece has the third-highest NEET rate in the EU. In 2016, 23.0% of 20-to-24-year-old Greeks were neither employed nor participating in education or training. Promisingly, this rate has continued to decline since peaking at 31.3% in 2013, but remains distressingly far from the 15.9% seen in 2007. If unresolved, this high incidence of inactive

113 Sotiropoulos/Huliaras/Karadag (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.


114 Ibid.

young adults threatens to seriously destabilize the country over the long term. Compounding these other inequities, Greece ranks 26th in mitigating discrimination against people with disabilities when accessing education, health care and housing.

Hungary

Hungary's overall placement on the SJI has fluctuated somewhat since our first edition in 2008, but remained among the underperforming countries. Its score of 5.18 ranks 22nd in the EU. Hungary finds itself among the bottom five in three of the index's six social justice dimensions. With regard to children and youth, the country places 26th on this subindex with a score of 4.66.

The Hungarian labor market has witnessed substantial improvement in recent years. Hungary ranks 13th among the 28 EU member countries on this dimension, scoring 6.33. The overall employment rate has increased from 54.9% in 2010 to 66.5% (2016, rank: 12). The employment of foreign-born workers is virtually on par with native workers (rank: 6). However, 80.2% of the labor force in temporary employment would prefer a regular contract (2016, rank: 25). Unemployment has progressively decreased in recent years to 5.1% (2016, rank: 5). Likewise, the number of persons unemployed for a year or more has gradually decreased to 2.4% (rank: 12). Youth unemployment has been more than halved since 2013 to 12.9% (rank: 7). While these significant reductions in unemployment appear encouraging, they have "largely been achieved by controversial public-works programs and an increase in the number of Hungarians working abroad. In 2016, the Orbán



government's public-works program provided about 220,000 unemployed people, i.e., more than 2% of the overall population, some prospect of employment. However, participants perform unskilled work under precarious conditions and for very modest remuneration, and few participants have succeeded in transitioning to a job within the regular labor market. (...) The large number of Hungarians working abroad, which is estimated at 600,000..., has reduced revenues from taxes and social insurance contributions. Moreover, the increasing brain drain of educated and skilled people is creating shortages in quality labor in many fields."¹¹⁵

A major policy challenge confronting Hungary is strengthening social cohesion and combating discrimination. It ranks 25th in this dimension, with a score of 4.48. The Hungarian National Assembly has the lowest proportion of seats held by women of any national parliament in the EU: 10.1%, (until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). The SGI country experts awarded the government scores of 4 out of 10 on both social inclusion and non-discrimination and a 3 on integration. They note that "despite the economic recovery since 2013, both the impoverishment of people in the lower income deciles and the fragmentation and weakening of the middle classes have continued. (...) The Hungarian government has sought to keep the problem hidden. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) has presented different concepts, definitions, and statistics to domestic and international audiences."¹¹⁶ "The integration of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries – above all from Romania, Serbia and Ukraine – has gone fairly smoothly but has slowed down in the last years, since they have also gone to the West. By contrast, the integration of other migrants remains a controversial process. The Hungarian government has refused the integration of non-Europeans and non-Christians as a lethal danger to the national culture and identity. Out of 27,000 people granted refugee status in the first three-quarters of 2016, only seven were allowed to settle in Hungary permanently."¹¹⁷

Ireland


Ireland's overall score of 5.66 on our current SJI ranks it 17th in the EU. The government's policy performance on social justice tends toward below average. Across our six dimensions, it rises to the top ten only once (social cohesion and non-discrimination), but also never sinks into the bottom five. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the country ranks 16th with a score of 6.15.

The Irish government has made praiseworthy advances at ensuring social cohesion and that members of society are free from discrimination. With a score of 6.53, the country ranks 9th in the EU. The SGI country experts awarded the Irish government a score of 9 out of 10 (the highest score achieved in the EU) for successfully fighting discrimination. They determine that Ireland's Equality Authority, an independent body set up to monitor discrimination, as well as an independent equality tribunal "have been active in recent years and successful in prosecuting cases on behalf of parties who felt they had been discriminated

¹¹⁵ Ágh/Dieringer/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.



against.”¹¹⁸ The employment of foreign-born workers has been relatively on par with native workers for years, placing 5th among the 28 EU countries. However, the country ranks 17th for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students. In addition, in 2015, Ireland amended its constitution to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. In terms of gender equality, however, more needs to be done. Ireland places 17th for the share of parliamentary seats held by women (22.2% in 2016, until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). In comparison, women hold over 40% of national parliament seats both in Sweden and Finland. Our country experts awarded the government’s integration policy a score of 7. They highlight that while “[m]ore than 70% of immigrants to Ireland have the right to reside, work and own property in the country by virtue of their EU citizenship,” many are not employed “in occupations commensurate with their skills and education.”¹¹⁹ “There are signs of increasing gaps between schools in relatively deprived areas of the main cities, which often have high concentrations of children holding non-Irish citizenship, and schools in the more affluent areas with lower concentrations.”¹²⁰

The education system continues to pose among the greatest policy challenges (score: 5.87, rank: 21). Ireland spends just 0.10% of GDP on pre-primary education, ranking last place. Much evidence has shown that early investments in children’s education yield significant, lifelong positive effects. Also, only 80.1% of the working-age population have attained at least an upper secondary edu-

¹¹⁸ Murphy/Mitchell/Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

cation (2016, rank: 16). While this share has noticeably increased since 2007, in comparison, the rate in first-place Lithuania is 94.6%. “The two-tier structure of the secondary education system is controversial. A minority of pupils (about 10%) attend fee-paying schools where state support is augmented by the revenue from fees that can amount to €6,000 a year. These schools are socially exclusive and achieve higher academic results and higher progression rates to tertiary education than non-fee-paying schools.”¹²¹ “The resources allocated per pupil or student increase steadily the higher up the educational scale one goes, but access becomes more dependent on social class.”¹²² There are, however, also numerous successes. The average Irish student’s PISA results (509 in 2015) are among the highest in the EU, though socioeconomic factors continue to impact the PISA results of students (rank: 14). Also, the rate of 18-to-24-year olds who dropped out of education or training has been nearly halved since 2008 and stands at 6.3% (2016, rank: 7).

Italy

Overall, Italy’s 25th place position on the latest SJI ranks it among the worst-performing EU countries (score: 4.84). Italy’s social justice performance has fluctuated slightly since our inaugural index in 2008, but shows only minor improvement over the previous three years. How Italy measures up against the other EU member states varies somewhat across the six dimensions, though it ranks among the bottom ten in all. With regard to children and youth, the country places 25th on this subindex with a score of 4.70.


Italy ranks highest on our health dimension, though below the EU average (score: 5.79, rank: 19). In 2015 (the latest reported year), 7.2% of surveyed Italians reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 24), a slight increase compared to 2006. Empirical data from the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) confirm that wait times as well as the range and reach of health services have marginally worsened compared to 2008, ranking 20th in 2016. Health system outcomes, as measure by the EHCI, have remained middling (rank: 17). These outcomes are reflected in a decrease in healthy life years. On average, Italians can expect 62.7 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 13), two years less than in 2006. The SGI country experts find that “due to significant differences in local infrastructures, cultural factors, and the political and managerial proficiency of local administrations, the quality of public health care varies across regions. In spite of similar levels of per capita expenditure, services are generally better in northern and central Italy than in southern Italy. (...) In these regions, lower quality levels and typically longer waiting lists mean that wealthier individuals will often turn to private sector medical care.”¹²³ Out-of-pocket costs for accessing health care, though they are inversely linked to income, “discourage some of the poorest from accessing necessary health care services.”¹²⁴

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Cotta/Maruhn/Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

124 Ibid.



The country places 26th in terms of intergenerational justice (score: 4.10). Aside from the poor prospects for young people on the labor market (37.8% of youth were unemployed in 2016), Italy is demographically the “oldest” country in the EU and also carries the second highest public debt (132.6% of GDP in 2016). The fiscal burdens for today’s young people as well as future generations are thus immense. “The improved climate on the international markets and ECB policies have yielded a sharp decline in interest rates for Italian long-term treasury bonds. This has eased the country’s budgetary pressures. Toward the end of 2014, the recession ended and modest economic growth returned in 2015 and 2016, which has slowed the growth in public debt.”¹²⁵ At the same time, investment in research and development has remained too low (1.3% of GDP in 2015, the latest reported year). “The Renzi government has not been able to make much headway in this regard given the tight budgetary context. In spite of complaints from universities, which are severely underfunded compared to other European countries, public funding for universities and R&D has not been increased, though some measures to foster start-up companies and sustain investments in technological innovation have been introduced.”¹²⁶ Even in the state’s current financial situation, such investments remain vital for future economic growth.

With regard to environmental preservation, government policies have yield mid-dling outcomes. The share of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) from renewable sources has increased from 8.3% in 2006 to 17.5% (2015, the latest reported year), placing Italy 13th. In line with this, the country ranks

¹²⁵ Ibid.


¹²⁶ Ibid.

14th in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, releasing 6.5 tons of climate-warming gases per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents) in 2015. “Italy traditionally fared reasonably well thanks to its large hydroelectric (and geothermic) plants.”¹²⁷ However, “[t]he country has among the highest numbers of cars per capita in the world, and this combines with poor short-, medium- and long-haul public transport to make life in cities difficult. (...) Smog, particulate matter, poor air quality and traffic jams increasingly undermine the quality of life significantly in Italian towns. Erosion is a danger in many parts of Italy. Perhaps more so than any other policy area, the environment demands a stronger strategy and corresponding political action.”¹²⁸

Latvia

Latvia’s SJI score of 5.46 places it 19th among the 28-member EU. For three of the six social justice dimensions in our study, Latvia ranks among the bottom ten. It has, however, achieved demonstrable improvements on half of the dimensions. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the country ranks 13th with a score of 6.29.

In our 2017 assessment, Latvia ranks highest on our education dimension. With a score of 7.25, the country places 6th, demonstrating tangible improvements over the past three years. The Latvian education system ranks 3rd for the comparatively low impact socioeconomic factors have on the PISA results of its students. Yet, Latvia’s



127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

policies for ensuring that educational opportunities are equitable, while praiseworthy, have stagnated in one vital aspect: quality. The average Latvian student's PISA results have changed little over the OECD's past four assessments; in 2015, these averaged 35 points or more below those of students in Estonia and Finland, ranking a middling 17th. The SGI country experts note that "there is a significant urban-rural performance gap, while education opportunities for students with special needs are limited."¹²⁹ Also, for a time, the education system was succeeding in reducing student dropout, but this is now on the rise. In 2016, the number of 18-to-24-year olds who left education or training rose to 10.0%, placing the country 18th. "Key challenges to the education system include a shrinking population, a high rate of early retirement among teachers, an unsustainably low teacher-student ratio and a level of public funding significantly lower than the OECD average."¹³⁰ The government, however, continues to make laudable investments in early childhood education. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on pre-primary education totaled 0.86% in 2014 (the most recent reported year), ranking Latvia 4th. Much evidence has shown that these early investments in children's education yield significant, lifelong positive effects. In addition, the working-age population is highly educated: 90.7% have attained at least an upper secondary education (2016, rank: 5).

In targeting broad-based social justice, Latvia faces many challenges, particularly in the area of health policy. "Latvia has universal health care insurance and a single payer system financed through general taxation. Universal population coverage, highly qualified medical staff, the innovative use of physician's assistants are positive aspects of the system. However, substantial challenges remain, including disproportionately high out-of-pocket expenses...and long waiting times for key diagnostic and treatment services."¹³¹ The country again ranks last in our health dimension, with a score of 3.91, and has the lowest healthy life years in the EU. The average Latvian can expect 53.0 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability, a shocking two decades less than the average Swed or Maltese. Insufficient access to health services may well be the root cause of this figure, as Latvia also has among the highest percentage of respondents reporting unmet medical needs. In 2016, 8.2% reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 26). The Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) confirms this, reporting that Latvian health policy performs far below average, with comparatively long wait times as well as a low range and limited reach of health services (rank: 23). In terms of health system outcomes (another measure from the EHCI), the country ranks 20th.

Lithuania


Lithuania's overall SJI score, currently 5.61, has remained stable over recent assessments, placing it 18th in the EU. The country's performance across the six dimensions varies greatly, placing among the top five on two social justice dimensions (equitable education and intergenerational justice) and in the bottom five on one (poverty prevention). With regard to children and youth, Lithuania places 14th on this subindex with a score of 6.24.

129 Terauda/Auers/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

Social justice requires that all students be provided with high quality, equitably distributed education. Only then do all young people have an equal opportunity to achieve their potential. Lithuania has had some commendable policy successes at attaining this goal. The country ranks 5th on this dimension (score: 7.26). The working-age population is the most highly educated in the EU: 94.6% have attained at least an upper secondary education. Related to this, Lithuania has one of the lowest dropout rates, placing a commendable 2nd, behind Croatia. In 2016, a comparatively small 4.8% of 18-to-24-year olds dropped out of education or training. Lithuania places 10th with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students. However, “[p]reprimary education attendance is... low, with only 78.3% of Lithuanian children aged four to six attending preprimary education programs, compared to the EU-27 average of 92.3%.”¹³² Furthermore, government spending on early-childhood education has decreased compared to 2011. As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on pre-primary education totaled 0.50% in 2014 (the most recent reported year), placing the country 15th. Much evidence has demonstrated that early investments in children’s education yield significant, lifelong positive effects. Overall, the SGI country experts awarded the Lithuanian government a score of 7 out of a possible 10 for its education policy. They note that “in terms of equitable access to education, the country shows an urban-rural divide and some disparities in educational achievements between girls and boys. However, there are no significant gaps in access to education for vulnerable groups (with the exception of the Roma population and, to a certain extent, the migrant population).”¹³³



132 Nakrošis/Vilpišauskas/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

133 Ibid.

One of Lithuania's principal social justice challenges remains poverty (score: 3.83, rank: 25). In 2016, 30.1% of the total population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, though this is a clear improvement compared to 2010 (34.0%). "Families with many children, people living in rural areas, youth and disabled people, unemployed people, and elderly people are the demographic groups with the highest poverty risk."¹³⁴ Here the share of the general population without the financial means to afford fundamental necessities of daily life (e.g., an appropriately heated apartment or a telephone) was 13.5% in 2016. On this measure, Lithuanians 65 and over fare the worst, with 17.3% living under conditions of severe material deprivation and 27.7% in income poverty (i.e., receive 60% or less of the median income, after social transfers). "A mix of government interventions (general improvements to the business environment, active labor market measures, adequate education and training, cash social assistance, and social services targeted at the most vulnerable groups) is needed in order to ameliorate Lithuania's remaining problems of poverty and social exclusion."¹³⁵

Luxembourg

With an overall score of 6.55 on the SJI, Luxembourg ranks 9th in the EU. The country ranks among the top ten on four of the index's six social justice dimensions. It ranks 3rd in the area of health and 5th in social cohesion and non-discrimination. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Luxembourg places 9th with a score of 6.54.


Because illness undermines an individual's capacity to fully achieve their potential, access to quality health services is considered a precondition for social inclusion. Luxembourg can be praised for being a leader among the 28 EU member countries in our health dimension with a score of 7.82 (rank: 3). In 2015 (the latest survey year), a comparatively low 0.9% of Luxembourgers reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Luxembourg's health system is among the best-performing (rank 4), with comparatively short wait lists as well as a high range and wide reach of health care services. Also on the EHCI, the country ranks 6th in terms of health system outcomes. These accomplishments, however, have not yielded a considerable increase in healthy life years. The average Luxembourger can expect 62.2 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (2015, rank: 14), just half a year more than in 2006 and nearly 12 years less than the average Sweden. The government received a score of 8 out of 10 from the SGI experts for its health policy. "[H]ealth care provision has recently been expanded and levels of replacement revenues exceed Scandinavian standards."¹³⁶ Though it has many strengths, "Luxembourg's health care system is the 7th most expensive system within the OECD group. The high cost of the health care system is due to high wages, a high ratio of technical medical equipment to residents and low out-of-pocket costs for patients."¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Schneider/Lorig/Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹³⁷ Ibid.



The education system continues to pose among the greatest policy challenges. With a score of 6.08, Luxembourg has considerably improved since our first assessment in 2008, but remains below average in the EU (rank: 18). The average student's PISA results (483 in 2015) have barely shifted over the OECD's past four assessments (rank: 19). In addition, socioeconomic factors continue to extensively impact the PISA results of students (rank: 22). Only 78.4% of the working-age population have attained at least an upper secondary education (2016, rank: 19). While this share has noticeably increased since 2007, in comparison, the rate in first-place Lithuania is 94.6%. "[A]fter six years of primary school, students face a crucial junction and must choose one of two academic tracks, general or technical. There is a marked division between Luxembourg nationals and migrant students, as migrants generally (especially the Portuguese minority) struggle with [the three official] languages and often end up in the technical level (secondeaire technique), which affects their progress toward a university education."¹³⁸ "Over the past 15 years, several school reforms have sought to facilitate the integration of migrant children within this trilingual system by reducing the weighting on language competency in determining student grades."¹³⁹ Yet, these efforts have not sufficiently reduced the disadvantages faced by migrant students. "Recent studies have shown that migrants are four times less likely to transfer to the higher-level university-oriented school track (enseignement secondaire) than Luxembourgish nationals."¹⁴⁰ There are, however, also successes. Education system reforms have succeeded in more than halving student dropout. In 2016, the

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.


140 Ibid.

number of 18-to-24-year olds who left education or training declined to 5.5%, placing Luxembourg 5th among its peers.

Malta

Malta's overall performance on the SJI has nominally improved since our 2014 edition, remaining within the midrange. In the 2017 index, it ranks 15th in the EU (along with Poland) with a score of 5.79. Across the six social justice dimensions of our index, Malta places among the top five in one dimension (health) and last in one dimension (equitable education). With regard to children and youth, the country ranks 19th on this subindex with a score of 5.84.

Malta ranks highest on our health dimension (score: 7.66, rank: 5). The average Maltese can expect 73.6 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 2), virtually on par with first-place Sweden and six years more than in third-place Ireland. In 2015 (the latest reported year), 0.8% of surveyed Maltese reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 6), a lower share than in the previous three years. Empirical data from the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) confirm that wait times as well as the range and reach of health services have considerably improved compared to 2008, ranking 11th in 2016. Health system outcomes, as measure by the EHCI, have likewise improved, though they remain below average (rank: 20). The SGI country experts report that “[v]ulnerable groups are entitled to state support for a list of prescription medicines, and all citizens are entitled to free medicine in relation to specified chronic diseases (high blood pressure and diabetes). How-



ever, other more expensive treatments – for instance, those required by oncology patients or necessitated by certain eye conditions – are given only limited coverage, and treatment costs can be thousands of euros. (...) A recently launched patients' rights charter by the government, which includes the right to access one's medical files should improve access to medical care."¹⁴¹

Malta faces some of its most serious challenges within its education system. With a score of 4.54, the country continues to place last in the EU. The system has the highest incidence of youth dropping out of education and training. While this rate has improved since 2008 (30.2%), 19.6% of 18-to-24-year olds dropped out in 2016. In comparison, the share in first-place Croatia is 2.8%. Related to this, the working-age population is less educated than in other EU countries: only 45.2% have attained at least an upper secondary education, the lowest rate in our sample; in the top five countries, the share is above 90%. Keeping young adults in education or training and improving targeted qualification measures as well as vocational training is of vital importance for the long-term viability of the Maltese labor market and social cohesion. In addition, the quality of education must be improved. The average Maltese student's PISA results (463 in 2015) are nearly 60 points below those of students in Estonia and Finland (rank: 23). "The education system's limitations exist in spite of the system's high level of equitable access to education at all levels. A total of 80% of all schools are free, while there are various measures available to support students. Access to higher education remains open for all due to the absence of tuition fees and stipends for students. The provision of free preschool state facilities for children three years and over has been greatly expanded."¹⁴²

Netherlands


The Netherlands counts among the more socially just countries in the EU. It ranks 6th, with an overall score of 6.73. The country's score, however, has moderately declined since our first social justice assessment in 2008. Notwithstanding, the overall success is broad-based, with the Netherlands placing among the top ten on four of the six social justice dimensions. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the country ranks a commendable 3rd with a score of 7.18.

The Netherlands has demonstrable successes in fostering an inclusive society. The country achieves the highest score awarded – 7.53 – in the dimension of social cohesion and non-discrimination. "A non-discrimination clause addressing religion, life philosophy, political convictions, race, sex and 'any other grounds for discrimination' is contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions or another individual."¹⁴³ The Netherlands ranks among the top ten for its comparatively high gender equality. The Dutch national parliament (Stat-en-Generaal) has the 6th highest proportion of seats held by women in the EU (until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). Most commendable, the Netherlands continues to have the lowest NEET rate

141 Pirotta/Calleja/Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

142 Ibid.

143 Hoppe/Woldendorp/Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.



in the EU. In 2016, only 6.9% of 20-to-24-year olds were neither in employment nor participating in education or training. While this share remains higher than in 2007 and 2010, it falls well below the double-digit rates observed in much of the EU.

The SGI country experts awarded the Netherlands a score of 7 out of 10 for its social inclusion policy. Though poverty levels remain comparatively low, the experts identify several growing inequalities warranting further policy intervention. They note, for example, that wealth inequality has increased since 2008, “largely because of a decrease in the value of housing stock. (...) Of the country’s home-owning households, almost 1.4 million (3.2%) had mortgage debts higher than the market value of their house.”¹⁴⁴ In addition, “[l]evels of health inequality in the Netherlands are high; wealthier and comparatively highly educated people live longer (on average seven years compared to low-income and less-educated populations), with healthier lives.”¹⁴⁵ They also fault the country for its continued high gender pay gap (men earn about 40% more than their female counterparts).¹⁴⁶ Also, the experts scored the government’s non-discrimination policy a 9 (the highest score awarded), while noting that “the Dutch government does not pursue affirmative action to tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination.”¹⁴⁷

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.


One policy area where the Netherlands continues to lag behind is in the fight against climate change. The country ranks 25th on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2015 (the most recent reported year), the Dutch emitted 11.9 tons per capita of climate-warming gases (in CO₂ equivalents). In comparison, the rates in second-place Croatia and third-place Lithuania are below 5 tons. This is in large part a result of the Netherlands' dismally low use of renewable energy. Whereas in the top five countries 30% or more of the energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) comes from renewable sources, renewables account for a meager 5.8% in the Netherlands (2015). This ranks the country a reprehensible 26th, ahead of only Luxembourg and Malta. Vastly increasing the use of renewable energy would help the Netherlands significantly cut its GHG emissions and demonstrate far greater solidarity with the global community on climate change. Scoring the government's environmental policy a middling 5 out of 10, the SGI country experts observe that "government references to sustainable growth are largely rhetorical, as GDP growth and job creation clearly have priority over criteria reflecting environmental and social sustainability. While the future development of a low-CO₂ energy system has been agreed, the government has failed to demonstrate a strong political commitment to climate change policy and develop a long-term energy strategy."¹⁴⁸

Poland

Poland's overall performance on the SJI has improved since our first assessment in 2008. In the current edition, it ranks 15th in the EU (along with Malta) with a score of 5.79. Across our six social justice dimensions, the country places in the top ten on only one dimension (equitable education) and among the bottom five in health care. With regard to children and youth, Poland ranks 10th on this subindex with a score of 6.42.

Polish governments in recent years can be commended for improving some outcomes relating to social justice, in particular in reducing poverty. Though the country's score of 5.77 is only middling (rank: 14), with much potential for further improvement, it demonstrates tremendous gains over our 2008 assessment. At 21.9% (2016), Poland has reduced the share of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion by nearly 13 percentage points compared to 2007. The contours of this policy achievement can be seen across a range of related indicators. The share of children and youth (under 18) at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 24.2%. Although higher than the rate for the total population, it is far better than the 37.1% observed in 2007. Those 65 or older fare particularly well, with 16.1% at risk. The SGI country experts partially attribute these improvements "to Poland's strong economic performance and the EU structural funds which were predominantly aimed at helping less-developed regions and relatively poor households. In addition, previous governments have been successful in mitigating regional disparities through regional-development policies. Moreover, government policies have helped improve families' financial conditions, especially those suffering from poverty, and have increased average educational attainments. The most dramatic pockets of poverty have shrunk, and income inequality has fallen substantially since the early 2000s. In-depth sociological studies have shown that

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.



poverty in Poland is not inherited across generations.”¹⁴⁹ The current government has raised family allowances and increased the minimum wage, further reducing the social inequalities caused by poverty.¹⁵⁰

The greatest policy challenge affecting the general population remains broad access to high-quality health care. Poland ranks 25th in our health dimension. With a score of 4.69, the country has seen only negligible improvements to the health care system since our first assessment in 2008. The SGI researchers awarded the government’s health policy a score of 5 out of 10. “Public health insurance covers some 98% of Poland’s citizens and legal residents and is financed through social insurance contributions. However, access to health care is highly uneven, as public health insurance covers only a limited range of services, and out-of-pocket payments feature prominently in the system.”¹⁵¹ In 2015 (the latest reported year), 7.3% of Poles surveyed reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists (rank: 25). In comparison, in the top eight countries this share is less than one percent. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), the Polish health care system is one of the worst. The range of health services is low, the reach narrow and wait times are long, placing the country last in the EU. Also, the EHCI ranks Poland 20th on health outcomes.

149 Matthes/Markowski/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.


150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

Portugal

Portugal's SJI score of 5.36 places it 20th among the 28 EU member countries – a progressive, though minor, improvement over the past three years. The country remains far from realizing a socially just society. In all six social justice dimensions in our study, it scores below the EU average. Moreover, on our equitable education dimension, it ranks 26th. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, Portugal places 21st with a score of 5.73.

The Portuguese government has made advances at ensuring social cohesion and that members of society are free from discrimination. Yet, with a score of 5.86, the country ranks a middling 17th in the EU. The SGI country experts awarded the government a score of 8 out of 10 (the highest score achieved in the EU) for successfully integrating migrant communities. The employment of foreign-born workers has been relatively on par with native workers for years, placing 2nd (with Malta). However, the country ranks 14th for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students. The SGI researchers note “that the economic crisis has been accompanied by a decrease in immigration.”¹⁵² “[T]he fall in immigration in Portugal in recent years has less to do with policy than with the country's lack-luster economic performance.”¹⁵³ “Portugal has tried to receive refugees currently entering the European Union. Figures from the European Commission indicate that Portugal received the second-largest number of asylum-seekers from refugee camps in Italy and Greece, although the total number remains low (379) and far from the 3,000 or more Portugal expects to receive. Indeed, Prime Minister António Costa wrote to his EU counterparts in early 2016 indicating his government's willingness to accept an even larger number of refugees than previously



agreed.”¹⁵⁴ In terms of gender equality, Portugal outperforms many of its EU peers. The country places 9th for the share of parliamentary seats held by women (34.8% in 2016, until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). However, “[t]he unadjusted gender wage gap increased from 8.4% in 2006 to 14.9% in 2014. Though the gender wage gap in Portugal is below the EU average, the increase in Portugal contrasts with the modest downward trend in the EU average.”¹⁵⁵

Ensuring that educational opportunities reach all segments of society and are equitably distributed remains Portugal’s greatest policy challenge. The score of 4.92 in our equitable education dimension places the country a dismal 26th, with only the Maltese and Romanian education systems functioning worse. The working-age population continues to be less educated than in other EU countries. Though progressively improving, only 46.9% have attained at least an upper secondary education (2016), the second lowest rate in our sample. Although Portugal’s dropout rate has more than halved since 2008 – from a staggering 36.5% to 14.0% in 2016 – it remains one of the highest in the EU (rank: 25). In order to promote both social cohesion and long-term labor market success, more of these 18-to-24-year olds must remain in education or training. The SGI country experts award the government’s education policy a score of 5 out of 10. These researchers point to disruptive instability in education policy. “Shortly after taking office in 2015, the Costa government decided to review the national system of assessing students, with these changes taking effect in the 2015 to 2016 school year. According to one analyst, this is the fifteenth change to the national assessment system since 2000.”¹⁵⁶ On a positive note, student performance on the OECD’s PISA survey has measurably improved. In 2015, the average Portuguese student’s PISA results (497, rank: 11) were 26 points above 2006. In addition, the education system has succeeded in reducing the impact of socioeconomic factors on the PISA results of students (rank: 9).

Romania


Romania’s overall performance on the SJI places it among the EU countries most urgently in need of progressive policy reforms. With a score of 3.99, it ranks 27th out of 28 EU member states. The country ranks among the bottom five in four of the six social justice dimensions in our study. Most worrying, it ranks second-to-last in the areas of poverty prevention, equitable education, and social cohesion and non-discrimination. With regard to children and youth, Romania alarmingly places last on this subindex with a score of 3.69.

Romania ranks highest with respect to ensuring outcomes are intergenerationally just. With a score of 5.18, the country ranks 17th. The government has maintained a comparatively low level of public debt since the beginning of the global financial crisis (rank: 6). Though higher than the level seen in 2007 (12.7% of GDP), the government’s gross debt of 39.2% of GDP (2016) has improved since peaking in 2014 (40.5% of GDP). The SGI country experts, however, note that “[b]udgetary policy

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.



was procyclical in 2016. Despite the strong economic growth, the general government fiscal deficit is estimated to have increased from 0.8% of GDP in 2015 to 2.8% of GDP in 2016, and is expected to widen further to 3.6% in 2017.”¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Romania’s public debt remains “sensitive to aging costs and exchange rate risk.”¹⁵⁸ Regarding environmental preservation, the share of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) from renewable sources has increased from 17.1% in 2006 to 24.8% (2015, the latest reported year), placing Romania 10th. In line with this trend, the country ranks 4th for its low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, bested only by Sweden, Croatia and Lithuania. It emitted a comparatively low 5.4 tons of climate-warming gases per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents) in 2015. The SGI researchers awarded the government a score of 5 out of 10 for its environmental policy. They observe that “Romania continues to struggle with developing and implementing comprehensive environmental regulations. The main challenges have been industrial pollution, illegal resource extraction and systemic corruption. To address issues such as waste management and pollution, Romania has strongly relied on taxation. This led to the introduction of a solid waste fee in January 2016.”¹⁵⁹

One major policy challenge confronting the Romanian government is poverty prevention (score: 1.77, rank: 27). In 2016, an alarming 38.8% of Romanians were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the second-highest rate in the EU. While this rate has improved since 2007 (47.0%), it remains more than 20 percentage points higher than in the top ten countries. Among those at risk, children fare the

¹⁵⁷ Wagner/Stan/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

worst: with effectively half (49.2%) of all children and youth under 18 at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the highest rate in the EU. Seniors (65 and over) finds themselves similarly worse off than most of their EU counterparts: 34.0% are at risk (rank: 24). Clearly, across the spectrum of society, far more must be done in order to reduce the incidence of poverty.

Another major policy challenge confronting Romania is strengthening social cohesion and combating discrimination. It ranks 27th on this dimension, with a score of 4.33. The SGI experts awarded the government a score of 6 (out of 10) for its integration policy. “From a comparative perspective, Romania’s legislation has been fairly favorable toward immigrants..., but policies are less welcoming with respect to education access and access to citizenship. Moreover, foreign workers are not represented by local labor unions, and often fall victim to dubious contracts leading to worse work and pay conditions than initially promised.”¹⁶⁰ More precarious is the condition of minority groups. According to the SGI researchers, the government has been ineffective in combating discrimination against the LGBT community, people with disabilities, HIV positive people and the large Roma community.¹⁶¹ “The civil code still prohibits same-sex partnership and marriage, and fails to recognize any such marriages registered abroad.”¹⁶² In addition, “the discrimination which has beset the Roma threatens to marginalize refugee and migrant peoples arriving from abroad.”¹⁶³

Slovakia

Slovakia’s current SJI score of 5.91 ranks the country 14th in the EU. Its performance across our six social justice dimensions varies greatly, placing among the top ten in one dimension (poverty prevention) and in the bottom ten in four dimensions. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the country places 20th with a score of 5.81.

Poverty prevention features as the first dimension in our index because it is such an essential factor in achieving broad-based social justice. Slovakia, in 6th place (score: 6.67), ranks relatively well mainly because of the country’s comparatively uniform income distribution patterns. In 2016, 18.1% of the population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, a reduction from 21.4% in 2007. Particularly noteworthy, poverty has been noticeably reduced among seniors. Indeed, the share of seniors (65 and older) at risk of poverty or social exclusion has fallen from 22.1% in 2007 to 12.3%. By contrast, the respective rate among children and youth is much higher at 24.4%. The SGI country experts note that “social-protection system covers standard social risks.”¹⁶⁴ Notwithstanding, “[t]he Roma face the highest poverty risk within the Slovak population.”¹⁶⁵

Slovakia faces serious challenges within its labor market. Overall, the Slovak labor market is in a particularly precarious and unsustainable state. The country

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.


¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Kneuer/Malová/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.



receives a score of just 5.49 in terms of labor market access, which places it 22nd. In 2016, only 64.9% of the working age population was employed (a moderate improvement over the 59.9% seen in 2013). Low levels of employment have hit one group the hardest: women. With regard to the ratio of women to men active in the labor force, Slovakia ranks 23rd. In this context, the country experts note that “[m]others of children under two years of age rarely work” and “the employment rate for women (25–49) with children below six years of age reaches a mere 40%. (...) Working women face an enormous double burden of both professional and domestic responsibilities. This situation is reinforced by the low incidence of part-time employment, income tax splitting and the relatively long duration of parental leave. Child-care facilities are limited and have not kept up with the increase in birth rates. Child care for children under three years of age in particular continues to be virtually unavailable.”¹⁶⁶ In contrast, Slovakia has done particularly well to integrate persons with disabilities into the labor market, ranking 1st followed by Croatia and the Czech Republic. The country has observably reduced the incidence of involuntary temporary employment to below pre-global financial crisis levels. In 2014, the share of working-age Slovaks in temporary employment because they could not find a permanent position reached 87.3%, but declined in 2016 to 66.4% (rank: 16). Even given this improvement, the rate remains high. In comparison, the rate in Austria, which ranks first on this measure, is 9.1% (2016). The overall unemployment rate, 9.7% has progressively declined in recent years (rank: 20). Those with less than upper secondary education suffer a much higher unemployment rate of 29.4%, the highest rate in our study (2016). “Slovakia’s expenditure on active labor market policy is low compared to the rest of the EU.”¹⁶⁷


¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Slovenia

Slovenia's SJI score of 6.74 places it 5th among the countries of the EU. The country shows incremental, though moderate, improvement since it was added to the index in 2014. In five of the six social justice dimensions in our study, Slovenia ranks among the top ten and, notably, on no dimension among the bottom half. With regard to children and youth, the country places 2nd on this subindex with a score of 7.31.

The Slovenian government, scoring 6.24 in terms of intergenerational justice, has proven more successful than 22 of its EU counterparts at ensuring that the policy decisions it takes today do not inequitably burden future generations. One example of this is the growth in renewable energy use. By 2015 (the latest reported year), the share of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) from renewable sources had increased to 22.0%, up from 15.6% in 2006, placing Slovenia 11th. In line with this trend, the country ranks 7th in minimizing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It emitted a comparatively low 5.4 tons of climate-warming gases per capita (reported in CO₂ equivalents) in 2015. The SGI country experts scored the government's environmental policy 8 out of 10 points. They commend Slovenia's "tradition of close-to-natural forest management and...low-intensity farming" noting that "[f]orests occupy approximately 62% of the total land area, about twice the OECD average."¹⁶⁸ They also praise the active role of environmental NGOs in environmental policymaking and management, pointing as well to their important watchdog role.¹⁶⁹ This sound investment in the future has



¹⁶⁸ Haček/Pickel/Bönker (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

been accompanied by another: research and development spending. Intramural research and development expenditure totaled 2.2% of GDP in 2015 (the latest reported year), the 7th highest (with France). However, government spending on research and development peaked at 2.6% in 2013 and has since been declining. The government “has failed to increase national funds available for R&I and to raise the share of EU funds devoted to the support of research and development. In some areas of research, EU funds have even declined, as Slovenia has experienced serious administrative difficulties in absorbing funds for R&I.”¹⁷⁰

Slovenia ranks lowest on our health dimension, with a score of 6.44 (rank: 14). “The Slovenian health care system is dominated by a compulsory public-insurance scheme. This scheme guarantees universal access to basic health services, but does not cover all costs and treatments. In order to close this gap, citizens can take out additional insurance.”¹⁷¹ In 2015 (the latest reported year), a low 0.2 percent of surveyed Slovenians reported not getting medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists, ranking 2nd (with Austria). This consistently favorable self-reporting on access to health care, however, has not translated into an increase in healthy life years. On average, Slovenians can expect 58.1 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability, placing the country 20th (2015). This healthy lifespan is 15.5 years shorter than in Sweden and Malta. According to the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI), Slovenian health policy ranks 18th on its ability to achieve short wait times as well as a high range and wide reach of health services. However, the EHCI places the country 6th for its health system outcomes. This is particularly praiseworthy as the health outcomes for Slovenians have much improved since 2008. The SGI researchers note, however, that “both the compulsory public health insurance scheme and the supplementary health insurance funds have suffered from severe financial problems for some time, resulting in financial problems among the majority of health providers.”¹⁷²

Spain

Spain’s overall performance on the SJI has worsened since our first edition in 2008; it remains among the most poorly functioning countries with regard to social justice. With a score of 4.96 it ranks 24th in the 28-member state EU. Indeed, Spain places among the bottom ten in four of the six dimensions of social justice used in our index, and among the bottom five in terms of equitable education and labor market access. On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the country ranks 24th with a score of 4.92.


Spain ranks highest on our health dimension (score: 7.04, rank: 12). The average Spaniard can expect 64 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability, placing 6th (with Greece). This comparatively long healthy lifespan, however, remains 10 years shorter than in Sweden. “Access to a core set of high-quality health services is guaranteed through a public insurance system that covers 99% of the population.”¹⁷³ In 2016, 0.5% of surveyed Spaniards reported not getting

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Molina/Homs Ferret/Colino (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.



medical attention because of cost, distance or long waiting lists, ranking 4th (with Germany). This share has fluctuated little and remained low throughout the past decade. Empirical data from the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) confirm that wait times as well as the range and reach of health services have remained stable in recent years, ranking 19th in 2016. Health system outcomes, as measured by the EHCI, have improved, though they remain average (rank: 13). “However, the number of practicing doctors, nurses and hospital beds per 1,000 residents is relatively low. Moreover, the general quality of this system has deteriorated in recent years due to austerity measures. (...) There is also interregional inequality.”¹⁷⁴

Spain faces a number of major policy challenges to achieving broad-based social justice. Despite signs of recovery from the brutal recession, the greatest of these continues to be ensuring equitable access to the labor market (score: 4.10, rank: 27). Beginning in 2014, unemployment began to fall when the Spanish economy entered recovery. The overall unemployment rate increased from 8.3% in 2007 to 26.2% in 2013 before sinking to 19.7% in 2016 (rank: 27). However, despite this positive trend, the country’s labor market remains far from inclusive. “Especially among youth and those who have now been out of the labor market for several years, the government has to develop and implement job-creation policies involving more than simple wage cuts.”¹⁷⁵ Since the crisis began, the long-term unemployed have seen their numbers increase from 1.7% in 2007 to an alarming 9.5%. Those with less than upper secondary education are unemployed at a much higher rate: 26.1% (rank: 25). Among youth, the unemployment rate has more

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

than doubled since 2007. With 44.4% of 15-to-24-year olds unemployed (the second-highest rate in the EU), the Spanish government faces a truly urgent policy challenge. Rather than increase government interventions, “public-spending cuts have reduced the prevalence of active labor market programs designed to help the unemployed find work.”¹⁷⁶

Looking at the Spanish labor market from the perspective of the employed, the magnitude of the challenge becomes even clearer. Only 59.5% of the working-age population were employed in 2016 – one of the lowest employment rates in the EU (rank: 25). In addition, the share of working-age Spaniards in temporary work because they could not find a permanent position, 91.4%, is the second highest. In comparison, the rate in Austria, which ranks first place on this indicator, is 9.1%. “[T]he Spanish labor market continues to languish under problems that public policies have been unable to solve. Perhaps the three most significant ones include: 1) a lack of flexibility in the labor force (insufficient mobility, few part-time contracts); 2) a high share of undeclared work (which also means the actual unemployment rate is not as extreme as official figures indicate); and above all, 3) the...dual labor market, which is a serious source of inequality.”¹⁷⁷


Sweden

Sweden is the second most socially just country in the EU, scoring 7.31 on the 2017 SJI. Since our first assessment in 2008, Sweden has consistently maintained its position as one of the best performing countries, although preventing poverty has become an increasing challenge. Overall, the success is broad-based, with the country ranking in the top five across five of the six social justice dimensions, two of these being in first place (health and intergenerational justice). With regard to children and youth, Sweden places 5th on this subindex with a score of 7.00.

Current and prior Swedish governments have had success at ensuring that policies are equitable both for the present and coming generations. Sweden remains the top-ranked country in terms of intergenerational justice (score: 7.97). The country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have steadily declined since 2006 and consistently remained the lowest in the EU. In 2015 (the latest reported year), GHG emissions totaled 0.3 tons per capita (in CO₂ equivalents). The use of renewable energy has likewise progressively improved. An admirable 53.9% of energy consumed by end users (e.g., households and industry) came from renewable sources, the highest share in our sample. Sweden’s forward-looking policies also include strong investments in research and development. In 2015, the public and private sector invested a total of 3.3% of GDP in research and development. Such expenditures are sound investments in the future, helping to ensure that the Swedish economy will remain globally competitive in the decades to come. At the same time, investments made today must not unduly burden future taxpayers with debt. “In the wake of a financial crisis in the early 1990s, maintaining sound fiscal policy has been an overarching policy goal for both center-right and Social Democratic governments. Sweden is one of very few countries that targets a bud-

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.



get surplus.”¹⁷⁸ “In 2016, a revised budget surplus goal of 0.33% was negotiated between the two major blocs in parliament.”¹⁷⁹ While public debt remains moderately higher than before the global financial crisis, at 41.7% of GDP (2016), it ranks on the lower end (rank: 9).

In addition, the SGI country experts awarded the Swedish government’s family policy a top score of 10. They conclude that the “[m]ajor features of Sweden’s policy have been the separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public and private daycare centers and a very generous parental leave program provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities to combine a professional career with parenthood.”¹⁸⁰

Sweden, however, faces an escalating policy challenge as a result of its aging population. The country’s age dependency ratio ranks as one of the more burdensome in the EU. In 2016, there were 31.5 older dependents (age 65 years or over) for every 100 people of working age. In this context, our experts are optimistic that recent major pension reforms, which strengthen capital-funded occupational and private pension schemes, have improved the system’s stability and sustainability.¹⁸¹ They warn, however, that a high and persistent youth unemployment rate threatens equity in the long term.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Pierre/Jochem/Jahn (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

The Swedish administration can also be praised for effectively promoting social inclusion and combating discrimination. With a score of 7.50 on this dimension, the country ranks 2nd, marginally bested by the Netherlands. The Riksdag enjoys the highest gender equity of any national parliament in the EU, with 43.6% of seats being held by women (2016, until better data are available, we use this as a proxy for gender equality in society). Furthermore, Sweden's NEET rate has progressively declined since our first assessment in 2008. A comparatively low 9.3% of 20-to-24-year olds are neither in employment nor education or training (rank: 5). The SGI experts awarded the government a score of 9 (out of 10) for its non-discrimination policies and 8 for its social inclusion. They conclude that while discrimination of any kind is not officially tolerated, "it is clear that there are still differences between salaries for men and women performing the same work as well as between immigrants and Swedes in the labor market."¹⁸³ The country ranks second-to-last for the level of education parity attained by foreign-born students. In addition, "ethnic segmentation in several suburbs of metropolitan areas in Sweden has increased."¹⁸⁴ In terms of social cohesion, these experts warn that "data and recent developments suggest that Sweden is gradually losing its leading role...and is today largely at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and income distribution. If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today."¹⁸⁵

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's performance on the SJI has remained stable and within the midrange since our first edition in 2008. In the current index, it places 11th in the EU with a score of 6.22. Across the six social justice dimensions that comprise the index, the UK performs best in labor market access (rank: 3). On our subindex focusing on children and youth, the UK places 15th with a score of 6.22.


The UK offers a relatively well-functioning labor market. With a score of 7.10, it ranks 3rd on this dimension. The overall employment rate, 73.5% (2016), has remained relatively stable since 2007 and places 5th. Employment among older workers has increased since 2013: 63.4% of this demographic are employed (rank: 7). These high rates of employment are conversely reflected in the country's unemployment figures. At 4.9%, the UK has one of the lowest incidences of unemployment in the EU (rank: 4). Also, the share of workers unemployed for a year or more, 1.3%, has returned to pre-global financial crisis levels (rank: 1). Those with less than upper secondary education were unemployed at a higher rate (6.2%), but have witnessed an improvement over 2013, when the share was 10.6%. Youth unemployment peaked in 2013 (20.7%), but has since decreased to 13.0% (rank: 8). According the SGI country report, "recent labor market performance has been so robust that the new government has declared full employment an official government objective. (...) However, the increase in employment has come at the cost of weakness in real wages. Furthermore, wages have only recently returned to their pre-crisis levels, partly because of a moderating effect of immigration."¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Busch/Begg/Bandelow (2017), available at www.sgi-network.org.



The UK's health sector performs above average, but has growing challenges (score: 7.09, rank: 11). "The National Health Service (NHS) remains a cornerstone of the United Kingdom's universal welfare state and is widely regarded as a core public institution. (...) Most health care provided by the NHS is free at the point of delivery. However, there are charges for prescriptions and dental treatment, though specific demographic groups (e.g., pensioners) are exempt from these charges."¹⁸⁷ The average British citizen can expect 63.5 years without a limitation in functioning and without disability (rank: 9), 10 years fewer than the average Swede and Maltese. In 2016, 1.0% reported that the UK's National Health Service had failed to meet all of their medical needs, the lowest share in a decade. Empirical data from the Euro Health Consumer Index (EHCI) reveal mixed results. According to the EHCI measures used in our study, wait times as well as the range and reach of health services are middling (rank: 16). Health system outcomes, however, are assessed by the EHCI as well above average (rank: 9) and have considerably improved compared to 2008. The SGI experts note that "input and outcome indicators of health care, such as how quickly cancer patients are seen by specialists or the incidence of 'bed-blocking' (i.e., where complementary social care is difficult to arrange and so patients are kept in hospital), vary considerably across localities."¹⁸⁸ In addition, "[t]he financial position of many hospital trusts is rather precarious... with more hospitals struggling to maintain standards."¹⁸⁹

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid.

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Appendix

TABLE 1A Overview of results

RANK	COUNTRY	WEIGHTED INDEX						UNWEIGHTED INDEX					
		2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017
8	Austria	6.86	6.59	6.65	6.60	6.68	6.69	6.90	6.59	6.68	6.65	6.68	6.69
13	Belgium	6.09	6.17	6.16	6.15	6.13	6.18	6.23	6.29	6.25	6.24	6.20	6.24
26	Bulgaria			3.79	3.95	3.91	4.19			4.26	4.33	4.34	4.58
23	Croatia			4.92	4.93	4.97	5.07			5.08	5.06	5.09	5.17
21	Cyprus			5.06	5.10	5.07	5.31			5.09	5.11	5.14	5.37
4	Czech Republic	6.62	6.69	6.72	6.73	6.83	6.84	6.48	6.54	6.59	6.60	6.68	6.67
1	Denmark	7.23	6.99	7.09	7.11	7.12	7.39	7.32	7.09	7.21	7.21	7.20	7.40
12	Estonia			6.22	6.01	6.11	6.19			6.23	6.11	6.12	6.24
3	Finland	7.11	7.11	7.17	7.19	7.17	7.14	7.17	7.18	7.19	7.25	7.22	7.17
10	France	6.21	6.14	6.26	6.18	6.24	6.29	6.23	6.15	6.24	6.15	6.20	6.29
7	Germany	6.09	6.33	6.52	6.46	6.57	6.71	6.10	6.35	6.57	6.50	6.58	6.79
28	Greece	4.36	4.36	3.53	3.58	3.61	3.70	4.34	4.36	3.70	3.78	3.78	3.87
22	Hungary	5.11	4.88	4.45	4.70	4.99	5.18	5.23	5.06	4.69	4.86	5.00	5.13
17	Ireland	5.91	5.37	5.06	5.24	5.49	5.66	6.03	5.65	5.35	5.42	5.63	5.84
25	Italy	5.10	5.09	4.69	4.69	4.80	4.84	5.10	5.06	4.75	4.72	4.86	4.92
19	Latvia			4.68	4.92	5.09	5.46			4.88	5.03	5.12	5.45
18	Lithuania			5.46	5.67	5.66	5.61			5.79	5.81	5.87	5.85
9	Luxembourg	6.48	6.67	6.58	6.55	6.56	6.55	6.52	6.76	6.66	6.64	6.65	6.63
15	Malta			5.16	5.32	5.50	5.79			5.20	5.35	5.51	5.74
6	Netherlands	7.00	6.97	6.85	6.73	6.70	6.73	7.05	6.93	6.87	6.76	6.69	6.73
15	Poland	4.46	5.15	5.44	5.58	5.82	5.79	4.68	5.21	5.44	5.54	5.74	5.61
20	Portugal	4.99	4.96	4.71	4.85	5.04	5.36	5.05	5.04	4.90	5.04	5.16	5.45
27	Romania			3.72	3.64	3.94	3.99			4.07	3.95	4.21	4.32
14	Slovakia	5.66	5.58	5.37	5.47	5.57	5.91	5.63	5.42	5.30	5.36	5.43	5.72
5	Slovenia			6.35	6.37	6.58	6.74			6.39	6.43	6.61	6.71
24	Spain	5.51	4.96	4.79	4.62	4.76	4.96	5.65	5.20	5.04	4.93	5.08	5.24
2	Sweden	7.54	7.41	7.38	7.32	7.44	7.31	7.64	7.61	7.55	7.44	7.57	7.51
11	United Kingdom	5.99	5.88	5.91	6.02	6.12	6.22	6.07	6.00	6.09	6.15	6.22	6.27

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

POVERTY PREVENTION						EQUITABLE EDUCATION					
2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017
7.00	6.48	6.51	6.41	6.62	6.70	6.11	6.18	6.26	6.11	6.31	6.33
5.84	6.03	6.03	5.94	5.96	6.06	6.04	6.00	6.31	6.27	6.30	6.19
		1.00	1.46	1.18	1.39			5.58	5.56	5.79	6.23
		3.88	4.02	4.07	4.21			7.05	7.20	7.21	6.91
		4.37	4.47	4.11	4.40			6.59	6.65	6.71	6.72
7.22	7.55	7.50	7.45	7.64	7.81	6.86	6.98	6.93	6.73	6.69	6.35
6.98	6.62	6.62	6.72	6.77	7.00	6.95	6.93	7.18	7.23	7.25	7.84
		5.39	4.80	5.23	5.18			7.47	7.26	7.11	7.14
6.84	6.96	7.17	6.86	6.98	7.03	7.20	7.21	7.21	7.86	7.69	7.62
6.46	6.41	6.67	6.58	6.77	6.65	5.45	5.44	5.67	5.74	5.84	5.93
6.08	6.29	6.15	6.08	6.22	6.29	6.06	6.15	6.47	6.49	6.65	6.54
4.26	4.40	2.50	2.43	2.50	2.53	4.17	4.21	4.76	5.06	5.18	5.27
4.00	3.88	2.72	3.43	4.28	4.73	6.33	5.88	6.04	5.48	5.47	5.20
5.49	4.49	3.88	4.40	4.80	4.80	5.24	5.36	5.47	5.64	5.66	5.87
4.80	5.04	4.21	4.26	4.16	4.16	5.08	5.01	5.01	5.18	5.40	5.40
		2.65	3.21	3.64	4.21			6.87	6.90	6.88	7.25
		3.66	4.49	4.02	3.83			7.58	7.46	7.49	7.26
7.19	6.91	6.46	6.46	6.58	6.58	4.68	5.51	6.43	6.30	5.94	6.08
		5.27	5.32	5.65	6.20			4.19	4.35	4.34	4.54
7.24	7.38	7.19	7.05	7.07	6.98	6.16	6.30	6.14	6.18	6.17	6.09
2.81	4.37	4.85	5.11	5.42	5.77	6.31	6.38	6.89	7.15	7.21	6.86
5.04	4.97	4.45	4.45	4.66	5.01	3.54	3.67	4.17	4.21	4.54	4.92
		1.04	1.41	2.10	1.77			5.42	4.65	4.67	4.91
5.89	6.08	6.27	6.60	6.60	6.67	6.06	6.40	5.48	5.25	5.28	5.99
		6.13	6.13	6.41	6.60			7.15	7.17	7.05	7.30
5.44	4.78	4.49	4.04	4.19	4.35	4.42	4.60	5.02	4.85	4.95	5.32
7.67	7.41	7.07	6.96	7.17	6.62	6.96	6.89	7.49	7.72	7.72	7.77
5.61	5.46	5.09	5.25	5.39	5.70	5.45	5.38	6.01	6.07	6.11	6.10

TABLE 1B Overview of results

		LABOR MARKET ACCESS						SOCIAL COHESION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION					
RANK	COUNTRY	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017
8	Austria	7.07	7.16	7.13	7.17	7.22	7.06	7.15	6.46	6.63	6.81	6.75	6.72
13	Belgium	5.82	5.92	5.75	5.93	5.89	6.02	6.92	6.84	6.49	6.59	6.36	6.41
26	Bulgaria			4.81	5.02	4.89	5.44			4.44	4.25	4.16	4.02
23	Croatia			3.96	3.67	3.81	4.35			4.67	4.77	4.67	4.85
21	Cyprus			4.70	4.71	4.91	5.36			4.80	4.83	5.21	5.54
4	Czech Republic	5.98	5.57	5.77	6.07	6.25	6.46	6.35	6.29	6.19	6.20	6.13	6.11
1	Denmark	7.50	7.16	7.16	7.18	7.23	7.63	7.58	7.41	7.52	7.46	7.23	7.31
12	Estonia			6.58	6.58	6.89	6.99			5.93	5.97	5.90	6.26
3	Finland	7.14	6.84	7.04	6.87	6.72	6.73	7.94	7.60	7.74	7.71	7.49	7.46
10	France	6.38	6.23	6.13	5.95	5.85	5.90	5.91	5.66	6.18	6.09	6.02	6.20
7	Germany	6.05	6.51	6.97	6.98	7.09	7.21	6.48	6.63	7.08	7.05	6.95	6.97
28	Greece	4.85	4.38	3.34	3.17	3.20	3.46	4.21	4.13	3.53	4.01	4.17	4.36
22	Hungary	5.38	4.83	4.91	5.49	5.83	6.33	5.31	5.36	4.73	4.66	4.50	4.48
17	Ireland	6.77	5.47	5.21	5.46	5.81	6.09	6.31	6.12	6.08	5.98	6.08	6.53
25	Italy	5.71	5.39	4.98	4.93	5.10	5.17	4.85	4.58	4.66	4.59	4.87	4.88
19	Latvia			5.33	5.75	6.04	6.24			5.04	4.89	4.85	5.02
18	Lithuania			4.95	5.41	5.85	6.07			6.01	6.04	5.88	5.97
9	Luxembourg	6.63	6.77	6.46	6.42	6.61	6.47	7.10	7.32	7.07	7.26	7.23	7.20
15	Malta			5.65	6.06	6.28	6.46			4.71	4.96	4.85	4.89
6	Netherlands	7.09	7.06	6.76	6.53	6.52	6.82	7.75	7.77	7.73	7.61	7.38	7.53
15	Poland	4.57	5.13	5.13	5.26	5.69	5.85	5.03	5.32	5.99	6.03	6.18	5.77
20	Portugal	6.00	5.74	4.59	5.21	5.57	5.97	5.74	5.41	5.48	5.36	5.70	5.86
27	Romania			5.24	5.24	5.29	5.50			4.34	4.08	4.23	4.33
14	Slovakia	5.01	4.72	3.87	4.11	4.63	5.49	6.12	5.16	5.70	5.70	5.68	5.63
5	Slovenia			5.74	5.67	6.27	6.61			6.69	6.73	7.06	7.07
24	Spain	5.88	4.29	3.62	3.71	3.81	4.10	6.28	5.71	5.52	5.47	5.66	5.88
2	Sweden	7.30	6.74	6.91	6.91	6.88	7.03	7.92	8.02	8.11	7.89	7.75	7.50
11	United Kingdom	6.84	6.47	6.43	6.73	7.00	7.10	6.38	6.20	6.24	6.29	6.40	6.14

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

HEALTH						INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE					
2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017	2008	2011	2014	2015	2016	2017
7.77	7.48	7.48	7.36	7.06	7.22	6.27	5.80	6.06	6.04	6.08	6.10
7.61	7.97	7.90	7.68	7.56	7.64	5.18	5.01	5.01	5.00	5.16	5.12
		4.31	4.40	4.81	5.20			5.40	5.28	5.24	5.20
		6.04	5.70	5.96	6.00			4.87	5.00	4.84	4.72
		6.15	6.00	5.97	6.27			3.92	4.02	3.95	3.91
6.78	7.25	7.40	7.37	7.69	7.61	5.71	5.59	5.74	5.79	5.71	5.66
8.20	7.47	7.73	7.47	7.40	7.43	6.75	6.96	7.07	7.18	7.31	7.19
		5.19	5.51	5.07	5.17			6.80	6.54	6.49	6.69
6.48	6.77	6.66	6.86	7.10	6.99	7.43	7.73	7.33	7.32	7.31	7.20
7.32	7.44	7.25	7.04	7.12	7.50	5.86	5.70	5.56	5.51	5.63	5.59
6.49	7.09	7.20	7.10	7.03	8.05	5.45	5.41	5.53	5.27	5.50	5.69
5.67	6.13	4.68	4.41	4.09	3.99	2.88	2.92	3.40	3.59	3.57	3.60
5.56	5.24	4.97	5.27	5.18	5.33	4.80	5.16	4.80	4.84	4.76	4.72
6.80	7.33	6.56	6.15	6.18	6.35	5.55	5.13	4.91	4.90	5.26	5.39
6.57	6.47	5.89	5.50	5.76	5.79	3.59	3.89	3.76	3.84	3.86	4.10
		3.13	3.32	3.25	3.91			6.28	6.10	6.08	6.07
		6.24	5.38	5.79	5.75			6.31	6.09	6.19	6.24
8.12	8.21	8.12	7.88	7.95	7.82	5.40	5.84	5.45	5.49	5.57	5.65
		7.09	7.00	7.53	7.66			4.27	4.43	4.42	4.73
8.12	7.70	8.00	7.81	7.73	7.70	5.95	5.39	5.41	5.37	5.29	5.27
4.22	4.66	4.26	4.11	4.39	4.69	5.13	5.39	5.54	5.57	5.54	4.73
5.05	5.52	6.15	6.43	5.68	6.04	4.92	4.95	4.59	4.57	4.81	4.89
		3.18	3.09	3.76	4.21			5.21	5.20	5.19	5.18
5.12	4.88	5.32	5.40	5.19	5.38	5.58	5.31	5.15	5.14	5.18	5.13
		6.28	6.47	6.60	6.44			6.37	6.41	6.30	6.24
6.99	6.84	7.01	6.86	7.10	7.04	4.88	4.98	4.59	4.68	4.79	4.75
7.81	8.41	7.81	7.33	8.00	8.16	8.20	8.19	7.91	7.83	7.91	7.97
6.66	6.98	7.26	7.03	6.98	7.09	5.47	5.53	5.50	5.51	5.44	5.47

TABLE 2 Dimension I: Poverty Prevention

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
A1 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, total population	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A2 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, children (0-17)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A3 At risk of poverty or social exclusion, seniors (65+)	People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A4 Population living in quasi-jobless households	People living in households with very low work intensity, age 0 to 59 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A5 Severe material deprivation, total population	Severe material deprivation rate, total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A6 Severe material deprivation, children (0-17)	Severe material deprivation rate, age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014 or 2015; f: 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A7 Severe material deprivation, seniors (65+)	Severe material deprivation rate, age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2014 or 2015; f: 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A8 Income poverty, total population	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), total population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A9 Income poverty, children (0-17)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), age less than 18 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
A10 Income poverty, seniors (65+)	At risk of poverty (cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers), age 65 years or over (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 3 Dimension II: Equitable Education

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
B1 Education policy (SGI)	Policy performance in delivering high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment "To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?"
B2 Socioeconomic background and student performance	PISA results, product of slope of ESCS for reading and strength of relationship between reading and ESCS	OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006, 2012, or 2015; b: 2009, 2012, or 2015; c: 2012 or 2015; d: 2012 or 2015; e: 2012 or 2015; f: 2015)
B3 Pre-primary education expenditure	Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, at pre-primary level of education (ISCED 0) and not allocated by level (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2001, 2004, 2005, or 2006; b: 2004, 2007, or 2008; c: 2004 or 2011; d: 2004, 2011, or 2012; e: 2004, 2011, 2012, or 2013; f: 2004, 2011, 2012, 2013, or 2014), extracted 2 August 2017
B4 Early school leavers	Early leavers from education and training, age 18 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
B5 Less than upper secondary education	Population with less than upper secondary education (ISCED 0 and 2), age 25 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 21 August 2017
B6 PISA results	PISA results, mean score of reading, science and mathematics scale	OECD PISA (data refer to a: 2006, 2012, or 2015; b: 2009, 2012, or 2015; c: 2012 or 2015; d: 2012 or 2015; e: 2012 or 2012; f: 2015)

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 4 Dimension III: Labor Market Access

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
C1 Employment rate	Employment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C2 Older employment rate	Employment rate, age 55 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C3 Employment rate, foreign-born/native-born	Ratio of foreign-born to native-born employment rates, age 15 to 64 years	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2009 or 2013; d: 2009 or 2014; e: 2009 or 2015; f: 2009 or 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C4 Employment rate, women/men	Ratio of employment rates women/men, age 15 to 64 years	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C5 Unemployment rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C6 Long-term unemployment rate	Unemployment rate, unemployed greater than or equal to 1 year (% of labor force)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C7 Youth unemployment rate	Unemployment rate, age 15 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C8 Low-skilled unemployment rate	Unemployment rate, age 25 to 64 years, less than upper secondary education (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C9 Involuntary temporary employment rate	Main reason for temporary employment: Could not find permanent job, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 1999, 2003, or 2007; b: 1999, 2003, 2009, or 2010; c: 1999, 2009, or 2013; d: 1999, 2009, or 2014; e: 1999, 2009, or 2015; f: 1999, 2009, or 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
C10 In-work poverty rate	In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate, full-time workers (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
C11 Low pay incidence	Low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees (excluding apprentices), less than upper secondary education (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2010; d: 2010 or 2014; e: 2010 or 2014; f: 2010 or 2014), extracted 23 June 2017
C12 Employment rate, disabled/non-disabled	Ratio of employment rates disabled/non-disabled, age 25 to 50 years	Jorge Calero, University of Barcelona (data refer to a: 2008, 2010, or 2011; b: 2009, 2010, or 2011; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015)

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 5 Dimension IV: Social Cohesion and Non-discrimination

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
D1 Social inclusion (SGI)	Policy performance in strengthening social cohesion and inclusion	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment "To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?"
D2 Gini coefficient	Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 16 October 2017
D3 Non-discrimination (SGI)	Policy performance in protecting against discrimination	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment "How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?"
D4 Gender equality in parliaments	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	World Bank Gender Statistics Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 21 June 2017
D5 Integration policy (SGI)	Policy performance in integrating migrants into society	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment "How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?"
D6 NEET rate	Young people not employed and not participating in education or training, age 20 to 24 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
D7 Less than upper secondary education, foreign-born/native-born	Less than upper secondary education (ISCED 0 to 2), ratio foreign-born/native-born, age 15 to 64 years (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007 or 2010; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2009 or 2013; d: 2009 or 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 22 August 2017
D8 Discrimination against people with disabilities	Discrimination suffered by people with disabilities related to accessing education, medical treatments and a suitable dwelling, age 25 to 50 years	Jorge Calero, University of Barcelona, based on EU-SILC data (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2014 or 2015)

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 6 Dimension V: Health

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
E1 Health policy (SGI)	Policy performance in providing high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment "To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?"
E2 Self-reported unmet needs for medical help	Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination; Reason: too expensive or too far to travel or waiting list (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2007, or 2010; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2011 or 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015 or 2016), extracted 2 August 2017
E3 Healthy life expectancy	Healthy life years at birth, total population	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006, 2007, or 2010; b: 2009 or 2010; c: 2011 or 2012; d: 2012 or 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015), extracted 2 August 2017
E4 Health system accessibility and range	Mean of standardized index values "waiting time for treatment" and "range and reach of services provided"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016)
E5 Health system outcomes	Standardized index values "outcome"	Euro Health Consumer Index (data refer to a: 2008; b: 2009; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016)

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 7 Dimension VI: Intergenerational Justice

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE
F1 Family policy (SGI)	Policy performance in enabling women to combine parenting with labor market participation	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment “To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?”
F2 Pension policy (SGI)	Policy performance in promoting pensions that prevent poverty, are intergenerationally just and fiscally sustainable	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment “To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?”
F3 Environmental policy (SGI)	Policy performance in the sustainable use of natural resources and environmental protection	Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017, expert assessment “How effectively does environmental policy protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?”
F4 Greenhouse gas emissions	Greenhouse gas emissions, all sectors excluding all memo items, tons in CO ₂ equivalents per capita	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015), extracted 2 August 2017
F5 Renewable energy (consumption)	Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2009; c: 2012; d: 2013; e: 2014; f: 2015), extracted 2 August 2017
F6 Total R&D spending	Total intramural R&D expenditure, all sectors (% of GDP)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2006; b: 2007 or 2009; c: 2012; d: 2012 or 2013; e: 2014; f: 2014 or 2015), extracted 2 August 2017
F7 Public debt	General government gross debt (% of GDP)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2017 (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2012 or 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016)
F8 Age dependency ratio	Ratio of older dependents (age 65 years or over) to the working-age population (age 15 to 64 years), proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population (%)	Eurostat Online Database (data refer to a: 2007; b: 2010; c: 2013; d: 2014; e: 2015; f: 2016), extracted 2 August 2017

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

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TABLE 8A SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	16.7%	18.5%	15.1%	8.2%	3.3%	3.7%	2.1%	12.0%	14.8%	14.0%	7	5.99	0.40%
Belgium	21.6%	21.6%	25.0%	13.8%	5.7%	7.0%	3.6%	15.2%	16.9%	23.0%	7	7.59	0.71%
Bulgaria*	60.7%	60.8%	71.1%	16.0%	57.6%	58.3%	67.2%	22.0%	29.9%	23.9%		12.47	0.74%
Croatia*	31.1%	29.4%	37.5%	13.9%	14.3%	14.8%	15.7%	20.6%	19.6%	30.5%		3.31	0.57%
Cyprus*	25.2%	20.8%	55.6%	3.7%	13.3%	11.7%	19.4%	15.5%	12.4%	50.6%		2.83	0.34%
Czech Republic	15.8%	21.5%	10.9%	8.6%	7.4%	10.0%	6.5%	9.6%	16.6%	5.5%	7	6.43	0.51%
Denmark	16.8%	14.2%	18.3%	10.1%	3.3%	4.8%	0.8%	11.7%	9.6%	17.7%	7	3.48	0.87%
Estonia*	22.0%	20.1%	35.4%	6.2%	5.6%	4.1%	7.9%	19.4%	18.2%	33.2%		2.21	0.35%
Finland	17.4%	15.1%	23.1%	8.8%	3.6%	3.4%	2.6%	13.0%	10.9%	21.6%	10	2.21	0.34%
France	19.0%	19.6%	15.2%	9.6%	4.7%	5.4%	3.4%	13.1%	15.3%	13.1%	5	7.93	0.64%
Germany	20.6%	19.7%	16.8%	11.5%	4.8%	5.4%	2.2%	15.2%	14.1%	16.2%	7	7.51	0.47%
Greece	28.3%	28.2%	30.6%	8.1%	11.5%	9.7%	17.4%	20.3%	23.3%	22.9%	2	3.67	0.11%
Hungary	29.4%	34.1%	21.1%	11.3%	19.9%	24.4%	17.2%	12.3%	18.8%	6.1%	5	8.71	1.00%
Ireland	23.1%	26.2%	28.7%	14.3%	4.5%	7.6%	1.2%	17.2%	19.2%	28.3%	7	4.63	0.00%
Italy	26.0%	28.6%	25.5%	10.2%	7.0%	7.8%	6.5%	19.5%	24.6%	22.2%	5	2.25	0.50%
Latvia*	35.1%	32.8%	51.4%	6.2%	24.0%	20.5%	35.8%	21.2%	19.8%	35.6%		2.90	0.67%
Lithuania*	28.7%	29.9%	39.1%	6.4%	16.6%	15.9%	20.8%	19.1%	22.1%	29.8%		5.43	0.59%
Luxembourg	15.9%	21.2%	7.2%	5.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	13.5%	19.9%	7.2%	3	8.48	0.50%
Malta*	19.7%	23.9%	22.8%	9.6%	4.4%	6.4%	3.1%	15.1%	19.8%	20.3%		5.30	1.02%
Netherlands	15.7%	17.2%	9.8%	9.7%	1.7%	1.9%	0.7%	10.2%	14.0%	9.5%	8	5.47	0.41%
Poland	34.4%	37.1%	27.3%	10.1%	22.3%	22.5%	23.7%	17.3%	24.2%	7.8%	4	5.57	0.53%
Portugal	25.0%	26.9%	30.0%	7.2%	9.6%	11.8%	10.7%	18.1%	20.9%	25.5%	5	5.85	0.53%
Romania*	47.0%	51.8%	57.9%	9.9%	38.0%	42.3%	50.1%	24.6%	33.0%	29.4%		3.49	0.65%
Slovakia	21.4%	25.8%	22.1%	6.4%	13.7%	16.3%	17.7%	10.6%	17.2%	8.5%	4	6.63	0.47%
Slovenia*	17.1%	14.7%	22.4%	7.3%	5.1%	4.4%	6.6%	11.5%	11.3%	19.4%		5.91	0.51%
Spain	23.3%	28.6%	27.8%	6.8%	3.5%	4.4%	3.6%	19.7%	26.2%	26.1%	5	2.82	0.55%
Sweden	13.9%	14.9%	10.4%	6.0%	2.2%	3.2%	0.6%	10.5%	12.0%	9.9%	7	3.05	0.59%
United Kingdom	22.6%	27.6%	27.9%	10.4%	4.2%	6.3%	1.9%	18.6%	23.0%	26.5%	6	5.25	0.38%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
10.8%	20.1%	502.17	69.9%	36.0%	0.87	0.83	4.9%	1.3%	9.4%	8.0%	18.1%	5.3%	14.2%	0.80
12.1%	32.0%	510.54	62.0%	34.4%	0.85	0.80	7.5%	3.8%	18.8%	11.3%	80.0%	3.5%	6.8%	0.60
14.9%	22.6%	416.49	61.7%	42.6%	0.95	0.87	6.9%	4.1%	15.1%	16.8%	65.3%	5.1%	18.9%	0.58
4.5%	24.3%	479.27	59.0%	36.6%	0.83	0.78	10.1%	6.1%	25.2%	12.3%	48.9%	5.9%	21.5%	0.51
12.5%	27.9%	442.11	71.0%	55.9%	1.00	0.78	4.0%	0.7%	10.2%	4.4%	89.5%	5.7%	22.7%	0.73
5.2%	9.5%	501.81	66.1%	46.0%	1.17	0.77	5.4%	2.8%	10.7%	19.1%	63.6%	3.2%	17.1%	0.65
12.9%	25.7%	501.13	77.0%	58.9%	0.78	0.91	3.8%	0.6%	7.5%	4.3%	39.2%	3.7%	8.3%	0.69
14.4%	10.9%	515.57	69.8%	59.9%	1.01	0.90	4.7%	2.3%	10.1%	8.3%	30.7%	7.2%	23.2%	0.71
9.1%	19.5%	552.85	70.3%	55.0%	0.83	0.95	6.9%	1.6%	16.5%	8.9%	64.5%	3.4%	4.8%	0.81
12.8%	31.5%	492.82	64.3%	38.2%	0.82	0.86	7.7%	3.1%	18.8%	9.6%	55.3%	5.3%	7.1%	0.81
12.5%	15.6%	504.79	69.0%	51.3%	0.79	0.85	8.8%	5.0%	11.9%	18.0%	26.6%	6.1%	20.3%	0.77
14.3%	39.9%	464.10	60.9%	42.7%	1.11	0.64	8.5%	4.2%	22.7%	7.1%	82.2%	12.9%	15.7%	0.53
11.4%	21.0%	492.41	57.0%	32.2%	1.13	0.80	7.5%	3.5%	18.0%	16.3%	59.9%	5.1%	21.9%	0.61
11.8%	32.2%	509.04	69.2%	53.9%	1.08	0.78	4.8%	1.4%	9.1%	6.2%	34.3%	3.8%	21.4%	0.54
19.5%	47.8%	468.54	58.6%	33.7%	1.15	0.66	6.2%	2.9%	20.4%	6.3%	65.0%	8.5%	10.3%	0.81
15.6%	15.4%	485.07	68.1%	58.0%	0.97	0.88	6.2%	1.7%	10.6%	9.4%	61.3%	8.0%	30.9%	0.76
7.8%	11.5%	481.48	65.0%	53.2%	0.97	0.91	4.3%	1.4%	8.4%	6.9%	68.0%	6.9%	29.1%	0.67
12.5%	34.3%	485.23	64.2%	32.0%	1.13	0.78	4.1%	1.2%	15.2%	4.1%	36.5%	8.7%	13.2%	0.86
30.2%	73.4%	463.36	55.0%	29.5%	0.92	0.49	6.5%	2.7%	13.5%	6.8%	51.1%	4.1%	14.4%	0.54
11.7%	26.8%	520.75	76.0%	50.9%	0.79	0.85	3.2%	1.3%	5.9%	4.0%	37.9%	4.3%	17.7%	0.69
5.0%	13.7%	500.29	57.0%	29.7%	1.14	0.80	9.7%	5.0%	21.7%	15.5%	73.1%	10.7%	24.7%	0.55
36.5%	72.7%	470.92	67.6%	51.0%	1.06	0.84	8.5%	4.0%	16.7%	8.0%	81.7%	7.7%	20.7%	0.67
17.3%	25.0%	409.70	58.8%	41.4%	1.11	0.81	6.8%	3.4%	20.1%	6.6%	78.1%	14.1%	26.9%	0.58
6.5%	10.9%	482.30	60.7%	35.6%	1.08	0.77	11.2%	8.3%	20.3%	41.5%	68.8%	4.5%	18.3%	0.84
4.1%	18.2%	505.89	67.8%	33.5%	0.96	0.86	5.0%	2.3%	10.1%	6.5%	52.0%	4.0%	19.2%	0.79
30.8%	49.4%	476.40	65.8%	44.5%	1.06	0.73	8.3%	1.7%	18.1%	9.0%	84.4%	9.7%	13.4%	0.69
8.0%	20.6%	504.33	74.2%	70.0%	0.80	0.94	6.2%	0.9%	19.3%	6.9%	57.1%	5.8%	1.8%	0.76
16.6%	26.6%	501.77	71.5%	57.4%	0.93	0.84	5.3%	1.3%	14.3%	6.0%	50.4%	5.8%	21.8%	0.66

TABLE 8B SJI 2008 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	26.2	7	32.8%	6	9.7%	1.64	8.69	9	0.5%	59.88	79.25	80.80
Belgium	8	26.3	8	35.3%	7	15.9%	1.35	6.97	9	0.5%	63.10	87.58	52.40
Bulgaria*		35.3		21.7%		24.6%		3.92		19.2%	69.12	52.58	42.80
Croatia*		31.6		20.9%		15.8%	1.24			6.3%	58.95	48.25	47.60
Cyprus*		29.8		14.3%		13.2%	0.84	6.19		3.1%	63.79	55.00	57.20
Czech Republic	8	25.3	6	15.5%	5	10.8%	1.32	8.32	7	0.6%	58.92	67.42	71.60
Denmark	9	25.2	7	38.0%	7	5.9%	1.15	7.77	9	0.2%	67.45	69.00	85.60
Estonia*		33.4		20.8%		12.4%	0.34	7.55		7.1%	51.90	67.42	57.20
Finland	9	26.2	9	41.5%	7	10.6%	1.24	8.82	8	2.5%	53.00	64.33	85.60
France	6	26.6	7	18.2%	6	15.8%	1.48	7.02	8	1.5%	63.63	69.25	76.00
Germany	7	30.4	8	31.6%	6	13.9%	2.12	7.26	7	5.0%	58.50	80.08	76.00
Greece	3	34.3	6	14.7%	5	15.9%	1.17	4.40	4	5.7%	67.31	55.58	71.60
Hungary	5	25.6	6	11.1%	5	17.1%	0.70	7.11	5	2.3%	55.87	70.67	52.40
Ireland	7	31.3	9	13.3%	7	13.2%	0.59	7.43	7	1.8%	64.05	57.42	76.00
Italy	5	32.0	7	17.3%	5	21.3%	0.99	5.57	7	4.6%	64.94	63.33	76.00
Latvia*		35.4		20.0%		15.3%	0.53	5.54		15.0%	51.72	50.08	57.20
Lithuania*		33.8		22.7%		11.0%	0.36	8.04		7.9%	54.69	52.33	47.60
Luxembourg	9	27.4	7	23.3%	8	8.5%	0.98	7.55	9	0.4%	61.65	91.08	76.00
Malta*		26.3		9.2%		11.3%	0.77			1.8%	68.91	57.42	47.60
Netherlands	9	27.6	9	39.3%	7	5.1%	1.08	7.46	8	0.4%	64.34	83.25	85.60
Poland	5	32.2	5	20.4%	4	17.1%	0.98	7.47	4	9.1%	60.72	54.42	52.40
Portugal	4	36.8	8	28.3%	9	14.2%	0.74	5.56	6	4.9%	58.91	50.67	52.40
Romania*		38.3		9.4%		16.5%		3.74		12.3%	61.53	62.33	28.40
Slovakia	7	24.5	6	19.3%	4	17.3%	0.96	9.12	6	2.7%	54.55	63.92	38.00
Slovenia*		23.2		12.2%		8.6%	1.52	7.61		0.2%	59.38	50.67	66.80
Spain	5	31.9	8	36.6%	7	13.6%	0.88	6.64	7	0.6%	63.70	62.25	71.60
Sweden	9	23.4	8	47.0%	7	11.1%	1.33	8.18	9	2.8%	67.40	61.67	95.20
United Kingdom	6	32.6	9	19.5%	8	15.6%	0.83	7.71	7	1.9%	64.85	62.25	62.00

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2009.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
6	8	8	10.19	25.4%	2.4%	65.1%	25.0%
9	7	7	13.13	2.6%	1.8%	87.0%	25.9%
			7.16	9.6%	0.5%	17.6%	25.5%
			5.10	22.7%	0.7%	37.7%	26.5%
			12.39	3.3%	0.4%	53.1%	18.0%
7	7	7	13.87	7.4%	1.2%	27.8%	20.3%
9	9	8	14.51	16.3%	2.4%	27.3%	23.2%
			11.84	16.1%	1.1%	3.7%	25.5%
9	9	7	8.96	30.0%	3.3%	34.0%	24.8%
9	6	7	7.69	9.3%	2.1%	64.3%	25.1%
7	7	8	11.99	7.7%	2.5%	63.7%	29.9%
3	2	3	11.68	7.2%	0.6%	103.1%	27.9%
5	5	6	7.06	5.1%	1.0%	65.6%	23.2%
7	8	5	17.37	3.1%	1.2%	23.9%	15.7%
4	4	4	9.28	8.3%	1.1%	99.8%	30.5%
			3.26	31.1%	0.7%	7.2%	25.4%
			5.53	16.9%	0.8%	16.7%	24.7%
6	8	6	25.71	1.5%	1.7%	7.8%	20.7%
			7.57	0.2%	0.6%	62.4%	19.9%
9	9	6	13.15	2.8%	1.8%	42.4%	21.5%
4	7	6	9.79	6.9%	0.6%	44.2%	19.0%
5	5	5	6.95	20.8%	1.0%	68.4%	26.3%
			6.03	17.1%	0.5%	12.7%	21.5%
5	9	4	7.99	6.6%	0.5%	29.8%	16.7%
			6.59	15.6%	1.5%	22.7%	22.7%
5	5	4	8.66	9.2%	1.2%	35.5%	24.0%
10	9	8	3.02	42.7%	3.5%	38.1%	26.4%
7	7	7	11.14	1.5%	1.6%	42.0%	23.9%

TABLE 9A SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	18.9%	22.4%	17.4%	7.8%	4.3%	5.6%	1.9%	14.7%	19.0%	16.8%	7	7.97	0.46%
Belgium	20.8%	23.2%	21.0%	12.7%	5.9%	7.7%	2.8%	14.6%	18.3%	19.4%	7	9.07	0.75%
Bulgaria*	49.2%	49.8%	63.9%	8.0%	45.7%	46.5%	58.1%	20.7%	26.7%	32.2%		10.30	0.85%
Croatia*	31.1%	29.4%	37.5%	13.9%	14.3%	14.8%	15.7%	20.6%	19.6%	30.5%		3.52	0.60%
Cyprus*	24.6%	21.8%	42.6%	4.9%	11.2%	12.5%	7.3%	15.6%	12.6%	39.9%		2.83	0.35%
Czech Republic	14.4%	18.9%	10.1%	6.4%	6.2%	8.6%	4.3%	9.0%	14.3%	6.8%	7	5.70	0.49%
Denmark	18.3%	15.1%	18.4%	10.6%	2.7%	3.1%	0.9%	13.3%	10.9%	17.7%	7	5.22	0.90%
Estonia*	21.7%	24.0%	19.0%	9.0%	9.0%	10.7%	6.6%	15.8%	17.3%	15.1%		2.20	0.55%
Finland	16.9%	14.2%	19.5%	9.3%	2.8%	2.3%	1.7%	13.1%	11.4%	18.3%	10	2.42	0.36%
France	19.2%	22.9%	11.8%	9.9%	5.8%	7.0%	3.4%	13.3%	18.1%	9.4%	5	8.52	0.64%
Germany	19.7%	21.7%	14.8%	11.2%	4.5%	5.2%	2.1%	15.6%	17.5%	14.1%	7	7.88	0.50%
Greece	27.7%	28.7%	26.7%	7.6%	11.6%	12.2%	12.4%	20.1%	23.0%	21.3%	2	4.25	0.11%
Hungary	29.9%	38.7%	16.8%	11.9%	21.6%	28.8%	14.1%	12.3%	20.3%	4.1%	5	12.48	0.96%
Ireland	27.3%	34.1%	11.3%	22.9%	5.7%	8.2%	1.5%	15.2%	18.9%	9.9%	7	4.91	0.00%
Italy	25.0%	29.5%	20.4%	10.6%	7.4%	8.6%	6.3%	18.7%	25.2%	16.7%	5	3.78	0.49%
Latvia*	38.2%	42.2%	36.8%	12.6%	27.6%	30.7%	27.5%	20.9%	26.3%	17.2%		2.99	0.85%
Lithuania*	34.0%	35.8%	29.8%	9.5%	19.9%	20.0%	24.0%	20.5%	24.8%	9.6%		4.49	0.52%
Luxembourg	17.1%	22.3%	6.1%	5.5%	0.5%	0.2%	0.1%	14.5%	21.4%	5.9%	3	7.20	0.51%
Malta*	21.2%	26.7%	21.7%	9.2%	6.5%	7.7%	5.0%	15.5%	22.1%	18.2%		5.30	0.37%
Netherlands	15.1%	16.9%	6.2%	8.4%	2.2%	2.0%	0.3%	10.3%	13.7%	5.9%	8	4.74	0.39%
Poland	27.8%	30.8%	24.4%	7.3%	14.2%	14.9%	16.5%	17.6%	22.5%	14.2%	4	5.77	0.57%
Portugal	25.3%	28.7%	26.1%	8.6%	9.0%	10.8%	9.6%	17.9%	22.4%	21.0%	5	4.95	0.48%
Romania*	41.5%	48.1%	40.1%	7.7%	30.5%	35.8%	32.4%	21.6%	32.1%	17.6%		4.90	0.77%
Slovakia	20.6%	25.3%	16.7%	7.9%	11.4%	13.5%	11.1%	12.0%	18.8%	7.7%	4	5.99	0.53%
Slovenia*	18.3%	15.2%	22.8%	7.0%	5.9%	5.1%	6.3%	12.7%	12.6%	20.2%		5.58	0.49%
Spain	26.1%	33.3%	22.9%	10.8%	4.9%	7.4%	2.2%	20.7%	29.3%	21.8%	5	3.94	0.64%
Sweden	15.0%	14.5%	15.9%	6.0%	1.3%	1.3%	0.7%	12.9%	13.1%	15.5%	7	5.76	0.67%
United Kingdom	23.2%	29.7%	22.3%	13.2%	4.8%	7.3%	1.3%	17.1%	20.4%	21.3%	6	6.03	0.29%

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
8.3%	17.6%	486.84	70.8%	41.2%	0.87	0.86	4.9%	1.2%	9.5%	8.1%	8.7%	6.4%	15.0%	0.77
11.9%	29.5%	509.26	62.0%	37.3%	0.87	0.84	8.4%	4.1%	22.4%	13.2%	74.5%	3.9%	6.4%	0.68
12.6%	20.9%	432.15	59.8%	44.9%	0.70	0.89	10.3%	4.7%	21.9%	21.7%	73.9%	6.4%	22.0%	0.67
5.2%	22.7%	474.02	57.4%	39.1%	0.56	0.83	11.9%	6.7%	32.4%	12.0%	47.3%	5.9%	21.4%	0.51
12.7%	26.0%	442.11	68.9%	56.3%	1.06	0.84	6.5%	1.3%	16.6%	7.1%	93.9%	7.2%	22.6%	0.71
4.9%	8.1%	490.50	65.0%	46.5%	1.15	0.77	7.4%	3.0%	18.3%	22.7%	75.2%	3.4%	18.2%	0.65
11.0%	24.4%	499.18	73.3%	58.4%	0.83	0.94	7.6%	1.5%	14.0%	9.0%	47.6%	5.1%	8.2%	0.77
11.0%	10.7%	513.63	61.2%	53.8%	0.91	0.99	17.1%	7.7%	32.9%	27.3%	43.1%	5.5%	23.8%	0.75
10.3%	17.0%	543.49	68.1%	56.2%	0.81	0.96	8.5%	2.0%	21.4%	11.6%	65.1%	3.0%	5.9%	0.81
12.7%	29.3%	496.88	64.0%	39.7%	0.83	0.88	8.9%	3.6%	22.5%	12.1%	58.0%	5.2%	6.1%	0.81
11.8%	13.9%	510.16	71.3%	57.8%	0.80	0.87	7.1%	3.4%	9.8%	15.7%	21.7%	5.4%	22.2%	0.75
13.5%	37.3%	473.00	59.1%	42.4%	1.09	0.68	12.9%	5.8%	33.0%	11.9%	84.6%	11.7%	12.8%	0.45
10.8%	18.8%	495.66	54.9%	33.6%	1.13	0.84	11.3%	5.5%	26.4%	23.6%	69.8%	4.3%	19.5%	0.61
11.5%	27.2%	496.92	59.6%	50.2%	1.00	0.88	14.1%	6.9%	27.6%	19.4%	34.3%	5.1%	20.7%	0.54
18.6%	44.9%	485.93	56.8%	36.5%	1.12	0.68	8.5%	4.1%	27.9%	9.0%	67.9%	8.6%	12.4%	0.81
12.9%	11.4%	486.60	58.5%	47.8%	0.90	1.02	19.8%	8.9%	36.2%	29.1%	72.3%	7.9%	27.8%	0.70
7.9%	8.1%	478.82	57.6%	48.3%	0.92	1.04	18.1%	7.5%	35.7%	37.8%	71.5%	11.4%	27.2%	0.59
7.1%	22.3%	481.72	65.2%	39.6%	1.09	0.78	4.4%	1.3%	14.2%	4.1%	41.4%	10.0%	13.1%	0.90
23.8%	67.0%	463.36	56.2%	31.9%	1.02	0.54	6.9%	3.1%	13.2%	8.2%	53.1%	5.3%	17.6%	0.54
10.0%	27.7%	518.82	74.7%	53.7%	0.80	0.87	4.5%	1.2%	8.7%	5.7%	31.9%	5.1%	17.5%	0.71
5.4%	11.5%	501.12	58.9%	34.1%	1.02	0.81	9.7%	3.0%	23.7%	16.1%	74.1%	10.5%	24.2%	0.60
28.3%	68.3%	489.72	65.3%	49.5%	1.00	0.87	11.4%	6.0%	22.8%	11.7%	84.1%	8.1%	16.1%	0.66
19.3%	26.1%	426.57	60.2%	40.7%	1.07	0.77	7.3%	2.5%	22.1%	5.5%	79.7%	15.7%	25.8%	0.59
4.7%	9.0%	488.13	58.8%	40.5%	1.02	0.80	14.4%	9.2%	33.6%	40.8%	76.1%	5.2%	19.0%	0.84
5.0%	16.7%	498.77	66.2%	35.0%	0.90	0.90	7.4%	3.2%	14.7%	11.2%	51.8%	4.6%	17.1%	0.84
28.2%	47.1%	484.26	58.8%	43.5%	0.95	0.81	20.0%	7.3%	41.5%	24.5%	91.3%	9.2%	14.7%	0.71
6.5%	18.8%	495.60	72.1%	70.4%	0.79	0.93	8.8%	1.6%	24.8%	11.6%	59.1%	5.1%	2.5%	0.66
14.8%	23.9%	500.10	69.4%	57.2%	0.96	0.87	7.9%	2.6%	19.9%	10.3%	50.4%	5.3%	22.1%	0.62

TABLE 9B SJI 2011 raw data

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	8	28.3	6	27.9%	4	9.6%	1.57	8.45	8	0.5%	60.17	78.92	76.00
Belgium	8	26.6	8	39.3%	6	16.2%	1.35	6.89	9	0.6%	63.80	92.08	62.00
Bulgaria*		33.2		20.8%		26.0%		5.58		10.3%	64.05	49.00	38.00
Croatia*		31.6		23.5%		20.3%	1.20			6.3%	58.95	61.00	57.20
Cyprus*		30.1		12.5%		16.2%	0.97	7.71		3.4%	65.06	73.33	62.00
Czech Republic	7	24.9	6	22.0%	5	13.3%	1.24	8.29	7	0.6%	61.91	73.58	76.00
Denmark	9	26.9	7	38.0%	7	8.5%	1.03	7.82	9	1.5%	61.09	70.33	80.80
Estonia*		31.3		22.8%		20.8%	0.35	7.88		4.3%	57.25	63.33	57.20
Finland	8	25.4	9	40.0%	7	13.3%	1.36	8.34	8	3.7%	58.40	63.58	90.40
France	6	29.8	6	18.9%	6	18.6%	1.55	7.68	7	1.9%	63.16	81.25	80.80
Germany	7	29.3	8	32.8%	6	12.4%	2.12	7.33	7	2.1%	57.61	80.08	85.60
Greece	4	32.9	6	17.3%	5	21.4%	1.37	3.62	5	5.5%	66.46	63.08	76.00
Hungary	5	24.1	6	9.1%	5	19.9%	0.70	7.75	4	2.1%	57.11	65.42	47.60
Ireland	8	30.7	9	13.9%	7	26.1%	0.77	7.93	6	2.0%	64.55	81.25	80.80
Italy	5	31.7	7	21.3%	4	25.9%	1.03	5.24	7	5.3%	62.99	61.00	85.60
Latvia*		35.9		20.0%		25.9%	0.45	5.65		9.9%	54.44	56.33	52.40
Lithuania*		37.0		19.1%		22.2%	0.44	7.39		3.1%	59.35	53.67	52.40
Luxembourg	9	27.9	8	20.0%	9	7.2%	0.96	7.56	8	0.6%	65.50	88.58	80.80
Malta*		28.6		8.7%		10.0%	0.78			1.4%	70.20	63.33	52.40
Netherlands	8	25.5	9	40.7%	8	6.4%	1.29	7.13	7	0.3%	60.89	79.75	90.40
Poland	5	31.1	7	20.0%	4	17.2%	0.65	7.32	5	7.6%	60.47	55.42	52.40
Portugal	4	33.7	7	27.4%	8	15.9%	0.73	5.05	7	3.3%	57.31	55.67	52.40
Romania*		33.5		11.4%		22.0%		4.27		8.5%	60.77	53.67	42.80
Slovakia	5	25.9	4	15.3%	4	21.7%	0.96	8.87	5	1.7%	52.50	61.92	38.00
Slovenia*		23.8		14.4%		9.8%	1.70	7.64		0.2%	61.06	65.67	62.00
Spain	5	33.5	8	36.6%	6	23.2%	0.94	6.67	7	0.5%	62.59	58.92	71.60
Sweden	9	24.1	9	45.0%	7	11.5%	1.40	8.46	9	2.0%	70.15	68.58	100.00
United Kingdom	7	32.9	8	22.0%	8	18.5%	0.79	7.12	7	1.2%	65.56	60.33	71.60

* Countries not surveyed in SGI 2011.

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
6	6	6	9.08	29.9%	2.6%	82.8%	26.2%
9	6	6	11.34	4.7%	2.0%	99.7%	26.0%
			6.55	12.1%	0.5%	14.1%	26.5%
			4.78	23.6%	0.8%	58.3%	26.7%
			11.83	5.6%	0.4%	55.8%	17.8%
6	7	7	12.32	9.9%	1.3%	38.2%	21.7%
9	9	8	11.67	20.0%	3.1%	42.6%	24.9%
			10.43	23.0%	1.4%	6.6%	25.9%
9	9	8	5.49	31.3%	3.8%	47.1%	25.6%
10	5	6	7.10	12.1%	2.2%	81.6%	25.6%
7	7	8	10.87	9.9%	2.7%	81.0%	31.4%
4	2	3	10.89	8.5%	0.6%	146.3%	28.6%
5	7	7	6.07	8.0%	1.1%	80.5%	24.2%
7	6	6	14.36	5.1%	1.6%	86.3%	16.5%
4	5	5	7.94	12.8%	1.2%	115.4%	31.2%
			5.06	34.3%	0.5%	40.3%	26.8%
			3.98	19.8%	0.8%	36.3%	25.6%
9	8	7	22.12	2.9%	1.7%	19.9%	20.4%
			7.21	0.2%	0.5%	67.6%	21.4%
8	8	5	12.56	4.3%	1.7%	59.3%	22.8%
6	7	6	9.38	8.7%	0.7%	53.1%	19.1%
5	4	6	5.66	24.4%	1.6%	96.2%	27.5%
			5.33	22.7%	0.5%	30.5%	23.7%
5	7	4	7.20	9.4%	0.5%	40.7%	17.3%
			6.20	20.1%	1.8%	38.2%	23.8%
5	5	5	7.16	13.0%	1.4%	60.1%	24.6%
10	9	8	1.63	48.2%	3.5%	37.6%	27.7%
8	8	7	9.45	3.3%	1.7%	76.0%	24.6%

TABLE 10A **SJI 2014 raw data**

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	18.8%	22.9%	16.2%	7.8%	4.2%	6.4%	1.8%	14.4%	18.6%	15.4%	5	6.42	0.59%
Belgium	20.8%	21.9%	19.5%	14.0%	5.1%	5.5%	2.0%	15.1%	17.2%	18.4%	6	6.30	0.78%
Bulgaria	48.0%	51.5%	57.6%	13.0%	43.0%	46.3%	50.7%	21.0%	28.4%	27.9%	4	11.52	0.88%
Croatia	29.9%	29.3%	31.9%	14.8%	14.7%	13.7%	16.9%	19.5%	21.8%	23.4%	6	3.75	0.66%
Cyprus	27.8%	27.7%	26.1%	7.9%	16.1%	18.7%	9.0%	15.3%	15.5%	20.1%	7	2.83	0.41%
Czech Republic	14.6%	16.4%	10.4%	6.9%	6.6%	7.3%	5.3%	8.6%	11.3%	5.8%	6	6.76	0.66%
Denmark	18.3%	15.4%	10.8%	11.9%	3.6%	3.8%	1.1%	11.9%	9.1%	10.1%	6	5.99	1.61%
Estonia	23.5%	22.3%	28.0%	8.4%	7.6%	7.0%	6.3%	18.6%	18.1%	24.4%	9	1.76	0.44%
Finland	16.0%	13.0%	16.8%	9.0%	2.5%	1.8%	1.1%	11.8%	9.3%	16.1%	9	2.47	0.40%
France	18.1%	20.8%	10.8%	8.1%	4.9%	5.6%	2.6%	13.7%	17.6%	9.1%	6	10.90	0.66%
Germany	20.3%	19.4%	16.0%	9.9%	5.4%	5.6%	3.2%	16.1%	14.7%	14.9%	6	5.61	0.56%
Greece	35.7%	38.1%	23.1%	18.2%	20.3%	23.3%	13.7%	23.1%	28.8%	15.1%	3	4.06	0.11%
Hungary	34.8%	43.9%	20.2%	13.6%	27.8%	35.6%	17.8%	15.0%	23.8%	4.6%	4	8.47	0.89%
Ireland	29.9%	34.4%	13.7%	23.9%	9.9%	13.4%	3.6%	15.7%	18.2%	10.6%	6	5.89	0.10%
Italy	28.5%	32.0%	22.0%	11.3%	12.3%	13.5%	10.3%	19.3%	25.2%	15.0%	4	2.98	0.44%
Latvia	35.1%	38.4%	36.1%	10.0%	24.0%	25.4%	26.6%	19.4%	23.4%	17.6%	5	5.00	0.82%
Lithuania	30.8%	35.4%	31.7%	11.0%	16.0%	18.5%	18.4%	20.6%	26.9%	19.4%	7	3.56	0.71%
Luxembourg	19.0%	26.0%	7.0%	6.6%	1.8%	2.4%	0.9%	15.9%	23.9%	6.2%	4	5.82	0.75%
Malta	24.0%	32.0%	20.8%	9.0%	9.5%	11.8%	7.1%	15.7%	24.0%	14.9%	5	5.30	0.42%
Netherlands	15.9%	17.0%	6.1%	9.3%	2.5%	2.3%	0.8%	10.4%	12.6%	5.5%	6	4.17	0.41%
Poland	25.8%	29.8%	19.7%	7.2%	11.9%	11.8%	11.5%	17.3%	23.2%	12.3%	6	4.77	0.54%
Portugal	27.5%	31.7%	20.3%	12.2%	10.9%	13.9%	9.0%	18.7%	24.4%	14.6%	4	5.18	0.47%
Romania	41.9%	51.4%	35.8%	7.6%	29.8%	36.4%	28.4%	23.0%	34.7%	14.5%	4	6.33	0.67%
Slovakia	19.8%	25.5%	13.6%	7.6%	10.2%	13.0%	9.2%	12.8%	20.3%	6.0%	4	13.39	0.53%
Slovenia	20.4%	17.5%	23.0%	8.0%	6.7%	6.0%	6.7%	14.5%	14.7%	20.5%	7	5.62	0.65%
Spain	27.3%	32.6%	14.5%	15.7%	6.2%	8.3%	2.7%	20.4%	27.5%	12.7%	5	3.92	0.68%
Sweden	16.4%	16.2%	16.5%	7.1%	1.4%	1.9%	0.2%	14.8%	15.4%	16.4%	8	3.45	0.72%
United Kingdom	24.8%	32.6%	18.1%	13.2%	8.3%	12.3%	2.1%	15.9%	18.9%	16.6%	7	4.75	0.33%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
7.5%	17.0%	500.31	71.4%	43.8%	0.87	0.88	5.4%	1.3%	9.7%	9.5%	8.2%	6.8%	15.0%	0.76
11.0%	27.2%	509.77	61.8%	41.7%	0.83	0.86	8.5%	3.9%	23.7%	13.5%	78.0%	3.5%	6.4%	0.56
12.5%	18.2%	440.44	59.5%	47.4%	0.87	0.91	13.0%	7.4%	28.4%	28.5%	70.9%	6.4%	22.0%	0.71
4.5%	18.7%	482.35	52.5%	37.8%	0.86	0.86	17.5%	11.1%	50.0%	19.8%	49.9%	5.3%	21.4%	0.52
9.1%	21.5%	442.11	61.7%	49.6%	1.09	0.85	16.1%	6.2%	38.9%	18.0%	95.2%	7.8%	22.6%	0.75
5.4%	7.2%	500.05	67.7%	51.6%	1.11	0.79	7.0%	3.0%	19.0%	23.4%	82.4%	3.5%	18.2%	0.68
8.0%	21.7%	498.21	72.5%	61.7%	0.85	0.93	7.2%	1.8%	13.1%	9.2%	50.6%	4.2%	8.2%	0.72
9.7%	9.4%	526.08	68.5%	62.6%	0.95	0.92	8.9%	4.0%	18.7%	13.7%	34.8%	6.4%	23.8%	0.76
9.3%	14.1%	529.40	68.9%	58.5%	0.85	0.97	8.3%	1.7%	19.9%	12.2%	66.8%	2.7%	5.9%	0.82
9.7%	25.0%	499.81	64.0%	45.6%	0.82	0.89	10.0%	4.0%	24.1%	14.0%	61.8%	5.9%	6.1%	0.84
9.8%	13.3%	515.11	73.5%	63.6%	0.84	0.88	5.3%	2.4%	7.8%	12.3%	21.7%	6.3%	22.2%	0.77
10.1%	32.8%	465.63	48.8%	35.6%	0.94	0.69	27.7%	18.6%	58.3%	28.7%	87.8%	10.7%	12.8%	0.69
11.9%	17.5%	486.60	58.1%	37.9%	1.12	0.83	10.2%	4.9%	26.6%	21.6%	73.4%	5.8%	19.5%	0.55
8.4%	23.3%	484.49	60.5%	51.3%	1.01	0.86	13.3%	8.1%	26.8%	20.3%	65.3%	3.1%	20.7%	0.51
16.8%	41.8%	515.56	55.5%	42.7%	1.06	0.72	12.3%	7.0%	40.0%	14.4%	73.4%	9.3%	12.4%	0.88
9.8%	10.6%	489.54	65.0%	54.8%	0.90	0.95	12.1%	5.9%	23.2%	22.6%	69.1%	7.7%	27.8%	0.71
6.3%	6.6%	493.82	63.7%	53.4%	1.14	0.97	12.0%	5.1%	21.9%	32.9%	64.5%	7.6%	27.2%	0.55
6.1%	19.5%	483.94	65.7%	40.5%	1.10	0.82	5.9%	1.8%	15.5%	8.6%	53.1%	10.1%	13.1%	0.83
20.5%	59.5%	463.36	60.8%	36.3%	0.96	0.63	6.5%	3.0%	13.0%	8.4%	51.6%	5.3%	17.6%	0.40
9.3%	24.2%	518.75	73.6%	59.2%	0.80	0.88	7.3%	2.6%	13.2%	9.0%	40.7%	3.4%	17.5%	0.71
5.6%	9.9%	520.50	60.0%	40.6%	1.02	0.80	10.5%	4.5%	27.3%	19.3%	66.8%	9.7%	24.2%	0.66
18.9%	60.2%	488.03	60.6%	46.9%	0.90	0.91	17.0%	9.6%	38.1%	17.0%	86.1%	8.8%	16.1%	0.70
17.3%	24.3%	440.31	60.1%	41.8%	1.07	0.78	7.4%	3.3%	23.7%	6.6%	87.7%	13.6%	25.8%	0.74
6.4%	8.1%	471.87	59.9%	44.0%	1.30	0.80	14.3%	10.0%	33.7%	40.0%	86.9%	5.3%	19.0%	0.78
3.9%	14.5%	498.86	63.3%	33.5%	0.89	0.88	10.3%	5.3%	21.6%	17.8%	55.9%	5.8%	17.1%	0.81
23.6%	44.5%	489.57	54.8%	43.2%	0.89	0.85	26.2%	13.0%	55.5%	32.7%	91.7%	8.9%	14.7%	0.64
7.1%	16.8%	482.13	74.4%	73.6%	0.76	0.95	8.2%	1.5%	23.5%	13.4%	58.6%	5.2%	2.5%	0.76
12.4%	21.7%	502.46	70.5%	59.8%	0.95	0.87	7.7%	2.8%	20.7%	10.6%	50.4%	6.2%	22.1%	0.60

TABLE 10B **SJI 2014 raw data**

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	27.0	6	33.3%	5	9.4%	1.60	8.30	8	0.3%	61.38	82.11	66.80
Belgium	7	25.9	7	38.0%	6	18.0%	1.46	6.91	8	1.7%	64.61	93.67	71.60
Bulgaria	4	35.4	6	24.6%	4	26.3%		6.47	4	8.2%	63.95	55.56	38.00
Croatia	4	30.9	5	23.8%	3	27.2%	1.15	8.26	5	3.5%	63.09	68.33	62.00
Cyprus	7	32.4	8	10.7%	4	28.4%	0.90	6.18	7	3.5%	63.71	55.67	62.00
Czech Republic	6	24.6	6	19.5%	5	13.7%	1.39	8.79	8	1.0%	63.22	74.22	71.60
Denmark	8	26.8	8	39.1%	7	8.7%	1.08	8.24	8	1.2%	61.00	82.22	85.60
Estonia	6	32.9	7	20.8%	7	16.2%	0.39	7.65	8	8.3%	55.29	63.11	62.00
Finland	8	25.4	8	42.5%	8	13.1%	1.45	8.68	8	4.6%	56.74	69.44	90.40
France	7	30.1	6	26.9%	6	16.0%	1.61	8.09	7	2.2%	63.22	79.44	76.00
Germany	7	29.7	8	36.5%	8	9.5%	2.41	7.24	8	1.6%	57.66	77.78	80.80
Greece	3	34.4	4	21.0%	5	31.3%	1.34	4.51	3	8.0%	64.85	53.67	62.00
Hungary	5	28.3	5	8.8%	5	22.8%	0.69	6.90	4	2.8%	59.88	55.67	42.80
Ireland	7	30.7	9	15.7%	7	22.1%	0.76	7.48	5	3.4%	67.21	68.33	71.60
Italy	4	32.8	7	31.4%	5	31.9%	1.10	5.68	7	5.6%	61.79	55.67	71.60
Latvia	5	35.2	7	23.0%	5	18.3%	0.44	5.97	4	12.4%	56.99	45.22	42.80
Lithuania	6	34.6	7	24.1%	7	18.0%	0.44	8.34	8	2.3%	59.30	60.33	57.20
Luxembourg	9	30.4	8	23.3%	8	7.4%	0.84	7.21	8	0.7%	66.10	88.11	76.00
Malta	6	27.9	5	14.3%	3	9.7%	0.79	4.29	7	1.2%	71.85	67.44	47.60
Netherlands	8	25.1	9	38.7%	8	8.7%	1.08	7.53	7	0.5%	61.18	91.78	90.40
Poland	7	30.7	8	23.7%	5	19.4%	0.83	7.64	5	9.0%	61.01	50.78	47.60
Portugal	5	34.2	8	28.7%	7	20.6%	0.71	5.49	6	3.3%	63.51	58.44	66.80
Romania	4	34.6	5	13.3%	6	22.9%		5.90	4	10.7%	57.65	48.78	33.20
Slovakia	5	24.2	5	18.7%	5	20.4%	0.99	9.04	5	2.2%	53.25	63.89	57.20
Slovenia	7	24.4	7	32.2%	4	13.7%	1.67	8.93	6	0.1%	56.05	57.11	76.00
Spain	5	33.7	7	36.0%	6	26.3%	1.02	7.14	6	0.7%	65.31	66.78	71.60
Sweden	9	24.9	9	44.7%	7	10.3%	1.70	8.90	8	1.4%	66.25	68.22	90.40
United Kingdom	7	30.2	8	22.5%	7	18.4%	0.87	7.34	8	1.4%	64.55	71.44	66.80

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
7	6	6	8.80	31.4%	2.9%	81.3%	26.8%
8	6	6	10.50	7.2%	2.4%	105.4%	26.8%
6	6	6	7.53	16.0%	0.6%	17.2%	28.5%
5	4	5	4.49	26.8%	0.8%	82.2%	27.1%
4	4	4	9.94	6.8%	0.4%	102.2%	18.8%
6	8	7	11.89	12.8%	1.8%	44.9%	24.6%
9	9	8	9.35	25.7%	3.0%	44.0%	27.6%
9	7	9	13.66	25.8%	2.1%	10.2%	27.2%
9	9	7	5.54	34.4%	3.4%	56.5%	28.9%
10	5	6	6.69	13.4%	2.2%	92.3%	27.5%
7	7	8	11.33	12.1%	2.9%	77.5%	31.3%
4	4	4	9.87	13.5%	0.7%	177.9%	30.7%
4	4	6	5.58	15.5%	1.3%	76.6%	25.1%
7	6	7	13.66	7.2%	1.6%	119.6%	18.6%
4	5	4	7.56	15.4%	1.3%	129.0%	32.7%
7	5	9	5.92	35.7%	0.7%	35.8%	28.1%
8	7	8	4.04	21.4%	0.9%	38.7%	27.2%
9	7	6	21.21	3.1%	1.3%	23.5%	20.2%
5	5	4	7.68	2.8%	0.8%	68.8%	25.1%
9	8	5	12.01	4.7%	1.9%	67.7%	25.5%
7	7	6	9.49	10.9%	0.9%	55.7%	20.4%
6	4	5	5.50	24.6%	1.4%	129.0%	29.4%
5	4	5	5.32	22.8%	0.5%	38.8%	23.9%
5	5	5	6.58	10.4%	0.8%	54.7%	18.4%
8	7	7	6.08	20.8%	2.6%	71.0%	25.0%
5	6	4	6.80	14.3%	1.3%	95.4%	26.3%
10	8	8	1.08	51.1%	3.3%	39.8%	29.9%
8	8	8	9.01	4.6%	1.6%	86.2%	26.4%

TABLE 11A **SJI 2015 raw data**

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	19.2%	23.3%	15.7%	9.1%	4.0%	6.0%	2.0%	14.1%	18.2%	14.2%	5	6.42	0.47%
Belgium	21.2%	23.2%	17.3%	14.6%	5.9%	6.8%	2.4%	15.5%	18.8%	16.1%	6	6.30	0.70%
Bulgaria	40.1%	45.2%	47.8%	12.1%	33.1%	38.4%	40.3%	21.8%	31.7%	22.6%	4	11.52	0.89%
Croatia	29.3%	29.0%	29.7%	14.7%	13.9%	13.1%	14.7%	19.4%	21.1%	23.1%	6	3.75	0.66%
Cyprus	27.4%	24.7%	27.2%	9.7%	15.3%	15.6%	7.4%	14.4%	12.8%	22.4%	7	2.83	0.38%
Czech Republic	14.8%	19.5%	10.7%	7.6%	6.7%	9.7%	5.1%	9.7%	14.7%	7.0%	6	6.76	0.54%
Denmark	17.9%	14.5%	10.8%	12.2%	3.2%	3.1%	0.9%	12.1%	9.2%	9.8%	6	5.99	1.25%
Estonia	26.0%	23.8%	35.0%	7.6%	6.2%	5.7%	6.4%	21.8%	19.7%	32.6%	9	1.76	0.44%
Finland	17.3%	15.6%	17.0%	10.0%	2.8%	2.0%	1.7%	12.8%	10.9%	16.0%	9	2.47	0.78%
France	18.5%	21.6%	10.1%	9.6%	4.8%	5.7%	2.4%	13.3%	17.7%	8.6%	6	10.90	0.65%
Germany	20.6%	19.6%	17.4%	10.0%	5.0%	5.0%	3.2%	16.7%	15.1%	16.3%	7	5.61	0.44%
Greece	36.0%	36.7%	23.0%	17.2%	21.5%	23.8%	15.5%	22.1%	25.5%	14.9%	4	4.06	0.11%
Hungary	31.8%	41.8%	19.0%	12.8%	24.0%	31.9%	16.5%	15.0%	25.0%	4.5%	3	8.47	0.65%
Ireland	27.7%	30.4%	13.9%	21.0%	8.4%	10.1%	2.9%	16.4%	18.3%	11.4%	6	5.89	0.11%
Italy	28.3%	32.1%	20.2%	12.1%	11.6%	13.7%	8.8%	19.4%	25.1%	14.2%	4	2.98	0.46%
Latvia	32.7%	35.3%	39.3%	9.6%	19.2%	19.9%	22.0%	21.2%	24.3%	27.6%	5	5.00	0.79%
Lithuania	27.3%	28.9%	31.9%	8.8%	13.6%	13.7%	17.8%	19.1%	23.5%	20.1%	7	3.56	0.63%
Luxembourg	19.0%	26.4%	6.4%	6.1%	1.4%	1.8%	0.1%	16.4%	25.4%	6.3%	4	5.82	0.65%
Malta	23.8%	31.3%	23.3%	9.8%	10.2%	13.9%	8.1%	15.9%	24.1%	16.9%	5	5.30	0.48%
Netherlands	16.5%	17.1%	6.9%	10.2%	3.2%	3.7%	1.0%	11.6%	13.7%	5.9%	6	4.17	0.41%
Poland	24.7%	28.2%	18.2%	7.3%	10.4%	10.2%	9.7%	17.0%	22.3%	11.7%	7	4.77	0.56%
Portugal	27.5%	31.4%	21.1%	12.2%	10.6%	12.9%	9.8%	19.5%	25.6%	15.1%	4	5.18	0.39%
Romania	40.3%	50.7%	35.0%	7.2%	25.9%	31.0%	26.5%	25.1%	39.3%	15.7%	4	6.33	0.29%
Slovakia	18.4%	23.6%	13.4%	7.1%	9.9%	12.1%	9.2%	12.6%	19.2%	6.2%	4	13.39	0.42%
Slovenia	20.4%	17.7%	20.1%	8.7%	6.6%	4.9%	6.7%	14.5%	14.8%	17.1%	7	5.62	0.68%
Spain	29.2%	35.8%	12.9%	17.1%	7.1%	9.5%	2.4%	22.2%	30.5%	11.4%	5	3.92	0.50%
Sweden	16.9%	16.7%	16.5%	6.4%	0.7%	1.1%	0.2%	15.1%	15.1%	16.5%	6	3.45	1.29%
United Kingdom	24.1%	31.2%	19.0%	12.3%	7.4%	10.8%	1.9%	16.8%	19.7%	17.7%	7	4.75	0.33%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
7.0%	16.1%	500.31	71.1%	45.1%	0.88	0.89	5.7%	1.6%	10.3%	10.8%	8.8%	5.6%	14.8%	0.76
9.8%	26.4%	509.77	61.9%	42.7%	0.85	0.88	8.6%	4.3%	23.2%	14.3%	76.6%	3.9%	3.8%	0.62
12.9%	18.9%	440.44	61.0%	50.0%	0.85	0.91	11.5%	6.9%	23.8%	27.5%	64.8%	8.1%	18.2%	0.68
2.7%	17.1%	482.35	54.6%	36.2%	0.73	0.85	17.5%	10.2%	45.5%	24.4%	47.2%	5.5%	21.4%	0.60
6.8%	22.4%	442.11	62.1%	46.9%	1.12	0.89	16.3%	7.8%	36.0%	19.4%	94.3%	6.3%	19.3%	0.75
5.5%	6.8%	500.05	69.0%	54.0%	1.08	0.79	6.2%	2.7%	15.9%	20.7%	82.5%	3.3%	18.7%	0.67
7.8%	20.4%	498.21	72.8%	63.2%	0.86	0.92	6.8%	1.7%	12.6%	8.4%	53.5%	3.5%	8.6%	0.67
12.0%	11.8%	526.08	69.6%	64.0%	0.93	0.91	7.5%	3.4%	15.0%	11.7%	29.1%	10.5%	22.8%	0.74
9.5%	13.5%	529.40	68.7%	59.1%	0.82	0.98	8.8%	2.0%	20.5%	12.5%	70.1%	3.1%	5.3%	0.80
9.0%	23.3%	499.81	63.8%	46.9%	0.81	0.90	10.4%	4.6%	24.2%	14.8%	62.6%	6.3%	8.8%	0.83
9.5%	13.1%	515.11	73.8%	65.6%	0.84	0.89	5.1%	2.3%	7.7%	12.0%	21.7%	7.5%	22.5%	0.78
9.0%	31.6%	465.63	49.4%	34.0%	1.02	0.71	26.7%	19.6%	52.4%	27.6%	86.3%	11.9%	21.7%	0.64
11.4%	16.9%	486.60	61.8%	41.7%	1.15	0.82	7.8%	3.7%	20.4%	16.7%	74.0%	5.4%	17.8%	0.63
6.9%	21.2%	484.49	61.7%	53.0%	0.99	0.85	11.5%	6.8%	23.9%	18.7%	61.7%	3.0%	21.6%	0.47
15.0%	40.7%	515.56	55.7%	46.2%	1.06	0.72	12.9%	7.9%	42.7%	15.2%	72.7%	9.6%	9.4%	0.88
8.5%	10.5%	489.54	66.3%	56.4%	0.92	0.94	11.1%	4.8%	19.6%	23.6%	63.9%	6.8%	25.5%	0.74
5.9%	6.7%	493.82	65.7%	56.2%	1.10	0.98	10.9%	4.9%	19.3%	28.6%	58.3%	6.8%	24.0%	0.52
6.1%	18.0%	483.94	66.6%	42.5%	1.09	0.83	5.9%	1.6%	22.6%	7.7%	54.2%	9.9%	11.9%	0.79
20.3%	57.8%	463.36	62.4%	37.8%	0.98	0.66	5.9%	2.8%	11.7%	7.7%	56.6%	5.1%	15.1%	0.53
8.7%	24.1%	518.75	73.1%	59.9%	0.82	0.87	7.5%	3.0%	12.7%	10.1%	44.4%	4.6%	18.5%	0.63
5.4%	9.5%	520.50	61.7%	42.5%	1.07	0.81	9.1%	3.9%	23.9%	18.0%	66.5%	10.0%	23.6%	0.67
17.4%	56.7%	488.03	62.6%	47.8%	0.95	0.91	14.5%	8.6%	34.8%	14.8%	83.9%	9.1%	12.0%	0.78
18.1%	27.2%	440.31	61.0%	43.1%	1.07	0.78	7.1%	2.9%	24.0%	6.4%	88.8%	15.0%	24.4%	0.71
6.7%	9.0%	471.87	61.0%	44.8%	1.29	0.80	13.2%	9.3%	29.7%	39.3%	87.3%	5.2%	19.2%	0.79
4.4%	14.3%	498.86	63.9%	35.4%	0.86	0.89	9.9%	5.4%	20.2%	15.5%	65.5%	5.5%	18.5%	0.78
21.9%	43.4%	489.57	56.0%	44.3%	0.90	0.84	24.6%	13.0%	53.2%	31.4%	91.5%	10.2%	14.6%	0.72
6.7%	16.3%	482.13	74.9%	74.0%	0.77	0.96	8.1%	1.5%	22.9%	13.9%	59.6%	6.2%	2.6%	0.77
11.8%	20.8%	502.46	71.9%	61.0%	0.96	0.87	6.3%	2.2%	17.0%	8.4%	50.4%	5.7%	21.3%	0.59

TABLE 11B **SJI 2015 raw data**

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	27.6	6	32.2%	7	9.6%	1.60	8.08	8	0.4%	59.96	84.11	70.80
Belgium	7	25.9	7	39.3%	6	17.0%	1.48	7.08	7	1.9%	63.85	96.00	79.20
Bulgaria	4	35.4	6	20.0%	3	24.8%		6.53	4	8.9%	64.56	54.89	50.00
Croatia	4	30.2	5	23.8%	3	26.1%	1.07	8.37	5	3.3%	59.05	69.56	62.40
Cyprus	7	34.8	8	12.5%	4	25.2%	1.03	6.06	6	4.4%	64.66	58.33	70.80
Czech Republic	6	25.1	6	19.5%	5	11.8%	1.31	8.62	8	1.0%	63.37	78.56	70.80
Denmark	8	27.7	8	39.1%	7	8.4%	0.96	8.10	8	1.3%	59.74	88.11	79.20
Estonia	6	35.6	8	19.0%	7	15.4%	0.41	7.81	8	8.4%	55.61	73.00	70.80
Finland	8	25.6	8	42.5%	8	14.6%	1.67	8.85	8	4.3%	56.74	84.89	87.60
France	7	29.2	6	26.2%	6	16.5%	1.63	7.63	7	2.7%	63.72	76.56	79.20
Germany	7	30.7	8	36.5%	8	9.5%	2.07	7.31	8	1.6%	57.39	73.11	91.60
Greece	3	34.5	5	21.0%	6	28.4%	1.40	4.98	3	9.0%	64.90	53.67	62.40
Hungary	4	28.6	5	10.1%	5	19.3%	0.51	6.53	4	2.4%	59.62	65.56	46.00
Ireland	6	31.1	9	15.7%	7	20.9%	0.52	7.55	5	3.3%	66.91	52.89	79.20
Italy	4	32.4	7	31.4%	5	32.0%	1.13	5.30	7	7.1%	61.34	60.00	66.80
Latvia	5	35.5	7	18.0%	5	17.7%	0.47	5.86	4	13.8%	53.06	60.33	50.00
Lithuania	6	35.0	7	24.1%	7	15.7%	0.44	8.15	7	3.2%	59.39	49.22	50.00
Luxembourg	9	28.7	8	28.3%	8	10.2%	0.79	7.64	8	0.9%	63.35	85.44	87.60
Malta	6	27.7	5	14.3%	3	10.2%	0.78	5.58	7	0.9%	72.15	65.44	46.00
Netherlands	8	26.2	9	38.7%	8	8.7%	1.18	7.20	7	0.4%	59.43	91.78	96.00
Poland	7	30.8	8	24.3%	5	18.8%	0.56	7.65	5	8.8%	61.01	51.56	41.60
Portugal	4	34.5	7	31.3%	7	19.0%	0.69	5.76	6	3.0%	63.01	67.56	75.20
Romania	4	35.0	5	13.5%	6	23.1%		4.68	4	10.4%	58.24	43.22	33.20
Slovakia	5	26.1	5	18.7%	5	18.5%	0.97	9.12	5	1.9%	54.40	68.22	54.00
Slovenia	7	25.0	7	35.6%	4	13.8%	1.78	8.86	6	0.0%	58.56	60.44	79.20
Spain	4	34.7	7	39.7%	6	24.8%	1.01	7.06	7	0.8%	64.29	59.89	75.20
Sweden	8	25.4	9	44.7%	7	9.8%	1.79	8.54	7	1.9%	66.45	69.56	87.60
United Kingdom	7	31.6	8	22.6%	7	16.5%	0.83	7.54	8	1.6%	64.60	65.89	70.80

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
7	6	6	8.89	32.3%	3.0%	84.4%	27.2%
8	6	6	10.50	7.5%	2.4%	106.5%	27.4%
6	5	6	6.76	19.0%	0.6%	26.4%	29.3%
5	5	5	4.10	28.0%	0.8%	86.6%	27.6%
4	5	4	9.18	8.1%	0.5%	107.1%	19.9%
6	8	7	11.59	13.8%	1.9%	42.2%	25.7%
9	9	9	9.88	27.4%	3.0%	44.0%	28.3%
9	7	9	15.48	25.6%	1.7%	10.7%	27.9%
9	9	8	6.76	36.7%	3.3%	60.2%	30.2%
10	5	6	6.62	14.1%	2.2%	95.2%	28.4%
7	5	8	11.53	12.4%	2.8%	74.9%	31.6%
5	4	4	9.20	15.0%	0.8%	180.9%	31.6%
4	4	6	5.42	16.2%	1.4%	75.7%	25.8%
6	6	7	13.52	7.7%	1.6%	105.4%	19.3%
4	5	4	6.69	16.7%	1.3%	131.8%	33.1%
7	4	9	6.17	37.1%	0.6%	38.5%	28.8%
6	7	8	3.89	22.7%	1.0%	40.5%	27.5%
9	7	6	19.43	3.5%	1.3%	22.7%	20.4%
6	5	4	6.83	3.7%	0.8%	64.3%	26.4%
8	9	5	12.01	4.8%	2.0%	67.9%	26.4%
7	7	6	9.34	11.4%	0.9%	50.2%	21.2%
6	4	5	5.40	25.7%	1.3%	130.6%	30.3%
5	4	5	4.87	23.9%	0.4%	40.5%	24.3%
5	5	5	6.43	10.1%	0.8%	53.6%	19.0%
8	7	8	6.13	22.4%	2.6%	80.9%	25.7%
5	6	5	6.16	15.3%	1.3%	100.4%	27.2%
10	8	8	1.12	52.0%	3.3%	44.6%	30.6%
8	8	8	8.68	5.7%	1.7%	88.1%	27.0%

TABLE 12A **SJI 2016 raw data**

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	18.3%	22.3%	14.0%	8.2%	3.6%	4.2%	1.4%	13.9%	17.8%	13.2%	6	6.42	0.47%
Belgium	21.1%	23.3%	16.2%	14.9%	5.8%	7.9%	2.1%	14.9%	18.0%	15.2%	6	6.30	0.71%
Bulgaria	41.3%	43.7%	51.8%	11.6%	34.2%	37.3%	40.9%	22.0%	25.4%	31.7%	4	11.52	1.03%
Croatia	29.1%	28.2%	31.8%	14.4%	13.7%	13.4%	14.5%	20.0%	20.9%	26.3%	6	3.75	0.66%
Cyprus	28.9%	28.9%	20.8%	10.9%	15.4%	17.2%	5.1%	16.2%	16.7%	17.3%	7	2.83	0.35%
Czech Republic	14.0%	18.5%	10.9%	6.8%	5.6%	7.2%	4.5%	9.7%	14.7%	7.4%	6	6.76	0.54%
Denmark	17.7%	15.7%	9.9%	11.6%	3.7%	4.3%	0.9%	12.2%	10.4%	9.1%	6	5.99	1.25%
Estonia	24.2%	22.5%	37.0%	6.6%	4.5%	3.9%	5.2%	21.6%	20.0%	35.8%	9	1.76	0.35%
Finland	16.8%	14.9%	14.5%	10.8%	2.2%	2.0%	1.2%	12.4%	10.0%	13.8%	8	2.47	0.77%
France	17.7%	21.2%	9.3%	8.6%	4.5%	5.4%	1.9%	13.6%	18.7%	8.0%	6	10.90	0.70%
Germany	20.0%	18.5%	17.2%	9.8%	4.4%	4.7%	2.4%	16.7%	14.6%	16.5%	8	5.61	0.44%
Greece	35.7%	37.8%	22.8%	16.8%	22.2%	25.7%	15.2%	21.4%	26.6%	13.7%	4	4.06	0.11%
Hungary	28.2%	36.1%	17.1%	9.4%	19.4%	24.9%	14.2%	14.9%	22.7%	4.6%	3	8.47	0.65%
Ireland	26.0%	28.8%	16.5%	19.2%	7.5%	8.9%	3.1%	16.3%	17.9%	14.2%	6	5.89	0.11%
Italy	28.7%	33.5%	19.9%	11.7%	11.5%	13.0%	8.2%	19.9%	26.8%	14.7%	5	2.98	0.45%
Latvia	30.9%	31.3%	42.1%	7.8%	16.4%	17.0%	18.2%	22.5%	23.2%	34.6%	5	5.00	0.82%
Lithuania	29.3%	32.7%	36.0%	9.2%	13.9%	13.8%	18.2%	22.2%	28.9%	25.0%	7	3.56	0.63%
Luxembourg	18.5%	23.0%	8.2%	5.7%	2.0%	3.0%	0.3%	15.3%	21.5%	7.9%	5	5.82	0.53%
Malta	22.4%	28.2%	23.7%	9.2%	8.1%	10.4%	4.7%	16.3%	23.4%	21.0%	5	5.30	0.44%
Netherlands	16.4%	16.8%	6.1%	10.2%	2.6%	2.6%	0.5%	11.6%	14.0%	5.6%	6	4.17	0.38%
Poland	23.4%	26.6%	17.0%	6.9%	8.1%	7.9%	7.9%	17.6%	22.4%	12.1%	7	4.77	0.59%
Portugal	26.6%	29.6%	21.7%	10.9%	9.6%	11.0%	8.4%	19.5%	24.8%	17.0%	4	5.18	0.42%
Romania	37.4%	46.8%	33.3%	7.9%	22.7%	28.9%	21.5%	25.4%	38.1%	19.4%	4	6.33	0.30%
Slovakia	18.4%	24.9%	12.8%	7.1%	9.0%	11.2%	9.2%	12.3%	20.1%	5.6%	4	13.39	0.44%
Slovenia	19.2%	16.6%	20.2%	7.4%	5.8%	4.7%	6.1%	14.3%	14.2%	17.2%	7	5.62	0.61%
Spain	28.6%	34.4%	13.7%	15.4%	6.4%	9.1%	2.2%	22.1%	29.6%	12.3%	5	3.92	0.48%
Sweden	16.0%	14.0%	18.3%	5.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.4%	14.5%	12.9%	18.2%	6	3.45	1.29%
United Kingdom	23.5%	30.3%	17.9%	11.9%	6.1%	9.6%	1.6%	16.6%	19.9%	16.5%	7	4.75	0.31%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
7.3%	15.4%	500.31	71.1%	46.3%	0.87	0.89	5.8%	1.7%	10.6%	10.6%	9.5%	5.9%	14.8%	0.82
10.1%	25.3%	509.77	61.8%	44.0%	0.87	0.89	8.6%	4.4%	22.1%	14.8%	80.1%	3.7%	3.8%	0.56
13.4%	18.1%	440.44	62.9%	53.0%	0.71	0.91	9.2%	5.6%	21.6%	24.7%	69.9%	6.7%	18.2%	0.53
2.7%	16.6%	482.35	56.0%	39.2%	0.69	0.86	16.4%	10.3%	42.3%	21.5%	43.4%	5.4%	21.4%	0.57
5.2%	22.1%	442.11	62.7%	48.5%	1.10	0.88	15.2%	6.9%	32.8%	17.9%	92.9%	7.6%	19.3%	0.74
6.2%	6.8%	500.05	70.2%	55.5%	1.06	0.80	5.1%	2.4%	12.6%	20.7%	83.9%	3.8%	18.7%	0.67
7.8%	19.6%	498.21	73.5%	64.7%	0.85	0.92	6.3%	1.7%	10.8%	8.5%	43.5%	4.0%	8.6%	0.63
12.2%	11.3%	526.08	71.9%	64.5%	0.94	0.91	6.3%	2.4%	13.1%	11.7%	30.9%	8.9%	22.8%	0.75
9.2%	12.3%	529.40	68.5%	60.0%	0.81	0.98	9.6%	2.4%	22.4%	12.3%	72.6%	2.9%	5.3%	0.77
9.2%	22.5%	499.81	63.8%	48.7%	0.78	0.90	10.4%	4.6%	24.7%	15.6%	62.0%	6.0%	8.8%	0.79
10.1%	13.2%	515.11	74.0%	66.2%	0.83	0.90	4.7%	2.1%	7.2%	11.4%	21.7%	7.1%	22.5%	0.79
7.9%	29.6%	465.63	50.8%	34.3%	1.00	0.72	25.1%	18.3%	49.8%	26.2%	83.3%	11.6%	21.7%	0.54
11.6%	16.8%	486.60	63.9%	45.3%	1.06	0.82	6.8%	3.1%	17.3%	15.5%	76.3%	8.4%	17.8%	0.66
6.9%	20.2%	484.49	63.3%	55.6%	0.99	0.84	9.6%	5.5%	20.9%	15.9%	63.2%	2.9%	21.6%	0.50
14.7%	40.1%	515.56	56.3%	48.2%	1.05	0.72	12.1%	7.1%	40.3%	14.2%	73.5%	9.8%	9.4%	0.88
9.9%	9.9%	489.54	68.1%	59.4%	0.92	0.95	10.1%	4.6%	16.3%	22.4%	51.7%	8.2%	25.5%	0.78
5.5%	6.5%	493.82	67.2%	60.4%	1.01	0.98	9.3%	4.0%	16.3%	26.2%	63.3%	8.6%	24.0%	0.53
9.3%	24.0%	483.94	66.1%	38.4%	1.07	0.85	6.7%	1.9%	17.3%	8.2%	48.1%	10.0%	11.9%	0.86
19.8%	56.5%	463.36	63.9%	40.3%	1.00	0.67	5.5%	2.4%	11.8%	7.3%	54.8%	4.7%	15.1%	0.54
8.2%	23.6%	518.75	74.1%	61.7%	0.80	0.88	6.9%	3.0%	11.3%	9.3%	51.7%	4.4%	18.5%	0.61
5.3%	9.2%	520.50	62.9%	44.3%	0.99	0.82	7.6%	3.0%	20.8%	15.5%	64.7%	10.7%	23.6%	0.67
13.7%	54.9%	488.03	63.9%	49.9%	0.96	0.91	12.9%	7.4%	32.0%	13.0%	83.1%	9.6%	12.0%	0.81
19.1%	25.0%	440.31	61.4%	41.1%	1.07	0.77	7.0%	3.1%	21.7%	7.7%	85.7%	14.7%	24.4%	0.75
6.9%	8.6%	471.87	62.7%	47.0%	1.23	0.80	11.5%	7.6%	26.5%	34.4%	86.5%	5.4%	19.2%	0.87
5.0%	13.2%	498.86	65.2%	36.6%	1.02	0.88	9.1%	4.8%	16.3%	13.6%	59.5%	5.9%	18.5%	0.82
20.0%	42.6%	489.57	57.8%	46.9%	0.93	0.84	22.2%	11.5%	48.3%	28.9%	90.6%	10.3%	14.6%	0.67
7.0%	15.7%	482.13	75.5%	74.5%	0.75	0.96	7.6%	1.6%	20.4%	14.1%	59.0%	6.1%	2.6%	0.71
10.8%	20.3%	502.46	72.7%	62.2%	0.97	0.88	5.4%	1.7%	14.6%	7.3%	50.4%	5.6%	21.3%	0.64

TABLE 12B **SJI 2016 raw data**

COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	27.2	6	30.6%	6	9.8%	1.63	8.65	7	0.1%	57.70	81.44	75.20
Belgium	6	26.2	7	39.3%	6	17.5%	1.47	6.80	7	2.4%	64.09	93.67	79.20
Bulgaria	4	37.0	6	20.4%	3	24.0%		6.26	4	5.6%	64.11	52.00	50.00
Croatia	4	30.4	5	15.2%	3	23.8%	1.21	8.57	5	3.3%	59.32	78.56	62.40
Cyprus	7	33.6	8	12.5%	4	22.2%	1.08	7.10	6	4.7%	66.20	54.78	70.80
Czech Republic	6	25.0	6	20.0%	4	10.8%	1.30	8.70	8	1.1%	64.21	89.00	70.80
Denmark	8	27.4	8	37.4%	6	9.3%	0.94	7.99	8	1.4%	60.85	76.67	87.60
Estonia	6	34.8	7	23.8%	7	15.1%	0.34	7.35	8	11.3%	55.28	71.56	75.20
Finland	8	25.2	8	41.5%	7	15.7%	1.74	8.73	8	3.3%	58.09	81.33	91.60
France	7	29.2	6	26.2%	6	18.1%	1.67	7.59	7	2.8%	63.81	77.11	83.20
Germany	7	30.1	8	36.5%	7	9.3%	2.07	7.35	8	1.6%	56.45	73.11	91.60
Greece	3	34.2	6	19.7%	6	26.1%	1.44	4.72	3	10.9%	64.46	50.78	66.80
Hungary	4	28.2	4	10.1%	4	16.5%	0.56	6.55	4	2.5%	59.90	59.11	50.00
Ireland	6	29.8	9	16.3%	7	19.7%	0.52	7.45	5	3.7%	66.91	53.56	83.20
Italy	5	32.4	7	31.0%	6	31.1%	1.15	5.13	7	7.0%	62.40	60.00	75.20
Latvia	5	35.4	7	18.0%	5	16.1%	0.42	5.35	4	12.5%	53.56	50.11	58.40
Lithuania	6	37.9	7	23.4%	7	14.4%	0.42	7.90	7	3.7%	59.81	63.89	54.00
Luxembourg	9	28.5	8	28.3%	8	8.8%	0.93	7.18	8	0.8%	63.75	86.11	87.60
Malta	6	28.1	5	12.9%	3	9.8%	0.84	5.24	7	1.1%	73.30	77.89	54.00
Netherlands	7	26.7	9	37.3%	8	7.2%	1.22	6.79	6	0.5%	61.13	92.44	96.00
Poland	7	30.6	8	27.4%	5	17.6%	0.36	7.75	5	7.8%	61.30	43.22	58.40
Portugal	4	34.0	7	34.8%	8	17.5%	0.69	5.91	6	3.5%	56.78	59.11	75.20
Romania	4	37.4	5	13.7%	6	24.1%		6.17	4	9.3%	59.00	54.33	41.60
Slovakia	5	23.7	5	18.7%	4	19.2%	0.86	9.33	4	2.1%	55.04	67.56	54.00
Slovenia	8	24.5	7	36.7%	5	14.0%	1.84	8.85	6	0.2%	58.71	63.11	83.20
Spain	4	34.6	7	41.1%	7	22.2%	1.02	6.64	7	0.6%	65.00	62.78	79.20
Sweden	8	25.2	9	43.6%	7	9.3%	1.88	7.85	7	1.5%	73.60	70.22	91.60
United Kingdom	7	32.4	8	29.4%	7	15.0%	0.81	7.13	8	2.1%	63.81	65.89	75.20

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
7	6	6	8.34	32.8%	3.1%	85.5%	27.5%
8	7	6	9.98	8.0%	2.5%	105.8%	27.8%
6	5	6	6.99	18.0%	0.8%	25.6%	30.2%
5	4	5	3.90	27.9%	0.8%	86.7%	28.3%
4	5	4	9.74	8.9%	0.5%	107.5%	21.2%
6	8	6	11.20	15.1%	2.0%	40.3%	26.6%
9	9	9	8.93	29.3%	3.0%	39.6%	28.8%
9	7	9	14.70	26.3%	1.5%	10.1%	28.7%
9	9	8	5.62	38.7%	3.2%	63.7%	31.3%
10	6	6	6.22	14.7%	2.2%	96.2%	29.2%
8	5	8	10.95	13.8%	2.9%	71.2%	32.0%
5	4	4	9.11	15.3%	0.8%	179.4%	32.4%
4	4	6	5.33	14.6%	1.4%	74.7%	26.5%
7	6	7	13.48	8.7%	1.5%	78.7%	20.0%
4	5	4	6.40	17.1%	1.4%	132.0%	33.7%
7	4	9	7.82	38.7%	0.7%	34.8%	29.5%
7	7	8	4.29	23.6%	1.0%	42.5%	28.1%
8	7	7	18.30	4.5%	1.3%	22.1%	20.5%
6	5	4	6.83	4.7%	0.8%	60.6%	27.6%
8	8	5	11.48	5.5%	2.0%	65.1%	27.2%
7	7	6	9.23	11.5%	0.9%	51.1%	22.2%
7	4	6	5.25	27.0%	1.3%	129.0%	31.1%
5	4	5	4.89	24.8%	0.4%	39.4%	25.2%
5	5	5	6.37	11.7%	0.9%	52.5%	19.7%
8	7	8	5.29	21.5%	2.4%	83.1%	26.6%
5	7	5	6.13	16.1%	1.2%	99.8%	27.9%
10	8	9	0.89	52.5%	3.2%	42.9%	31.1%
8	8	7	7.95	7.1%	1.7%	89.0%	27.5%

TABLE 13A **SJI 2017 raw data**

COUNTRY	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	B1	B2	B3
Austria	18.0%	20.0%	13.7%	8.1%	3.0%	3.5%	1.2%	14.1%	16.5%	13.2%	6	6.57	0.48%
Belgium	20.7%	21.6%	16.4%	14.6%	5.5%	6.9%	2.1%	15.5%	17.8%	15.4%	6	7.77	0.70%
Bulgaria	40.4%	45.6%	45.9%	11.9%	31.9%	36.1%	37.5%	22.9%	31.9%	24.3%	4	8.17	1.05%
Croatia	28.5%	27.2%	33.7%	13.6%	12.9%	11.7%	15.2%	19.5%	20.4%	27.0%	5	4.47	0.66%
Cyprus	27.7%	29.6%	22.9%	10.6%	13.6%	17.7%	5.4%	16.1%	17.1%	19.5%	7	2.01	0.36%
Czech Republic	13.3%	17.4%	10.1%	6.7%	4.8%	6.3%	3.0%	9.7%	14.1%	8.1%	6	9.48	0.55%
Denmark	16.7%	13.8%	9.2%	10.6%	2.6%	3.0%	0.7%	11.9%	9.4%	8.5%	7	3.22	1.25%
Estonia	24.4%	21.2%	41.4%	5.8%	4.7%	4.0%	5.4%	21.7%	18.6%	40.2%	9	2.24	0.35%
Finland	16.6%	14.7%	13.6%	11.4%	2.2%	1.8%	1.7%	11.6%	9.3%	12.3%	8	3.70	0.77%
France	18.2%	22.6%	10.0%	8.4%	4.4%	5.3%	2.9%	13.6%	19.1%	8.2%	6	10.49	0.70%
Germany	19.7%	19.3%	18.3%	9.6%	3.7%	3.6%	2.7%	16.5%	15.4%	17.6%	7	4.86	0.44%
Greece	35.6%	37.5%	22.0%	17.2%	22.4%	26.7%	15.2%	21.2%	26.3%	12.4%	4	4.48	0.11%
Hungary	26.3%	33.6%	15.1%	8.2%	16.2%	21.1%	10.2%	14.5%	19.9%	6.8%	3	10.25	0.65%
Ireland	26.0%	28.8%	16.5%	19.2%	7.5%	8.9%	3.1%	16.3%	17.9%	14.2%	6	4.49	0.10%
Italy	28.7%	33.5%	19.9%	11.7%	11.9%	12.3%	10.9%	19.9%	26.8%	14.7%	5	3.63	0.46%
Latvia	28.5%	24.7%	43.1%	7.2%	12.8%	11.9%	14.9%	21.8%	18.6%	38.1%	5	2.64	0.86%
Lithuania	30.1%	32.4%	37.4%	10.2%	13.5%	11.5%	17.3%	21.9%	25.6%	27.7%	7	4.22	0.50%
Luxembourg	18.5%	23.0%	8.2%	5.7%	2.0%	3.0%	0.3%	15.3%	21.5%	7.9%	5	7.54	0.57%
Malta	20.1%	24.0%	26.1%	7.3%	4.4%	6.4%	3.5%	16.5%	21.0%	24.2%	5	5.30	0.52%
Netherlands	16.8%	17.5%	10.1%	9.7%	2.6%	2.4%	1.2%	12.8%	14.7%	9.1%	6	4.89	0.37%
Poland	21.9%	24.2%	16.1%	6.4%	6.7%	5.8%	5.9%	17.3%	21.1%	12.8%	5	4.80	0.61%
Portugal	25.1%	27.0%	21.8%	9.1%	8.4%	9.6%	6.7%	19.0%	22.4%	18.3%	5	3.98	0.42%
Romania	38.8%	49.2%	34.0%	8.2%	23.8%	30.2%	22.5%	25.3%	37.2%	19.1%	4	5.57	0.34%
Slovakia	18.1%	24.4%	12.3%	6.5%	8.2%	9.7%	8.0%	12.7%	20.8%	5.7%	4	7.57	0.49%
Slovenia	18.4%	14.9%	19.9%	7.4%	5.4%	4.5%	5.8%	13.9%	11.9%	17.6%	7	4.28	0.65%
Spain	27.9%	32.9%	14.4%	14.9%	5.8%	7.1%	2.5%	22.3%	29.7%	13.0%	6	3.22	0.48%
Sweden	18.3%	19.9%	17.0%	8.5%	0.8%	0.7%	0.3%	16.2%	18.7%	16.8%	7	4.57	1.30%
United Kingdom	22.2%	27.2%	18.0%	11.3%	5.2%	7.5%	1.2%	15.9%	18.5%	17.1%	7	3.10	0.20%

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

B4	B5	B6	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
6.9%	15.5%	492.22	71.5%	49.2%	0.85	0.90	6.1%	2.0%	11.2%	11.7%	9.1%	6.9%	14.8%	0.78
8.8%	24.9%	502.50	62.3%	45.4%	0.87	0.87	7.9%	4.1%	20.1%	14.5%	77.5%	3.7%	3.8%	0.57
13.8%	17.7%	439.56	63.4%	54.5%	0.84	0.90	7.7%	4.5%	17.2%	21.9%	67.5%	10.2%	18.2%	0.63
2.8%	16.9%	475.43	56.9%	38.1%	0.60	0.85	13.3%	6.7%	31.3%	16.8%	80.1%	4.7%	21.4%	0.65
7.7%	20.4%	437.51	63.4%	52.0%	1.04	0.86	13.2%	5.8%	29.1%	15.7%	92.1%	7.3%	19.3%	0.73
6.6%	6.6%	490.80	72.0%	58.5%	1.10	0.81	4.0%	1.7%	10.5%	19.2%	79.9%	3.5%	18.7%	0.68
7.2%	19.3%	504.28	74.9%	67.8%	0.88	0.93	6.3%	1.4%	12.0%	6.6%	36.7%	3.2%	8.6%	0.71
10.9%	10.9%	524.29	72.1%	65.2%	0.92	0.91	7.0%	2.2%	13.4%	11.5%	23.2%	8.6%	22.8%	0.80
7.9%	11.9%	522.72	69.1%	61.4%	0.80	0.96	9.0%	2.3%	20.1%	11.8%	71.5%	2.7%	5.3%	0.73
8.8%	21.9%	495.73	64.2%	49.8%	0.79	0.90	10.1%	4.6%	24.6%	15.9%	61.7%	6.5%	8.8%	0.82
10.2%	13.5%	508.07	74.7%	68.6%	0.81	0.90	4.2%	1.7%	7.1%	10.0%	21.7%	6.5%	22.5%	0.79
6.2%	28.2%	458.50	52.0%	36.3%	1.00	0.71	23.7%	17.0%	47.3%	26.2%	75.8%	12.2%	21.7%	0.70
12.4%	16.6%	474.37	66.5%	49.8%	0.98	0.82	5.1%	2.4%	12.9%	11.8%	80.2%	8.7%	17.8%	0.70
6.3%	19.9%	509.04	64.8%	57.2%	1.01	0.85	8.1%	4.5%	17.2%	13.8%	64.5%	2.9%	21.6%	0.49
13.8%	39.9%	485.01	57.2%	50.3%	1.04	0.72	11.9%	6.9%	37.8%	14.3%	72.9%	9.8%	9.4%	0.83
10.0%	9.3%	486.76	68.7%	61.4%	0.91	0.97	9.9%	4.1%	17.3%	19.8%	52.5%	7.0%	25.5%	0.80
4.8%	5.4%	475.40	69.4%	64.6%	0.94	0.98	8.1%	3.1%	14.5%	26.2%	63.1%	6.5%	24.0%	0.54
5.5%	21.6%	483.34	65.6%	39.6%	1.07	0.86	6.3%	2.2%	18.9%	7.0%	59.5%	10.0%	11.9%	0.81
19.6%	54.8%	463.36	65.7%	44.0%	1.00	0.67	4.8%	2.0%	11.1%	6.4%	45.8%	5.1%	15.1%	0.51
8.0%	22.9%	507.93	74.8%	63.5%	0.81	0.88	6.1%	2.6%	10.8%	7.6%	48.2%	5.2%	18.5%	0.71
5.2%	8.7%	503.87	64.5%	46.2%	0.94	0.82	6.2%	2.2%	17.7%	13.0%	62.6%	10.2%	23.6%	0.65
14.0%	53.1%	496.95	65.2%	52.1%	1.00	0.91	11.5%	6.3%	28.0%	11.6%	84.6%	9.5%	12.0%	0.84
18.5%	23.3%	437.49	61.6%	42.8%	1.07	0.76	6.1%	3.1%	20.6%	7.3%	76.8%	14.3%	24.4%	0.78
7.4%	8.1%	462.84	64.9%	49.0%	1.08	0.82	9.7%	5.8%	22.2%	29.4%	66.4%	6.1%	19.2%	0.85
4.9%	12.7%	509.33	65.8%	38.5%	1.01	0.91	8.1%	4.3%	15.2%	14.0%	57.4%	5.3%	18.5%	0.92
19.0%	41.7%	491.40	59.5%	49.1%	0.94	0.84	19.7%	9.5%	44.4%	26.1%	91.4%	10.7%	14.6%	0.73
7.4%	15.0%	495.83	76.2%	75.5%	0.74	0.97	7.1%	1.4%	18.9%	14.4%	55.3%	5.3%	2.6%	0.73
11.2%	20.5%	499.89	73.5%	63.4%	0.97	0.88	4.9%	1.3%	13.0%	6.2%	50.4%	6.0%	21.3%	0.64

TABLE 13B **SJI 2017 raw data**


COUNTRY	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
Austria	7	27.2	6	30.6%	6	9.8%	1.71	8.47	7	0.2%	58.00	84.04	79.33
Belgium	6	26.3	7	39.3%	6	15.3%	1.47	6.66	7	2.4%	64.20	93.60	83.33
Bulgaria	4	38.3	5	20.4%	3	22.7%		6.35	4	2.8%	63.30	52.13	50.00
Croatia	4	29.7	5	12.6%	3	19.6%	1.20	8.87	5	1.9%	56.08	80.49	62.67
Cyprus	7	32.1	8	17.9%	4	22.7%	1.05	7.77	6	1.5%	63.25	54.98	71.00
Czech Republic	6	25.1	6	20.0%	4	10.6%	1.21	8.61	7	0.8%	63.06	88.93	79.33
Denmark	8	27.7	8	37.4%	6	8.5%	0.95	8.29	8	1.3%	58.99	79.33	91.67
Estonia	6	32.7	8	23.8%	7	13.3%	0.46	7.58	8	12.7%	55.08	73.82	79.33
Finland	8	25.4	8	41.5%	7	14.6%	1.60	8.41	8	4.1%	57.82	79.33	96.00
France	7	29.3	6	26.2%	6	18.2%	1.67	8.52	7	1.2%	63.63	79.38	87.67
Germany	7	29.5	8	36.5%	7	9.7%	2.15	7.35	8	0.5%	66.42	74.98	96.00
Greece	4	34.3	6	19.7%	5	23.0%	1.45	5.13	3	12.3%	64.00	48.58	71.00
Hungary	4	28.2	4	10.1%	3	15.4%	0.80	6.94	4	1.4%	59.19	56.98	54.33
Ireland	7	29.8	9	22.2%	7	17.0%	0.49	7.71	5	2.8%	67.26	53.42	83.33
Italy	5	32.4	7	31.0%	6	29.1%	1.22	4.80	7	7.2%	62.65	61.87	75.00
Latvia	5	34.5	7	18.0%	5	18.1%	0.36	6.34	4	8.2%	53.04	54.31	62.67
Lithuania	6	37.0	7	21.3%	7	15.3%	0.43	8.54	7	2.9%	56.63	66.09	54.33
Luxembourg	9	28.5	8	28.3%	8	9.0%	0.84	7.08	8	0.9%	62.15	86.04	87.67
Malta	6	28.5	5	12.9%	4	8.1%	0.85	4.49	7	0.8%	73.60	73.82	62.67
Netherlands	7	28.2	9	37.3%	8	6.9%	1.18	7.80	6	0.1%	59.13	94.44	96.00
Poland	7	29.8	6	27.4%	4	16.8%	0.68	7.49	5	7.3%	61.70	47.42	62.67
Portugal	5	33.9	7	34.8%	8	17.2%	0.65	5.91	6	3.0%	56.52	64.53	83.33
Romania	4	34.7	5	13.7%	6	23.6%		5.94	4	6.5%	59.20	54.13	41.67
Slovakia	5	24.3	5	20.0%	3	16.8%	0.69	9.29	4	2.1%	54.95	71.82	58.33
Slovenia	8	24.4	7	36.7%	5	11.8%	1.77	8.48	5	0.2%	58.10	63.38	87.67
Spain	5	34.5	7	39.1%	7	21.2%	1.05	7.07	7	0.5%	64.00	62.71	79.33
Sweden	8	27.6	9	43.6%	6	9.3%	1.91	7.88	7	1.0%	73.90	72.22	91.67
United Kingdom	7	31.5	7	29.6%	6	14.8%	0.78	6.95	7	1.0%	63.50	65.82	83.33

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017.

F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
7	6	6	8.52	33.0%	3.1%	83.9%	27.5%
8	7	6	10.21	7.9%	2.5%	105.5%	28.2%
6	5	6	7.63	18.2%	1.0%	27.8%	31.1%
5	4	4	4.42	29.0%	0.9%	84.4%	29.0%
4	5	4	9.74	9.4%	0.5%	108.0%	22.1%
6	8	6	11.42	15.1%	2.0%	37.7%	27.6%
9	9	8	9.12	30.8%	3.0%	39.9%	29.3%
9	7	9	11.92	28.6%	1.5%	9.5%	29.3%
9	9	8	5.38	39.3%	2.9%	63.6%	32.4%
10	6	6	6.31	15.2%	2.2%	96.6%	30.0%
8	6	8	10.80	14.6%	2.9%	67.6%	32.0%
5	4	4	8.58	15.4%	1.0%	181.3%	33.1%
4	4	6	5.55	14.5%	1.4%	74.2%	27.2%
7	6	8	13.59	9.2%	1.5%	76.4%	20.4%
4	6	5	6.54	17.5%	1.3%	132.6%	34.3%
7	4	9	6.44	37.6%	0.6%	34.3%	30.2%
7	7	8	4.64	25.8%	1.0%	40.0%	28.6%
8	7	7	17.12	5.0%	1.3%	22.6%	20.5%
7	6	4	5.13	5.0%	0.8%	59.4%	28.6%
8	8	5	11.88	5.8%	2.0%	62.6%	27.8%
5	5	4	9.40	11.8%	1.0%	54.2%	23.1%
7	5	6	5.83	28.0%	1.3%	130.3%	31.8%
5	4	5	4.97	24.8%	0.5%	39.2%	25.9%
4	5	5	6.42	12.9%	1.2%	52.3%	20.6%
8	7	8	5.43	22.0%	2.2%	78.9%	27.6%
5	7	5	6.39	16.2%	1.2%	99.3%	28.3%
10	8	9	0.32	53.9%	3.3%	41.7%	31.5%
8	8	7	7.59	8.2%	1.7%	89.2%	27.9%

FIGURE 50 EU Social Justice Index (weighted)

Unit: Score




Source: Own calculations.

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FIGURE 51 EU Social Justice Index (unweighted)

Unit: Score



Source: Own calculations.

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Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Responsible

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler

Authors

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Dr. Christof Schiller
Sascha Matthias Heller
Nina Siemer

Statistical research and calculations

Dr. Margit Kraus, Calculus Consult

Copyediting

Dr. Barbara Serfozo (Berlin)

Graphic Design

Markus Diekmann, Bielefeld

Photography Credits

iStockphoto / George Clerk

Printing

Matthiesen Druck, Bielefeld



Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Program Shaping Sustainable Economies
Phone +49 5241 81-81240
daniel.schraad-tischler@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christof Schiller
Program Shaping Sustainable Economies
Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de